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The  German  position on agriculture  in the Uruguay  Round  of the  GATT 
negotiations has been conditioned by over  one  hundred years  of agricultural 
protectionism,  a  politically potent  farm  lobby  enhanced by coalition politics, 
and Germany's  role  in development  of the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  of 
the  EC.  German  influence  in the  shaping of the  Common  Agricultural Policy has 
been effective in;  1)  creation of an agrimonetary system that results  in high 
German  farm prices,  2)  opposing  any substantial price cuts  to  farmers,  3) 
introduction of the milk quota,  and 4)  es.tablishment of an  EC  set-aside 
program.  German  agriculturalists are very reluctant to  rely on markets  to 
determine  farm prices  and are strongly opposed  to  any  agreement  that would 
allow world supply and  demand  conditions affect domestic  farm prices. 
However,  they are  aware  of the  constant· trade friction the  CAP  has  created for 
its trading partners  and are prepared to make  some  policy changes.  German 
industrialists have  become  aware  of the high opportunity cost of German 
agricultural· policy and  the  CAP  and  could  influence  the  German  government  to 
compromise  on agriculture  in the  GATT  negotiations. 
The  German  agricultural position is supportive of an aggregate measure  of 
support  (AMS)  approach  in the agricultural negotiations.  Germans  would prefer 
an  AMS  that would  allow the  EC  sufficient flexibility to  reconcile  the 
disparate  interests of  EC  member  states in the  CAP,  and  Germans  would be 
particularly interested in gaining credit for  supply controls  and their social 
security program for  farmers.  The  Germans  might  also be  receptive  to binding 
the  degree  of self-sufficiency in the  CAP  because  of the precedents  in the 
GATT  and that  implied by  the maximum  guaranteed quantities  (MGQ)  program  in 
the  CAP.  A method could also be  devised that would phase  in world price 
effects  on  EC  markets  at a  level and rate that would be politically acceptable 
to  Germany.  Tarrification is not acceptable  to  German  agriculturalists 
because it either does  nothing or it completely undermines  the  instruments of 
the  CAP. 
A principal goal  of German  agricultural policymakers  in the  GATT  is to  keep 
CAP  mechanisms  intact.  While  German  farmers  originally considered the  CAP  a 
national catastrophe because it lowered prices  and protection,  they would not 
now  abandon  the  CAP.  Another  German  goal  in the  GATT  is to  close  the 
loopholes  in the  CAP  which means  "rebalancing"  access  to  EC  markets  of 
nongrain  feeds.  Some  form  of  "rebalancing"  could be  accomplished with little 
negative  economic  effect,  but it would have  a  disproportionately positive 
psychological  and political impact  on  German  farmers. 
Recent  events  such as  German  unification and  the political and  economic 
reforms  in Eastern Europe  and  the  USSR  add  to  the  pressure  for  Germany  to 
successfully complete  the Uruguay  Round  of GATT  negotiations.  German  capital 
resources  are stretched to  the  maximum  in restructuring east German  industry 
and agriculture,  and  in providing financial  aid to  Eastern  Europe  and  the 
USSR.  Germany  needs  access  to  export markets  to  finance  the  continuing needs 
of  these  regions.  For  non-EC  agricultural-exporting countries,  the  most 
effective strategy when  negotiating with Germany  in the  Uruguay  Round  is to 
insure  that the  German  government  is convinced that protecting farmers  from 
external pressure  cannot be  successful without  serious negative  consequences 
for  Germany's  non-agricultural  economic  sectors. 
iv Preface 
This  paper analyzes  the historical development  of German  agriculture  and 
agricultural policy with  the  purpose of providing a  deeper understanding of 
the  German  position in international negotiations  on agricultural trade.  The 
paper has  its origins  in a  1989  study drafted by Stefan Tangermann under  a 
cooperative  research agreement with  the  Economic  Research Service  (ERS)  of the 
U.S.  Department  of Agriculture.  The  agreement was  administered through  the 
National  Center for  Food  and Agricultural Policy of the  Resources  for  the 
Future  in cooperation with  the  International Agricultural Trade Research 
Consortium.  The  study was  part of a  larger program of studies  commissioned by 
the  ERS  in relation to  the  agricultural negotiations  of the Uruguay Round  of 
the General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade. 
The  original study by Tangermann consisted of 5  chapters which were  revised 
and edited by David Kelch.  These  first chapters of the  current study describe 
the situation as it appeared  in 1989  and were  not updated in order to retain 
the  character of an analysis before  the negotiations  took place during  1990 
and during  the  December  1990  GATT  Ministerial meeting in Brussels. 
One  important event which had  to be  considered before publication in 1991 
which  could potentially change  German  attitudes  toward  the agricultural 
negotiations was  German  unification.  David Kelch  therefore added chapter  6  in 
order  to  incorporate  some  of the agricultural  implications  of this unexpected 
development. 
The  views  expressed are  those of the  authors  and not necessarily those  of 
their employing  institutions. 
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Dr.  David Kelch 
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v Chapter 1.  The  Historical Background of Agricultural and  Food  Policies  in 
Germany 
Like  in all European countries,  German  agriculture experienced overwhelming 
progress  and revolutionary change  during the nineteenth century.  In the 
history of mankind,  agriculture had been the major constraint of development. 
The  sluggish growth of agricultural production had determined  the  growth of 
population and  economic  activity.  Recurring production shortfalls had caused 
mass  starvation,  and secular agricultural crises had been synonymous  with 
long-run depressions  in the overall economy  (Abel,  1966).  A majority of the 
labor force had been engaged in agriculture,  and many  of those who  could not 
be  fed at home  had  to  go  overseas  to  look for new  land. 
From  the Nineteenth Century until 1914 
During  the  late eighteenth and  throughout  the nineteenth century,  major social 
changes  and  technological breakthroughs provided the basis for what  could be 
called an agrarian revolution in Germany.  Unprecedented growth rates of 
agricultural output loosened the  trammels  of economic  development  and provided 
the basis for  an industrial revolution. 
Three  main phases  of this agrarian revolution can be  distinguished in Germany 
(Abel,  1967).  First,  in the late eighteenth century mentalities  changed.  A 
great interest in agricultural questions  aroused the  general public.  An 
increasing number  of associations dealing with  the  advancement of farming were 
established.  The  most  important result of this  development  was  a  considerable 
upswing  in agricultural science.  Second,  around  the  turn of the  century,  the 
social and legal  framework of farming  underwent  a  major  change.  The 
liberation of peasants  (Bauernbefreiung)  brought an end  to bondage, 
established new  relations between peasants  and feudal  landowners,  and 
liberalized the  use  of land.  The  emerging pattern of land ownership  became  a 
prominent factor of a  growing intensity of land use  which was  further  enhanced 
when,  in the third phase of this development,  around  the mid-nineteenth 
century,  increasingly available scientific and  technological knowledge  spread 
among  farmers.  Farming  techniques were  revolutionized and both crop  and 
livestock yields  increased at high rates  (Haushofer,  1963). 
Liberation of the  Peasants 
The  liberation of peasants was  probably  the most  important  long-run structural 
development  of German  agriculture during this period.  While  in the United 
Kingdom  the  enclosure movement  created large  farm units  and  led to  a  class 
system of large  landlords,  smaller  tenant  farmers,  and  a  mobile  landless 
workforce,  in Germany  the  foundations  for  a  system dominated by  a  vast number 
of small  family  farms  were  laid.  However,  the liberation of peasants  in the 
early  ninet~enth century,  which varied in importance  and  developed differently 
in the  individual German  States,  did not directly create  a  homogeneous  system 
of small-scale owner-occupied  farms.  The  compensating payments  which  the 
peasants  had  to  make  to  the  landlords  in many  cases had been fixed at such  a 
high level  that the liberation of peasants  turned out  to be  a  liberation of 
the  land from  the peasants. 
1 Nevertheless,  the  legal preconditions  for  a  more  even distribution of land had 
been created.  Together with  a  far-reaching policy of land-settlement  (which 
relates back  to  the  early eighteenth century,  was  intensified in the  late 
nineteenth century,  and continued in the post-World War  I  period),  the current 
structure of German  agriculture characterized by  small  family  farms  was 
established.  Even  so,  a  considerable number  of very large estates survived 
until World War  II.  These  estates were  concentrated in the  eastern part of 
the Reich  and  remained mainly in the hands  of feudal  landowners. 
The  Effects  of Inheritance  Laws 
Another  factor  explaining the  development  towards  small  farm units  in some 
parts of Germany  was  the  customary  laws  of inheritance  in agriculture  (Abel, 
1958).  In the northern and eastern regions  of Germany,  like in most parts of 
northern Europe,  it was  usual  to pass  the undivided  farm  over  to  one  of the 
heirs,  generally the oldest son.  This  custom survived Napoleon's  Civil Code 
and the  Pruss  ian edict of 1811  which  tried to establish equal rights for all 
of the heirs of a  farmer.  However,  in most  of the western and southern parts 
of Germany,  which  then comprised about one-fifth of the Reich but a 
considerably greater share of what later was  to become  the  Federal Republic  of 
Germany  (FRG) ,  farms  and even individual plots used to be partitioned among 
heirs and resulted in a  fragmentation of farms  and plots. 
These  diverse  inheritance  customs  were  abruptly abolished when,  in 1933,  the 
Nazis  issued their Reichserbhofgesetz which established indivisible  farms 
(Reichserbhofe).  After World War  II more  flexible  laws  of inheritance for 
agriculture  emerged,  which again gave  a  preference  to  transferring the  farm 
undivided. 
Trade  Policy Changes 
Events  which probably had the  most  important  and lasting effects on the 
long-run development of German  agriculture were  strategic trade policy 
decisions.  Differing reactions of European countries  to  growing international 
competition in agricultural  trade  in the  last quarter of the nineteenth 
century go  far  in explaining the diversity of agricultural structures  and 
philosophies  towards  agricultural and  food policy in today's member  countries 
of  the  European Community  (Tracy,  1982). 
Germany  experienced waves  of decreasing and  increasing degrees  of 
protectionism during the nineteenth century  (Eulenberg,  1929).· The  Zollverein 
(German  customs  union),  strongly influenced by  the  trade policy of Prussia, 
started with relatively liberal policies,  but became  increasingly 
protectionist during  the  1840's.  The  phase  from  the  middle  of the century 
until 1870,  however,  was  characterized by  a  consistent move  toward free  trade. 
Germany,  which  was  an agricultural exporter at the  time,  abandoned  grain 
tariffs by  1865  and  livestock tariffs by  1870  (Ritter,  1927).  Other  European 
countries behaved similarly,  so  that the  end  of third quarter of  the 
nineteenth century can rightly be  described as  a  period of free  trade  in 
agricultural  commodities  (Heidhues,  1978). 
2 
.. The  Rise  of Agricultural Protectionism 
Economic  conditions  in agriculture  changed  fundamentally  in the late 1870's, 
when  an industrial depression coincided with an agricultural crisis.  The 
latter was  mainly caused by  the  rise of large scale  imports  of cheap  grain 
from Russia  and  the United States as  a  consequence  of the  sharp  decline  in 
transport costs.  While  the United Kingdom  stuck to  its liberal import  regime 
and Denmark  and the Netherlands  opted for specializing in livestock production 
based on  cheap  grain,  Germany  laid the  foundations  for its lasting 
agricultural protectionism during this phase. 
It was  by no  means  clear that German  farmers  would press for protection in the 
1870's.  Large  landowners  in particular had adopted a  strong free  trade 
attitude which was  consistent with their interests as  grain exporters.  In 
fact,  during a  political campaign of the  time,  farmers  had  to be  convinced 
that they shpuld accept  import duties  (Strecker,  1958). 
The  pressure  came  mainly  from  two  sides.  German  industrialists,  who  suffered 
from  domestic  recession and foreign competition,  strove for tariffs on 
industrial goods.  They  suggested that agricultural markets  should also be 
protected.  Moreover,  Chancellor Bismarck wished  to  increase fiscal  revenues 
in order to strengthen the position of the central government  of the Reich 
vis-a-vis  the states.  Eventually,  farmers  became  convinced and voted for 
tariffs. 
This  switch  from  a  free  trade philosophy to protectionism on the  side of 
farmers  must  be  seen against the background of the  changing net trade position 
of Germany  during that phase.  While net exports of total grain from  Germany 
still amounted  to  .6 million tons  in 1850,  they were  down  to  zero between 1860 
and 1865.  From  then on,  Germany  became  a  consistent grain importer,  importing 
.9 million tons  in 1880,  2.5 million tons  in 1890,  2.9 million tons  in 1900 
and 4.6 million tons  in 1910  (Teichmann,  1955).  At  the  same  time,  import 
prices  for grain fell drastically. 
Tariffs on grain imports were  introduced in 1879  at rather low  levels but 
increased rapidly  (Ritter,  1927).  Similarly,  livestock  im~orts were  taxed at 
increasing rates  (Ritter,  1927)  and restrained by non-tariff measures 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup,  1936).  During  the 1890's,  tariffs were  somewhat  reduced 
when  Chancellor Caprivi had  to enter into new  international trade agreements 
in which he  took account of foreign interests and of the  changing situation of 
German  industry which had rapidly developed an export position. 
Farmers  were  strongly opposed to  import tariff reductions because  they had 
become  accustomed to protection and now  suffered from  tariff cuts as well as 
from  decreasing international grain prices.  To  strengthen their influence 
they  founded  the first really important pressure  group  of farmers  in Germany 
in 1893,  the  Bund  der Landwirte,  which  can be  viewed as  the historical root of 
the  farming  lobby in Germany.  The  farmers'  protest eventually led to  the 
dismissal of Caprivi  and  to  the  reestablishment of higher tariffs which, 
because  of existing trade agreements,  could not become  effective before  1906 
(Strecker,  1958). 
3 Just as  in the 1880's,  the tariff structure,  while providing protection for 
livestock farmers,  protected grains  even more.  Large  land-owners  had been 
able  to  convince  the  smaller livestock-oriented farmers  that grain,  as  the 
principal agricultural  commodity,  was  most  in need of protection.  Though  this 
is directly against  the  interests of livestock farmers,  this view has  never 
been abandoned by  the  German  farming  lobby  as  the  larger crop-oriented farmers 
have  always  played a  decisive  role  (Ackermann,  1970). 
General  economic  conditions were  relatively favorable  for agriculture  in the 
two  decades  from  the mid 1890's  to  1914.  Industrial growth  led to higher 
incomes  and  the  concomitant  increase  in population augmented  the rise in 
demand  for  food.  Also,  the  competition from  North American agriculture 
weakened which further  strengthened domestic  farm prices.  This  could have 
been a  period for  liberalizing agricultural trade,  but agriculture was 
increasingly protected in Germany  during this phase  and has  remained so  since 
(Heidhues,  1~78).  The  end of the nineteenth century can be  said to be  the 
historical origin of agricultural protectionism in Germany  (Her1emann,  1969). 
On  the  eve  of World War  I,  the  share  of agriculture,  forestry  and fishing in 
total employment  was  35  per cent,  down  from  55  per cent in the 1850's;  the 
share  in net national  income  at factor cost in 1913  prices was  23  per cent, 
down  from  45  per cent.  However,  the absolute  number  of people  employed in 
agriculture,  forestry and fishing  increased from  8.3 million around  1850  to  10 
million in 1914  (Hoffmann,  1965). 
The  Period of Crises:  1914 to  1945 
Price  support for agriculture since  1890  had not prevented Germany  from 
becoming  increasingly dependent  on  food  and  feed  imports.  Though  production 
had been growing at high rates  due  to  improvements  in production techniques 
and  to  favorable  prices,  consumption had grown at even higher rates. 
Aggregate  self-sufficiency in food  is estimated to have been around  80  per 
cent  in the  last years before World War  I.  Some  40  per cent of oilseed 
consumption,  15  to  20  per cent of meat  and  livestock products  consumption,  and 
20  per cent of grain consumption had  to be  imported  (Henning,  1978;  Teichmann, 
1955). 
Food  Shortages  in World War  I 
German  food policy had not prepared for  any  lasting cut in food  imports  due  to 
wars  or other emergencies.  This  is attributed by  some  authors  to  the fact 
that Germany  had not  exp&ri&~d.r"an)l extended,  serious  problems  with  food 
imports  during wars  in the  last hundred years  (Haushofer,  1963).  Thus  the 
effects of the blockade  in World War  I,  which  became  effective in 1914,  were 
very serious  for  German  consumers.  Crop  production fell sharply because of 
decreased fertilizer availability.  By  1918,  production of wheat  had  dropped 
by  40  percent,  potatoes by  35  percent,  and  sugar beets by  30  percent as 
compared  to  the  average  of 1909-1913  (Haushofer,  1963).  Livestock production 
was  also  markedly  reduced  in response  to  the shortfall of feed  supply. 
German  food  policy reacted by establishing price ceilings,  by  introducing  food 
ration cards,  and by establishing an all-embracing bureaucracy,  the 
4 Kriegsernahrungsamt,  which was  to administer the scarcity of food  and 
agricultural products  (Haushofer,  1963).  The  most  immediate effect of these 
measures  was  the  rapid emergence  of a  black market  (Henning,  1978). 
The  overall  outcome  of the  food crisis during World War  I  was  a  serious  famine 
that affected much  of the population.  It is reported that during  the war 
800,000  people died of starvation in Germany  (Haushofer,  1963).  A noticeable 
animosity among  the hungry urban population grew against  farmers  who  allegedly 
held back supplies. 
The  Inter-War  Period 
The  inter-war period was  characterized by  a  succession of crises alternating 
with short phases  of relative prosperity in agriculture,  caused by 
developments within the  food  economy  as well as  in the general  economy. 
Agriculture  ~ecovered slowly after World War  I.  It was  not before  the  end of 
the 1920's that agricultural production had reached its pre-war  levels  again 
(Henning,  1978).  Food rationing and price controls were  kept  in part until 
1923.  Tariffs on agricultural  imports,  which had been abolished at the 
outbreak of the war,  remained at zero  levels.  This  was  consistent with  the 
objectives of alleviating food  shortages,  enhancing industrial exports,  and 
dampening  inflation. 
High  inflation until 1923  brought  a  short period of relative prosperity for 
farmers.  Food prices rocketed,  land values  increased,  and  farm  indebtedness 
had practically disappeared.  However,  after a  currency reform,  monetary 
stability was  regained and German  food markets  again became  attractive for 
foreign exporters  and German  farmers  suffered from  strengthening international 
competition. 
When  compared to  1913  levels of per capita consumption,  1925  consumption was 
lower by 19  percent for bread and grain products,  17  percent for milk and 
dairy products,  and  10  percent for potatoes  and pork while  consumption had 
only  increased by  2  percent and 12  percent,  respectively,  for  sugar and beef 
(calculated from  Hoffman,  1965).  In 1924,  producer prices of crop  products  and 
meat  were  14  percent and  2  percent,  respectively,  above  those  in 1913,  while 
prices for agricultural machinery had risen by  37  per cent  (calculated from 
Hoffman,  1965).  Indebtedness  of agriculture was  again increasing at 
noticeable rates. 
Germany's  obligation not  to  establish import barriers  in agricultural trade, 
as  implied in the Treaty of Versailles,  ended in 1925.  In the vigorous  debate 
about  what  trade policy to  adopt  then,  arguments  similar to  those  raised half 
a  century ago  again surfaced.  This  time,  however,  the big landowners  were 
firmly  on  the  side of those  who  voted for protection from  the beginning 
(Tracy,  1982).  Finally,  a  tariff slightly below that applying before  the war 
was  established in 1925,  and gradually increased to  prewar  levels until 1929 
(Haushofer,  1963). 
The  phase  from  1925  to  1928  was  a  mixed period for  German  agriculture  (Dietze, 
1929).  Import tariffs and  the  system of grain import certificates,  which had 
existed before  the war,  kept prices  above  world market  levels  and  gave  some 
5 support to agriculture  (Teichmann,  1955).  On  the  other hand,  production 
levels had not yet recovered,  taxes  were  relatively high,  partly due  to 
Germany's  obligation to  pay war  reparations,  and  interest payments  on rapidly 
increasing farm  debts placed a  heavy burden on  farm  incomes. 
Government  Intervention Expands 
In 1928  the  conviction gained ground that agriculture was  in a  serious crisis. 
In an  emergency program  (Reichsnotprogramm)  the  government  directly supported 
the marketing of agricultural products  among  other direct interventions 
(Haushofer,  1963).  In early 1929  the various  farmers'  associations,  including 
the powerful  Reichslandbund,  the  successor of the  Bund  der  Landwirte,  united 
and  formed  the  "Green Front"  in order  to jointly press  for  increased 
protection and support  (Haushofer,  1963). 
One  of the  m~in suggestions,  which was  made  on  several occasions by various 
groups,  was  that the  government  should establish a  grain trading monopoly. 
This  proposal,  which related back to  a  plan suggested already by Kanitz  in 
1894,  was  rejected by  the  government.  However,  a  compulsory milling ratio for 
domestic  wheat was  introduced,  rye prices were  supported by  intervention 
buying,  and preparations for  increasing import duties were  made. 
Thus  German  agriculture was  already in difficulty before  the Wall Street 
collapse in October  1929  initiated the worldwide  economic crisis. 
Rapidly declining world market prices  and declining domestic  demand  during the 
severe  recession grossly aggravated troubles  on agricultural markets  in most 
countries  and resulted in a  global  development which Tracy describes  as  a 
second wave  of protectionism after that of the 1880's  (Tracy,  1982).  In 
Germany,  government  interference with agricultural markets  grew  quickly in 
quantitative as well as  in qualitative  terms  during this phase.  From  1929  to 
1932,  121  new  laws  and regulations  dealing with  food  and agriculture were 
issued,  of which about  60  had  to  do  with agricultural trade  (Haushofer,  1955; 
Weber,1932).  The  ease with which public control of agricultural and  food 
markets  spread in these years  and later in the Third Reich may  well reflect 
the  degree  to which public opinion and  the administration had become  used to 
interventions during World  War  I  (Haushofer,  1958). 
The  main  developments  during the critical years  from  1929  to  1932  were 
relatively prohibitive duties  on agricultural  imports,  denouncements  of 
international trade agreements,  establishment of State monopolies,  heavy 
intervention buying,  compulsory cartelization of producers,  imposition of 
production quotas,  and regulation of qualitative aspects of food processing. 
Such  instruments varied in composition and intensity for  individual 
commodities,  but on  the whole  they constituted a  major  step  towards  converting 
an agricultural and  food  economy  that had been comparatively liberal until 
1929  into  a  quasi-centrally planned sector  (Teichmann,  1955;  Weber,  1932). 
However,  these  measures  could not prevent agricultural conditions  from 
deteriorating.  Though  imports  were  effectively restrained from  1928  to  1932, 
and  import  volume  fell by  50  percent  for  grains,  61  percent for  meat  and  32 
percent for  dairy products  and  eggs  (calculated from  data  in Hoffman,  1965), 
domestic  producer prices  dropped by  30  percent for  crop  products  and by  40 
6 percent for meat  and livestock products  (calculated from  data in Hoffman, 
1965).  Farm  debt  increased rapidly so  that by  1931/32,  interest payments 
amounted  to  14 per cent of agricultural revenues  (Henning,  1978),  and  the 
number  of forced auctions  in agriculture  trebled from  1927/28  to  1931/32 
(Haushofer,  1963). 
A program specifically designed to alleviate liquidity problems  of large 
landowners  in the  eastern parts of Germany  (the Osthilfe),  assumed major 
importance  among  several emergency measures  to help heavily  indebted farmers, 
(Haushofer,  1963).  It drove  a  wedge  between farmers  and  the  general public, 
and between large  landowners  and peasants  thus  aggravating extreme political 
trends within this latter group.  This,  in addition to  the natural 
conservative and anti-republican tendencies  among  the  largest farmers,  may 
have  contributed to  the  support which  the  National Socialists ·received from 
parts of the agricultural population. 
The  National Socialists Take  Power 
After Hitler and  the National Socialists came  to  power  in early 1933,  the 
basic philosophy,  objectives,  and  instruments  of food  and agricultural policy 
changed  fundamentally.  In the Weimar  Republic,  policies  toward  food  and 
agriculture had essentially been shaped by reactive crisis management  through 
emergency measures.  In the Third Reich,  a  system was  establisned in which 
farming  formed  an integral part of the overall  ideology and policy.  Farming 
was  no  longer viewed as just an economic activity,  rather,  the  farmer  was 
assigned a  decisive  role in racial  ideology.  The  Yeomanry  as  the  Life  Source 
of the  Nordic  Race,  the title of a  book by Darre  (Darre,  1929)  who  was  to 
become  Minister of Agriculture  in 1933,  is an appropriate  expression of this 
ideology.  Blut und Boden  (Blood and Soil)  became  the popular slogan. 
The  development of a  self-sufficient food  economy  became  the  overriding 
concrete goal of the National Socialists.  This  autarkic policy was  consistent 
with  the nationalistic attitude of National  Socialism.  In practical  terms  it 
constituted an essential step in preparing for war. 
The  establishment of a  fully controllable system of producing,  trading, 
processing,  and distributing food  formed  the major basis of Nazi  food  and 
agricultural policy.  This  can be  seen in the  massive  state  interventions 
during  the preceding years.  However,  this development,  which neatly fitted in 
with  the basic philosophy and objectives of the  general policy,  went  far 
beyond  the  interventionism of the Weimar  Republic.  All activities  in the  food 
economy  and the people,  enterprises,  and organizations  involved were  made  part 
of one  comprehensive  institution,  the Reichsnahrstand  (State  Food 
Corporation).  This  all-embracing institution,  which had an administrative as 
well  as  a  political character,  was  hierarchically organized with  a  strong 
top-down chain of responsibility  (Reischle  and Saure,  1940).  One  of its main 
functions  was  to  organize  and control  the marketing of agricultural products 
and  food at all levels  through specialized agencies  (Hanau  and Plate,  1975). 
The  guiding principle  in agricultural marketing policy was  to  guarantee 
farmers  fixed prices.  The  average  producer price level was  incrementally 
raised by one-third from  1932/33  to  1936.  Later,  as  part of the  fight against 
7 inflation,  the price level was  kept nearly constant until 1939 but rose  again 
during  the war.  Where  further production incentives  seemed necessary,  and in 
order  to keep  consumer prices  down,  subsidies were  introduced.  If production 
did not  grow  at desired rates,  input subsidies  of various  forms  were  granted. 
In addition to  these  economic  incentives,  moral  suasion was  used to  induce 
farmers  to produce  more  in what became  called Erzeugungsschlacht  (Battle of 
Production).  Domestic  market stability was  achieved mainly by selectively 
controlling imports  which  showed up  in grossly fluctuating  import levels, 
particularly in grains. 
The  results of this policy were  not overwhelming  as  far as  autarky in food was 
concerned.  As  compared to  1932,  degrees  of self-sufficiency in 1938  had 
remained  roughly constant for  grains,  potatoes,  sugar,  vegetables,  pork and 
poultry meat,  milk and dairy products,  but had decreased for beef meat  and 
only increased for  eggs,  animal  fat,  and oilseeds  (from data in Grupe,  1957). 
Neverthelessd  by  the  outbreak of World War  II,  German  agriculture had 
recovered  from  the production shortfalls during and after World War  I  as  well 
as  from  the  economic  difficulties of the  late twenties  and early thirties. 
Moreover,  the whole  food  economy  was  organized in a  way  which  made  it easier 
for Hitler to pursue his war  plans.  In addition,  contrary to  the situation 
before World War  I,  the Nazis  had built up  large stocks of grain and fat. 
World War  II Controls  on Agriculture 
During World War  II,  the  system of controlling the  food  economy  was  not 
changed  in principle.  Quantity controls were  tightened and where  they did not 
exist,  they were  introduced.  Mandatory delivery was  reinforced,  consumption 
was  rationed,  and  the  fixed price  system was  continued  (Hanau  and Plate, 
1975).  Though  production dropped during  the  war  due  to  shortages  in supply of 
fertilizers  and  imported feed  and because  agricultural labor and horses  were 
called up  for  service  in the war,  the  decline  in production was  far  less 
pronounced  than in World War  I.  Moreover,  occupied territories were  forced  to 
deliver  food  to  Germany.  Though  food  consumption had  to be  reduced later in 
the war,  the population was  adequately supplied until 1944.  Serious hunger 
did not begin until the  last phase  of the  war  (Henning,  1978). 
The  Post World War  II Period 
Extreme  shortage of food  supplies was  the  most  prominent  aspect of the  German 
food  economy  in the years  immediately  following World War  II.  Food  rations, 
which had been maintained at a  level  around  2,000 calories per head per  day 
until early 1944,  dropped  to  1,400 or  1,300 calories between 1946  and  1948  in 
the Western  Zones  (Magura,  1970;  Henning,  1978).  In part this was  due  to  two 
poor harvests  in 1946  and  1947,  but it also reflected the  fundamental  change 
in the basic structure of the  German  food  economy  resulting from  the  division 
of Germany. 
The  center of gravity in agricultural production had been in eastern Germany 
where  more  favorable  conditions  regarding soil fertility and  topology 
prevailed and where  population density was  lower.  In  terms  of 
1935-1938  conditions,  population per  100  hectares  of agricultural area 
averaged  236  in the  whole  of the  Reich,  while  the  corresponding figure  for 
8 the area which was  later to become  the  FRG  averaged  282  (Statistisches 
Handbuch  Landwirtschaft und Ernahrung,  1956).  This  reduction of the  land/man 
ratio was  grossly aggravated by  the  large  inflow of refugees  from  the  East. 
In 1948/49,  population per 100 hectares of agricultural area in the  FRG  had 
already reached 352  (Statistisches Handbuch  Landwirtschaft und  Ernahrung, 
1956). 
In addition,  because of the  uneven distribution of farm  sizes between the 
eastern and western regions,  the  average  size of holdings  in the  FRG  was 
noticeably smaller.  In 1937,  7.5 percent of total acreage  in the Reich had 
been  farmed  in holdings  of 50  to  100 hectares,  and 16.9 percent in holdings 
above  100 hectares,  while  the  corresponding figures  were  6.3  and 4.8 percent, 
respectively,  in the area of the newly  formed  FRG  (Henning,  1978). 
Within the  Reich  there had traditionally been massive  trade  flows, 
particularly. in grains,  from  the eastern to  the western regions.  The  rigid 
partition of Germany  in four  zones brought  these  flows  to  an  end and  thus 
aggravated food  shortages  in the western zones.  Lack of foreign exchange 
hindered imports,  and the rapidly declining purchasing power  of money  induced 
farmers  to withhold sales  to  the cities.  The  occupying powers  helped to ease 
the situation by providing means  to finance  imports  of food  and agricultural 
inputs but they still were  forced  to closely ration food  (Magura,  1970). 
Since  the  German  population had experienced two  periods of massive  food 
shortages within 30  years,  it is understandable  that the  new  government  of the 
FRG  in 1949  saw  the  expansion of food production as  one  of its major duties. 
Scarce  foreign exchange  and rocketing prices  on world markets  for agricultural 
products  during  the  Korean War  reinforced the  importance  of this objective. 
On  the other hand it was  necessary to protect consumers  against high food 
prices.  These  twin objectives were  pursued by  a  combination of measures  to 
help  farmers  increase their production,  materially supported by  funds  from 
Marshall Aid  (European Recovery  Program),  and measures  to  control prices  and 
subsidize  food  and feed  imports.  In order to  implement  the latter,  an 
elaborate administration was  available which finally,  in 1950  and 1951,  was 
consolidated in the  system of Einfuhr- und Vorratsstellen  (Import  and Storage 
Boards)  which could be  used  to  fully control foreign  trade  and  domestic 
markets  for agricultural products. 
The  basic question concerning  the  degree  to which agriculture  and  food 
production and trade could be  subjected to  the  free  forces  of the market was 
intensely discussed from  the beginning  in the  FRG.  The  AusschuB  fur 
landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung  (Committee  for  the  Organization of 
Agricultural Markets),  a  predecessor of the Scientific Advisory  Council  of the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture,  produced a  report  in 1950  and split on this 
question  (Gutachten des  Ausschusses  fur  landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, 
vol.l,  1950). 
The  minority of its members  held that the  new  FRG  should exploit the benefits 
of the  international division of labor  and  that this principle should guide 
agricultural trade policy.  Interference with markets,  it was  argued,  was 
advisable  only  in cases of temporary disturbances.  The  majority of the 
9 Committee,  however,  referred to  the  experiences of the  early thirties and 
suggested tight government control of the  food  economy.  The  majority view 
became  more  influential in actual policy.  Though  food  rationing was  soon 
abandoned,  agricultural markets  remained closely regulated. 
The  direction in which  instruments  of market policy were  used was  soon  to be 
reversed.  In 1952,  Germany's  balance  of payments  turned positive and 
agricultural  imports  could be  financed.  After  the  Korean Crisis was  over, 
world market prices  for agricultural products,  particularly grain prices, 
dropped below  the  level which prevailed in Germany.  Industrial activity and 
the  general level of income  recovered quickly,  and  consumer protection seemed 
less  important.  Instead,  farmers'  incomes  became  the  focus  of interest in 
agricultural policy.  The  third period of agricultural protectionism,  after 
those of the  1880's  and  the  1930's,  had begun. 
The  Emerging, Farm  Lobby 
In terms  of ideological developments,  the  rise of the  concept of  income  parity 
was  most noticeable.  In 1951  the Deutscher  Bauernverband  (the  German  Farmers' 
Union,  commonly  referred to as  DBV) ,  which had been founded  in 1948  and was  to 
become  the  exclusive representative of farming  interests in the  FRG,  had 
publicly claimed  income  parity as  a  goal.  The  consequent public  debate 
finally  led to  the  Landwirtschaftsgesetz  (Agricultural Act)  of 1955.  The  DBV 
had exerted a  major  influence  on the  formulation of this Act  (Puvogel,  1957). 
Though  no  fixed parity ratio is laid down  in the Act,  it requires  the 
government  to  "enable agriculture  ...  to offset the  existing natural  and 
economic  disadvantages"  in order to  "equalize  the social situation of people 
working  in agriculture with that of comparable  professions". 
To  prove  its record in this respect,  the  Federal Government  is bound by  law to 
publish annually  the  "Green Report"  (later renamed Agrarbericht)  in which it 
has  to demonstrate,  on  the basis of data collected from  a  sample  of different 
types  and sizes of farms,  to what  extent  farmers  receive  comparable 
remuneration for  their inputs  in terms  of labor,  capital,  and management.  In 
an  annual  plan  (formerly known  as  Gruner  Plan)  the  government has  to  announce 
the  measures  with which it intends  to  pursue  these  and other objectives of the 
Act.  The  Act  is still in force,  and its vague  income  parity concept,  which 
still is manifest  in the  comparative  income  calculation presented every year 
in the Agrarbericht,  continues  to play  some  political role in Germany. 
The  main  instrument for price support was  manipulation of agricultural  imports 
as  operated by  the  Import  and Storage Boards.  For many  products  this 
instrument was  sufficient since  the  FRG  still had  to  import  large volumes  of 
food  and  feed.  Degrees  of self-sufficiency in the  FRG  for wheat  were  56 
percent  on  average  from  1952/53  to  1954/55,  73  percent for  feed  grains,  84 
percent  for  sugar,  6  percent  for vegetable oil,  67  percent for  eggs,  and  82 
percent for  poultry meat,  while it was  about  self-sufficient in rye  (101 
percent),  beef  (92  percent),  pigmeat  (97  percent)  and butter  (96  percent) 
(calculated from  data in Statistiches Handbuch  Landwirtschaft  un  Ernahrung, 
1956). 
10 Import policy was  used to maintain stable and high domestic prices,  either by 
imposing  a  levy  on  imports,  which was  determined much  like the variable levies 
under  today's  Common  Agricultural Policy  (CAP)  of the  European  Community  (EC), 
or by controlling the volume  of imports.  Where  import policy did not suffice 
to  secure  the desired price level,  intervention buying  took place.  The 
average nominal  rate of protection was  somewhat  below  20  percent in the 
mid-fifties  (McCrone,  1962)  and  increased to  about  33  percent in the  early 
sixties  (Neidlinger,  1967). 
Though  farm  income  support was  mainly  achieved  through high market prices  and 
consumers  bore most of the burden,  there were  also direct government-financed 
subsidies.  Milk production,  which  tended to be  in surplus,  has been 
subsidized since  1957  on  the pretext of promoting high quality.  Egg 
production has  attracted subsidies  since  1956  which were justified by  the high 
grain costs  (OEEC,  1958).  Massive  transfers  to agriculture were  also effected 
by subsidies  on fertilizer,  which were  paid from  1955/56  to 1962/63,  and by 
exempting agriculture  from  the  tax on diesel fuel  since  1961  (Magura,  1970). 
The  greatest share of government  finance  flowing  to agriculture,  however,  was 
channeled through so-called structural policies.  An  important set of measures 
had been devised to  support settlement of farm  families  expelled from  the 
east.  But  the major effort was  oriented towards  increasing the efficiency of 
existing farms.  During the 1950's  and early 1960's this meant mainly  the 
consolidation of fragmented holdings,  the  transfer of farm buildings  from 
villages  to countryside,  and various  improvements  of the  infrastructure. 
The  general mood  of the  time  regarding agricultural policy was  rather 
conservative.  The  problem of low  incomes  in agriculture was  recognized,  but 
it was  attributed to unfavorable natural,  structural,  and  technical 
characteristics and  to adverse market conditions  for agriculture rather  than 
to  insufficient economic  adjustment  (Schmitt,  1972).  The  long  run nature of 
agricultural problems  was  seen in a  static rather  than in a  dynamic  context 
(Hanau,  1958). 
From  1950  to  1960,  the number  of farms  smaller than 0.6 hectares had been 
reduced by about  15  per cent,  and  the  labor  input on  these  farms  (measured  in 
man  year equivalents)  had decreased by nearly two-fifths  (calculated from 
Statistisches Jahrbuch uber  Ernahrung.  Landwirtschaft und  Forsten-STJELF-
various  issues).  Thus,  in reality developments  were  exceptionally dynamic. 
Nevertheless,  the  DBV  and  the  government based their philosophy on  the  idea 
that every farmer  should have  an opportunity to  remain a  farmer  rather than 
help  farmers  adjust to'-a dynamic  market.  In an  economy  which had only 
recently recovered  from  the war,  was  struggling with unemployment,  and had  to 
absorb millions of refugees  from  the  East,  this attitude was  quite natural. 
By  the  late 1950's  the basic problems  in the  overall  economy  had been largely 
settled and  the  time  was  ripe  for  a  reconsideration of the basic concepts  of 
FRG  agricultural policy.  However,  it coincided with  the  emergence  of the  CAP 
of the  EC  which  subjugated the agricultural policy of the  FRG  to  the  goals  of 
European  economic  integration.  This  phase  of European history with its major 
tensions  was  not  ideal for  freely rethinking the agricultural policy of the 
FRG. 
11 The  Emergence  of the  Common  Agricultural Policy 
There  had never been any  doubt  that the  Federal Republic  of Germany  was 
determined to be  an active partner in European  integration.  Germany's 
dreadful  recent history formed  the background for  the  FRG's  strong desire to 
become  a  fully integrated member  of the Western world.  In all negotiations 
which had  taken place within various  institutional frameworks  during  the 
1950's,  the  FRG  had made  it clear that it was  prepared to  make  major 
contributions  to  foster  integration in Europe,  and it was  without any 
hesitation that the  FRG  became  a  member,  first of the  sectoral,  and later of 
the full European Economic  Community. 
There  were  agricultural interests in Germany  which were  less  than enthusiastic 
about  the prospects  of integrating Europe's  agriculture.  After several 
attempts  during  the 1950's  to establish a  sectoral union for  agriculture in 
Europe,  it w~s clear that the agricultural exporters  among  the prospective 
member  countries,  above  all France,  would never accept  a  European  Community 
excluding agriculture.  Thus  Germany  was  never seriously in opposition to 
making  the agricultural sector an integral part of the  Community  in the Treaty 
of Rome. 
The  Treaty of Rome  still left considerable  scope  for  the actual method  and 
intensity of integrating agriculture.  However,  in spite of the fact that 
several analyses  of the problems  of harmonizing agricultural markets  in Europe 
were  available,  it seems  that the difficulties which  FRG  agriculture had  to 
face  in the  Community  had not been fully recognized  from  the outset.  This  may 
have  added  to  the  vehemence  with which  the  issue of agricultural policy 
harmonization was  debated in the  FRG  during  the early 1960's. 
After the  Council of Ministers had taken the basic decision that the  Community 
was  to opt for  a  full harmonization of markets  with  common  protection 
vis-a-vis third countries  and  free  internal trade,  it was  obvious  that 
agricultural support prices,  which differed widely among  member  countries,  had 
to be harmonized at one  common  level.  FRG  prices were  considerably above  the 
average  of the  Community,  and  for  many  products  the  FRG  had  the highest prices 
of all member  countries.  Prices of grain,  sugar,  and milk were  particularly 
high  in the  FRG.  Pork,  poultry and  egg prices  tended  to reflect the high 
level of feed grain prices,  although beef was  protected at a  somewhat  lower 
level  (Plate,  Woermann,  and  Grupe,  1962). 
Because  of the  central  importance  of grain in the production and use  of 
agricultural products,  it was  logical that grain was  the first commodity  for 
which  the  common  price level had  to be  negotiated among  member  country 
governments.  At  this stage it became  fully clear what  kind of pressures  FRG 
agriculture had  to  fear.  The  process  of deciding on  the  common  grain price 
level  turned  into  a  heated fight  in which  the  DBV  used all its power  and used 
every method at its disposal  to  safeguard what it supposed  to  be  the  interests 
of its members  (Ackermann,  1970).  This  led to  the  most  intense clash in 
German  agricultural policy in the post World  War  II period.  The  importance  of 
the  issue  and  the vigor with which it was  debated were  probably not less  than 
that of  the  dispute  about  the  introduction of tariffs in the  last decades  of 
the  nineteenth century  (Tangermann,  1979). 
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I . The  clash culminated when  a  panel of professors,  who  had been commissioned  to 
investigate  the  consequences  of agricultural price harmonization and 
especially the effects of a  reduction in FRG  grain prices,  submitted their 
report  (Hanau,  1971).  This  report  (Professorengutachten)  was  a  highly 
objective and purely positive analysis which projected,  for  two  alternative 
assumptions  on future  farm  product prices  (maintenance  of high  FRG  prices,  and 
reduction  to  some  lower  Community  price level),  the possible future 
developments  of total  income  of  FRG  agriculture  and  the  resulting need for 
outmigration of farmers  if their average  income  was  to  grow  in parallel with 
non-farm  incomes.  The  DBV,  however,  thought differently about  the  report when 
it was  published.  Instead of using it as  a  basis  for  arguing in favor  of 
adjustment  support for  the  farming  industry,  the  farmers'  union treated the 
report as  if it had been a  proposal  to  cut  farm  product prices  in the  FRG. 
Militant demonstrations  were  organized and  the  authors  of the  report were 
personally reviled. 
The  FRG  government originally tried to  persuade  the other member  countries  to 
raise their prices  to  the  German  level.  Chancellor Adenauer had even promised 
the  FRG  farmers  to not  lower  German  grain prices.  Erhard,  who  replaced 
Adenauer  in October  1963,  was  somewhat  more  cautious  in this respect,  but his 
government still fought hard for high support price levels  in Brussels.  It 
finally became  obvious  that this  line could not be  held.  The  FRG  government, 
under  strong pressure  from  Brussels,  won  ~he assent of the  DBV  to  a  reduction 
of support prices but at high financial costs.  In a  special Act 
(EWG-Anpassungsgesetz),  the  government  committed itself to  spending,  during 
four  adjustment years,  1.03 billion DM  annually  on various  measures  above 
normal  spending.  This  was  what  the president of the  DBV  had  demanded  as 
general  support. 
In addition,  German  farmers  were  granted,  during  the  adjustment period,  full 
financial  compensation for  the  loss  in revenue  due  to  the  cut in grain prices. 
In part this was  paid,  like compensation payments  for Italy and  Luxembourg, 
out of the  Community  budget.  However,  due  to  the  budgetary problems  of the 
EC,  in part caused by  the  1966/67  recession,  less was  paid than originally had 
been promised.  This  failure  is  thoroughly  remembered  in German  agriculture 
and  is still being used as  an argument  against direct  income  payments  in 
political debates  (Hanau,  1971). 
The  FRG  government  finally accepted a  decision on  common  grain prices which 
meant  a  nominal  reduction of German  prices by  10  to  15  percent.  The 
subsequent  reduction in livestock and product prices,  the  common  level of 
which was  decided at a  later stage,  was  less pronounced.  In spite of massive 
financial  compensation,  this cut  in nominal  prices,  and  the  corresponding 
increase  in competition from  the  other member  countries,  was  felt  to  cause 
considerable hardship  for  FRG  farmers.  The  establishment of the  CAP  was  thus 
regarded by  many  FRG  farmers,  as  well  as  by  many  officials in  the  FRG 
agricultural ministry,  as  a  national catastrophe. 
German  Agricultural Policies  in a  Community  Framework 
After  the  common  market  regimes  had been established,  the  FRGhad  to  abandon 
its market policies such  as  quantitative  import  controls  and producer 
13 subsidies  on milk.  The  basic  approach  to agricultural price policy, however, 
and many  of the  instruments  used in the  common  market  regimes  were  rather 
close  to  the  FRG's  policy.  Yet,  the  level of protection afforded to 
agriculture was  lower under  the  CAP  than what  FRG  farmers  were  used to,  and 
they complained bitterly. 
It is not surprising that after the  establishment of the  CAP,  the strategy of 
the  FRG  Ministers  of Agriculture was  to use all possible means  to provide 
continued support  to  their farming  constituency.  Their aims  were,  first,  to 
keep  the  system of market  regimes  intact and to  increase  common  support prices 
(or at least support prices prevailing in the  FRG),  as  far as politically 
feasible;  and,  second,  to retain as  much  national  freedom  as  possible  in 
non-price policies. 
In their efforts to keep  price support in the  Community  at a  high level,  FRG 
agricultural, policymakers were  rather successful,  and their influence  on  the 
Community's  agricultural market  and price policies has  been significant.  The 
FRG  even managed  to persuade  the  Community  that it needed  a  special exchange 
rate regime  in agriculture,  and  this  regime  has  been used by  the  FRG's 
Ministers of Agriculture  to keep  the  level of price support higher  than in 
other  EC  member  states.  These  developments will be  discussed regarding  FRG 
influence  on agricultural policymaking  in the  Community  in chapter 2. 
After static ideas had prevailed in the  1950's,  the view gained ground in the 
1960's  that agriculture was  in a  process  of secular adjustment  and that it was 
necessary both to encourage  outmigration from  agriculture  and  to avoid social 
hardship  in the  adjustment process.  These  views  were  appropriately expressed 
in two  influential government  reports  of 1968,  published by  the Ministry of 
Agriculture  (Arbeitsprogramm  fur  die Agrarpolitik der  Bundesregierung,  1968) 
and  the Ministry of Economic  Affairs  (Der  Bundesminister  fur Wirtschaft, 
1968).  Even  the  DBV  changed its earlier position and  recognized the  need for 
continuing structural change  (Deutscher  Bauernverband,  Oct.  6,  1968). 
Structural adjustment,  however,  was  seen as  a  continuous  process.  In this 
regard  the  FRG  approach was  fundamentally  different from  the Mansholt 
proposals  for  CAP  reform which were  made  at about  the  same  time  and called for 
massive  structural reform suggesting a  concentration of aids  on  farm units of 
a  minimum  size which was  totally out of the  range  of prevailing farm  sizes  in 
the  FRG.  Consequently,  the Mansholt proposals  were  strongly opposed in the 
FRG,  and  they are still referred to with hostility as  a  prime  example  of a 
brutal policy designed by  technocrats. 
Agricultural policy in the  FRG,  nevertheless,  did  take  a  small  step  in the 
direction of the Mansholt proposals.  In 1971,  a  new  program of investment 
aids  for  individual  farms  (Einzelbetriebliches  Forderungsprogramm)  became 
effective which  restricted investment aids  to  farmers  who  could demonstrate 
that they were  able  to  earn  incomes  comparable  to  non-farm  income  levels.  In 
a  supplementary program  for non-viable  farms  (Soziales  Erganzungsprogramm), 
special measures  to help  outmigrating farmers  and aids  for  those  farmers  who 
had  to bridge  the  time until retirement were  offered.  European  Community 
regulations  for  its 1972  structural policy were  very  close  to  these  programs. 
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.. This  swing  towards  a  growth-oriented policy of selective aids  for viable  farms 
was  later reversed.  Decreasing  growth rates  in the  overall economy  and 
deteriorating labor markets  made  many  policymakers  feel  that outmigration from 
agriculture should no  longer be  fostered.  In addition,  it proved politically 
difficult to be  thoroughly selective and exclude major  segments  of agriculture 
from  a  given set of public aids.  Thus,  while  the selective program in 
principle remained in existence,  it was  complemented by an array of measures 
which  in practice entitled any  farmer  to  some  form  of  investment aid. 
Structural policy in the  FRG,  therefore,  effectively reverted to 
undifferentiated investment support on  a  rather large scale. 
It soon became  increasingly difficult to  continue  a  policy of open  investment 
aids.  As  the  Community  began  to  produce  more  and more  surpluses,  its programs 
for  investment  subsidies were  curtailed and constraints were  imposed  on  the 
extent to which member  countries could support  farm  investments.  Moreover,  it 
was  politica;ly difficult to explain why  investment subsidies  should be 
continued at full scale,  while at the  same  time  measures  like quotas  for milk 
production had  to be  adopted in order to  reduce  market  imbalance. 
Consequently,  investment subsidies were  greatly reduced. 
The  agricultural policy of the  FRG  finally completed a  full circle back to 
conserving existing structures  in the  farming  industry.  In 1988,  a  bill for 
supporting the  family  farm  (Gesetz  zu  Forderung der bauerlichen 
Landwirtschaft)  was  adopted,  which  excludes  larger farms  from  certain 
benefits.  The  philosophy behind this bill reflects  the static view on 
agricultural structures which prevailed in the  1950's.  In today's 
agricultural policy debate,  any policy which would foster structural change  in 
agriculture is reviled as  a  policy of Wachsen  oder Weichen  (grow or leave), 
and  FRG  agricultural policymakers  are again heard to state that one  of their 
objectives  is to  keep  as  many  farmers  on  the  land as  possible. 
Social policy for  agriculture  in the  FRG  continually gained in importance  from 
the 1960's.  Government  contributions  to  the  social security system in 
agriculture have  exhibited the highest  growth  rates of all single expenditure 
items  in agriculture and in 1988  accounted for  57  percent of the  total budget 
of the  Federal Ministry of Agriculture.  The  social security system for 
agriculture,  i.e.  the old age  pension scheme  and health and accident 
insurance,  has  been established in isolation from  the  rest of the population 
in the  FRG  (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim  BML,  1979).  Its most  prominent 
feature  is  the  fact  that financial  contributions  of farmers  are  lower by far 
relative  to  expected benefits  than  those  in other economic  sectors. 
A considerable  expansion of the  array of measures  covered by  the  system,  high 
growth rates of the benefits,  and  increasing commitments  of the  government  to 
make  financial contributions,  have  rendered social policy  into  a  means  of 
effecting massive  income  transfers  to  agriculture.  On  occasion,  social policy 
has been deliberately used as  a  device  for  granting  farmers  compensatory 
payments.  Moreover,  government  contributions  to  the  social security system 
for  farmers  are  more  recently understood as  a  form  of decoupled payments  to 
farmers. 
15 Economic  Factors  Influencing Agricultural Policy in the  FRG 
From  the historical record it is obvious  that agricultural policy in Germany 
has  tended to be  rather conservative  and  to strive for  a  comparatively high 
level of protection for  the  farming  industry.  This  may  seem  to have  been 
inconsistent with the  general  economic  characteristics of the  FRG  for  there 
are  some  economic  reasons  why  Germany  should have  a  preference  for  low  farm 
prices  and liberal trade  in agriculture. 
The  general  approach  to  economic  policy in the  FRG  was  firmly  entrenched in 
the liberal philosophy of the  free  market  economy.  In comparison with other 
western countries,  government  interference with markets  in the  FRG  was  fairly 
limited,  and  trade policy was  liberal in principle.  In overall economic 
terms,  the  FRG  fared extremely well with this  economic  system,  and  there are 
few politicians  in Germany  who  would  deny  that the  "W'irtschaftswunder" 
(economic  mi~acle) of rapid growth  in the  post-war  FRG  was  to  a  large extent a 
result of this liberal economic  policy.  In international fora,  above  all in 
GATT,  the  FRG  had regularly been among  those countries which  in general 
advocated a  global  liberalization of trade  and limitation of state 
intervention in markets.  FRG  agricultural policy did not fit into this 
picture. 
The  FRG's  agricultural trade balance  should have  meant  that it prefer  low 
support prices because west  Germany  has  always  been and  remains  a  large 
agricultural importer.  Even after the massive  increase  in agricultural 
production over  the last twenty years  the  overall degree  of self-sufficiency 
in food  and  feed was  still only  94  percent in 1986/87,  and without production 
from  imported feedstuffs it was  only  80  percent  (STJELF,  1988).  During  the 
early post-war years,  import  dependence  was  a  valid argument  for  expanding 
domestic  production.  However,  when  the  FRG  became  a  member  of the 
increasingly self-sufficient Community,  there  was  no  longer  a  real danger of 
being cut off from agricultural  imports.  Consequently,  security of supplies 
was  not  really a  concern  (Sohn,  1984),  and  even  among  politicians it was 
rarely used as  an  argument  for price support  in the  FRG. 
In this situation a  low  degree  of self-sufficiency should have  induced  the  FRG 
to  opt for  low  levels of price support since  the  consumer benefit from  low 
food prices had more  economic  weight  than producer benefits  from high prices. 
Equally,  an  importing  EC  member  country which  opts  for  high price support 
incurs  a  national  economic  loss.  This  loss  comes  on  top  of the  "normal" 
welfare  loss  due  to protection. 
It has  been shown  that substantial economic  transfers  from  the  FRG  to  the  rest 
of the  Community  were  effected by  the  CAP  and  that these  transfers  increased 
whenever  the  support price level was  raised  (Koester,  1977).  Overall,  the  FRG 
suffered an  economic  loss  from  high  CAP  prices  and it only gained financially 
from  the milk market  regime.  If the  central objective of the  FRG  agricultural 
policy was  to maximize  national  economic  welfare,  one  would have  expected  the 
FRG's  agricultural policymakers  to  strive for  relatively low  farm  product 
prices  in the  Community. 
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.. However,  the  FRG's  agricultural policymakers were  not really concerned about 
overall  economic welfare.  Their objective was  to  support  farm  incomes,  as  far 
as  this was  politically and  economically possible.  There  were  some  political 
reasons  for  this,  which will be  discussed in the  following section.  However, 
there were  also  some  economic  factors  which made  it plausible for  the  FRG's 
agricultural policymakers  to  favor  a  relatively high level of price support. 
Some  of these factors  exerted a  pressure for high  income  support while others 
made  high farm prices an effective or at least tolerable means  of farm  income 
support. 
The  most  obvious  factor causing  low  farm  incomes  in the  FRG  was  an unfavorable 
farm size structure.  In 1986,  the  average  size of farms  above  one hectare was 
16.8 hectares  in the  FRG,  as  compared to  the  EC-10  average  of 17.4 hectares or 
average  farm  sizes of 29.1 hectares  in France  and 69.3 hectares  in the  UK 
(calculated from  STJELF,  1988).  A small  average  farm  size results in a  low 
endowment  of the agricultural labor force with acreage.  In 1985,  the 
agricultural' area per person employed in farming {full-time equivalent),  was 
13.1 hectares  in the  FRG,  while it was  20.0 hectares  in France,  34.3 hectares 
in the  UK  and 14.2 hectares  on  average  in the  Community  of 10  (calculated from 
STJELF,  1988). 
A  low  land/man ratio tends  to depress  labor productivity as  long as  this is 
not sufficiently outweighed by  a  high intensity of production.  Relatively 
intensive livestock production in the  FRG  worked  in this direction.  The  value 
of final production of livestock products  in 1986  was  1540  ECU/ha  in Germany 
while it was  888  ECU/ha  on average  in the  EC-lO  and  only  670  ECU/ha  in France 
and  586  ECU/ha  in the  UK.  However,  livestock production is by far less 
pronounced  in Germany  than in the Netherlands where  the  corresponding figure 
was  4472  ECU/ha  (calculated from  STJELF,  1988). 
A further  factor  that depressed productivity in FRG  agriculture was  the 
fragmentation of plots  in some  parts of the  country where  the  customary  laws 
of inheritance favored  the division of land.  Thus,  various  studies  came  to 
the  conclusion that labor productivity in German  agriculture was  comparatively 
low  (Kommission der  EG,  1969;  Britton and Hill,  1975;  Behrens,  1981).  As 
income  per head is closely related to  labor productivity,  this goes  far in 
explaining relatively low  farm  incomes  in the  FRG. 
The  resulting pressure for high  income  support was  particularly strong in the 
FRG  as  non-farm  incomes  and,  hence,  income  expectations  of farmers  were 
relatively high.  Valued at market  exchange  rates  in 1986,  GOP  per capita in 
the  FRG  was  25.1 percent above  the  Community  average,  11.9 percent above 
France  and 52.0 percent above  the  UK  (calculated from  STJELF,  1988).  Thus  it 
is no  surprise that  FRG  farmers,  who  wished  to earn  incomes  comparable  to 
those  in the rest of the  economy,  should desire higher prices  than in other 
member  countries. 
High  non-farm  incomes,  on  the  other hand,  are  a  first major  factor  explaining 
why  a  high  support price level  and,  hence,  high  food  prices  seemed relatively 
tolerable.  In 1987,  a  middle  income  family  in the  FRG  spent 11.4 percent of 
its private expenditure  on food  (Agrarbericht,  1988).  Of  this expenditure, 
63.3  percent was  made  up  of the processing and  trading margin and  only  36.7 
17 percent accrued to  farmers  (STJELF,  1988).  Thus  consumers  could be  more 
generous  to  farmers  than in those countries where  higher percentages  are spent 
on  food. 
The  same  logic holds with  the  relatively small size of the agricultural sector 
in the  FRG.  In 1987,  agriculture accounted for 4.7 percent of total 
employment  and 1.5 percent of overall  GDP  (STJELF,  1988).  Such  a  small 
sector,  one  could argue,  can easily be  supported. 
Some  economic  characteristics of  FRG  agriculture made  price protection a 
relatively effective  instrument for  income  support because most of an  increase 
in revenue  of the  farming  industry is reflected in rising  incomes  of farmers' 
households.  One  factor which works  in this direction is  the predominance  of 
owner-occupied  farms  which means  that little of an  increase  in revenues  gets 
lost in the  form  of rising rents.  In 1985,  only  34.0 percent of agricultural 
area was  rented,  while  rented acreage  accounted for  51.8 percent in France, 
38.1 percent' in the UK,  and  36.0 percent in the  Community  (STJELF,  1988). 
The  small  share of hired workers  in the total agricultural labor force  in the 
FRG  worked in the  same  direction.  In 1987,  only 11.6 percent of total labor 
input in FRG  agriculture,  measured in man-year equivalents,  was  hired labor 
(STJELF,  1988).  A noticeable structural change  has  taken place since World 
War  II.  In 1950/51,  the  share of hired labor was  still at 22.9  percent 
(STJELF,  1959). 
Even if income  support accrued to  farmers'  households,  its long run effect on 
income  per head would be  limited if it would  reduce  outmigration from 
agriculture  and  thereby increase  the  number  of farm households  which have  to 
share  the  given amount  of  income  support.  Though  this certainly happened  in 
the  FRG,  for  a  long  time  this effect may  have  been comparatively small as 
labor markets  rapidly expanded until the early seventies,  and rates of 
unemployment  were  relatively low at that  time.  From  1950/51  to  1973/74,  the 
average  annual  rate of decline of labor  input  in German  agriculture,  measured 
in man-year equivalents,  was  4.8 percent  (Agrarbericht,  various  issues). 
However,  since  the middle  of the  seventies,  higher unemployment  in the  overall 
economy  has  retarded outmigration and  reduced  the  decline  in agricultural 
labor  input.  From  1975  to  1987,  the  average  annual  rate of decline  in the 
agricultural labor  force  was  only  2.8  percent  (Agrarbericht,  1989),  not much 
more  than  the natural demographic  decrease.  Parallel to  the  decline  in labor 
input,  the  number  of farms  has  more  than halved during the past three  decades, 
while  average  farm  size more  than doubled  (Agrarbericht,  various  issues). 
Whatever  the negative effects of farm  support  on resource  allocation may  have 
been,  one  cannot  say that structural change  in German  agriculture since World 
War  II has  not been rapid,  in particular up  until the mid-seventies. 
In addition to  the  above  factors,  the particular stress which was  placed on 
the milk price has  to be  commented  upon because  the  FRG  interest in high milk 
support prices has  had  a  considerable  impact  on  EC  milk price policy and  the 
introduction of dairy quotas  in 1984  (see below).  In part,  the  FRG's  desire 
for high milk prices  is explained by  the  predominance  of small  low-income 
farms  in which  dairy production plays  an  important role.  The  average  size of 
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4 ' dairy herds  in the  FRG  was  16.0 cows  in 1987,  while it was  20.0  in France, 
63.2  in the  UK,  and 18.5  in the  EC-10  (STJELF,  1988). 
Another  important factor is the  regional distribution of dairy farms.  In 
general,  FRG  agriculture exhibits  about  average natural conditions with 
respect to  climate,  soil fertility etc.  However,  there is  a  heavy 
concentration of grassland and,  hence,  dairy  farming  in some  regions  dominated 
where  cropping is rarely an alternative.  These  regions  (the Lower  Alps,  the 
coastal strips in northern FRG  and  some  highland areas),  moreover,  happen to 
be  characterized by  a  relatively low  level of non-agricultural economic 
activity,  which means  that farmers  have  only limited alternatives to earning 
their  income  from  dairy farming. 
On  the other hand,  that great emphasis  in the  FRG  was  also placed on high 
grain and sugar prices can only be  explained historically by referring to  the 
fact  that grain and sugar have been protected at relatively high levels since 
the  1880's  in Germany.  The  real root of this phenomenon  is the  dominant 
position which  the  large  landowners  have  always  occupied in the  German  farming 
lobby. 
One  specific feature  of FRG  agriculture does  not directly fit into this 
explanation of the desire for high  farm price support.  Part-time  farming 
plays  a  relatively important role  in Germany.  According  to  the definition in 
FRG  statistics,  41.7 percent of all farms  were part-time in 1988,  and even of 
the  remaining full-time  farms,  around one-sixth earned ten per cent or more  of 
their income  from  non-farm activities  (Agrarbericht,  1989).  Part-time  farmers 
on average  earn less  than 10  percent of their total  income  from  farming 
(Agrarbericht,  1989).  Thus,  there was  an  important  group  of farms  in FRG 
agriculture which was  only marginally affected by price support.  Should 
problems  of low  income  prevail  in this group,  this  could rarely be  redressed 
by  the help of agricultural price policy.  However,  this  is not an  argument 
against high price support as  long as  full-time  farms  are  the  main  focus  of 
agricultural policy which has been the  case  in west Germany  for many  years. 
The  Political Background of Agricultural Policy in Germany 
Perhaps  more  powerful  than the  economic  factors  discussed in the previous 
section are  the political factors  which are behind the west  German  attitude 
towards  high  farm price  support.  In German  history of the  last hundred years 
or so,  the political weight of farmers  has  been substantial in part because of 
their numbers,  but more  importantly because  of agriculture's particular role 
as  a  central pillar of the prevailing social system.  Moreover,  Germany  has 
suffered through  a  succession of famines  in its history,  and it was  easy  to 
argue  for policies which helped to  increase domestic  food production. 
However,  food security is no  longer  a  valid political argument  in west German 
agricultural policy. 
The  percentage of farmers  in the  general electorate in west  Germany  is now  so 
small  that it would  appear that farmers  should have  lost the political 
influence which  they were  able  to  exert a  few  decades  ago.  Moreover,  a 
protectionist agricultural policy does  not  seem  to fit German  political needs 
since west  Germany  is an  industrial exporter  interested in an  open 
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(Agrarbericht,  1989).  Thus,  there was  an  important  group  of farms  in FRG 
agriculture which was  only marginally affected by price support.  Should 
problems  of low  income  prevail in this  group,  this could rarely be  redressed 
by  the help of agricultural price policy.  However,  this is not an argument 
against high price support as  long as  full-time  farms  are  the  main  focus  of 
agricultural policy which has been the  case  in west Germany  for many  years. 
The  Political Background of Agricultural Policy in Germany 
Perhaps  more  powerful  than the  economic  factors  discussed in the previous 
section are  the political factors  which  are behind  the west German  attitude 
towards  high  farm price support.  In German  history of the  last hundred years 
or so,  the political weight of farmers  has  been substantial in part because of 
their numbers,  but more  importantly because  of agriculture's particular role 
as  a  central pillar of the prevailing social system.  Moreover,  Germany  has 
suffered through  a  succession of  famines  in its history,  and it was  easy to 
argue  for policies which helped to  increase  domestic  food production. 
However,  food security is no  longer  a  valid political argument  in west German 
agricultural policy. 
The  percentage of farmers  in the  general electorate in west  Germany  is now  so 
small  that it would  appear  that farmers  should have  lost the political 
influence which  they were  able  to exert a  few  decades  ago.  Moreover,  a 
protectionist agricultural policy does  not  seem  to fit German  political needs 
since west Germany  is an  industrial exporter  interested in an open 
19 international trading environment  and generally favors  liberal economic 
policies. 
Such  considerations  do  not come  close  to explaining the  depth  and weight  of 
agriculture  in German  politics.  In Germany,  as  in many  other countries, 
agricultural policy is not really a  policy which  truly represents  the  economic 
interests  and  the political weights  of all groups  of society in a  very 
balanced manner.  To  put it bluntly,  agricultural policy in west Germany  has 
been made  by  farmers  for  farmers. 
Ministers of Agriculture,  both at the  Federal  and at the  Bundeslander  (state) 
level,  have  usually been farmers  themselves,  and  the  same  holds  true  for 
parliamentarians dealing with  farm policy in the  committees  of agriculture of 
the  Federal  Parliament and  the State Parliaments.  Asked what he  feels  should 
be  the main goal of his policy,  a  German  minister of agriculture would 
typically answer  "to preserve  the  family  farm"  or even "to preserve  as  many 
family  farms' as possible".  The  designation of the  Federal Ministry is 
Ministry for  Food,  Agriculture  and Forestry.  But  an old joke says  that in 
reality it operates as  the ministry for  feeding agriculture. 
Relatively  few  activities of the  Federal Ministry are  geared  towards  consumer 
affairs,  and essentially none  of them  takes·up  the  economic  concerns  of 
consumers.  For  example,  out of a  total of 134  pages  of text in the  1989 
Agrarbericht,  only  two  pages  dealt with  consumer  affairs.  The  consumer 
interest is protected to  a  certain extent but only as  far as  the quality of 
food  is concerned. 
The  link between  the Ministry for  Food,  Agriculture,  and Forestry on  the  one 
hand,  and  food  consumers  on  the  other,  is further weakened because  a  number  of 
food  issues are dealt with by other ministries  (for example,  the Ministry for 
Health,  Youth  and Family Affairs).  Moreover,  when  the  Federal Ministry for 
the  Environment was  established in 1986  (after Chernobyl),  a  number  of 
responsibilities  in relation to  the  environment were  taken away  from  the 
Ministry for Agriculture.  When  it comes  to price support  and financial aids, 
the  interest of the  farming  industry is of overriding weight  in the Ministry 
for Agriculture  and in German  agricultural policy. 
How  can one  explain this apparently biased political situation? 
A number  of studies have  tried to  apply  the  concepts  of the political economy 
to  this phenomenon with  interesting results  (Haase,  1983;  Beusmann  and 
Hagedorn,  1984).  Yet,  there  is a  number  of relatively straightforward factors 
which  explain why  agricultural policy is as  it is,  and not as it should be 
from  the point of view of an economist  (Schmitt,  1984;  Tangermann,  1979). 
Some  of these  factors  are  the  following: 
o  People  outside agriculture have  relatively little information on 
agricultural policy matters  and  do  not  realize how  they are  affected by 
agricultural policy. 
o  For  farmers  it is worthwhile  to vote  for  those policies which  increase 
their welfare  rather  than the overall welfare  of society.  As  there is no 
countervailing political force,  it is natural  that agricultural 
20 policymakers  feel  that they can gain votes  from  the  farming  community 
without  losing votes  from  other sectors of the electorate.  This 
asymmetry of the political process  can also explain why  even those 
political parties which  traditionally represent the workers'  or 
consumers'  interest are  farmer-oriented when  it comes  to  agricultural 
policy. 
o  Interests of small  groups,  like  farmers,  are  much  more  easy to 
organize  into effective political pressure groups  than those of large 
groups  like consumers  and  taxpayers. 
o  The  farming  lobby has been successful in securing solidarity 
while'maintaining insularity from  consumers  and  taxpayers  for what has 
been politically "sold"  as  rather mode.st  and unobj ectionable claims  of 
the  farming  community.  The  farming  lobby has been able  to  leave  the 
general public with the  impression that farmers  are  a  disadvantaged group 
that provides  many  important services  to society  (Schmitt,  1984). 
It is revealing that a  German minister of agriculture can make  statements of 
the  following  type without opposition:  "The  present  CAP  has  brought  consumers 
great advantages,  namely stable prices which have  dampened  inflation,  and  a 
marvelous  quality of food  in overwhelming variety,  and it has  also  opened up 
excellent opportunities for producers  inside  and outside  the  EC"  (Kiechle, 
1984  as  translated by Tangermann). 
The  power  of the  farm  lobby  in a  fragile national political context and  the 
ignorance of the  general public about  the  economics  of agriculture help 
explain why  agricultural policy in general exhibits  a  significant bias  towards 
the  farmers'  interest.  These  factors  seem  to have  worked particularly 
effectively in the  FRG.  It was  often difficult to distinguish between 
statements made  by  a  representative of the  farmers'  union and  those  made  by 
politicians while  listening to  an agricultural policy debate  in the  FRG. 
Moreover,  all major political parties  in the  Federal Republic  adopted the  same 
pro-farmer attitude with regard  to agricultural policy,  thus  changes  in 
government  did not significantly affect the  FRG's  agricultural policy nor  its 
position on  the  CAP.  It was  only  in the early 1980's  that certain differences 
of opinion on agricultural policy matters  emerged  among  parties  (Tangermann, 
1982). 
The  political factors  in the  FRG  outlined above  became  even more  pronounced in 
the  framework of the  CAP.  There  are many  reasons which  could be mentioned in 
order  to  support this hypothesis  (Koester,  1977;  Schmitt,  1984;  Tangermann, 
1983),  but  the  main point  is that there was,  at least before  the  EC  budget 
crisis of the  1980's,  very little effective political control over what  farm 
ministers  decided in the Brussels'  Council  meetings.  Or,  to put it 
differently,  the  Community  framework  for  agricultural policy meant  that both 
economic  and political costs  of agricultural policy decisions  can be 
externalized.  Thus,  any opposition against  farm  policy that could arise was 
neutralized by  the  fact  that there was  no  lever which national political 
forces  could bring to bear  on  "Community"  decisions. 
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21 The  resulting behavior of the Agricultural Council  in the  EC  was  described as 
"happy  accompliceship"  by  a  high level official of the  FRG  Ministry of 
Agriculture.  The  degree  of satisfaction which  the  agricultural industry in 
the  FRG  derived  from  this political situation in Brussels has  been most 
clearly demonstrated by  the fact  that the  German  farmers'  union has  become  a 
keen defender of the  CAP.  This  does  not  imply  that German  farmers  are happy 
with everything which  goes  on in the  CAP.  However,  German  farmers  would not 
be willing to give  up  on  the  CAP. 
Trends  Immediately Precedin& Unification 
Basic attitudes  towards  agricultural policy have not significantly changed in 
west Germany  over  the past twenty years  or so.  However,  weights  shifted 
slightly,  mainly because  of the  changed economic  environment,  but also because 
of political developments  in the  FRG  and as  a  consequence of emerging problems 
in the  Community.  Among  the many  interesting trends before German  unification 
in west  Germany's  agricultural,  political,  and  economic  environment,  only five 
shall briefly be  described here:  1)  concerns  about  a  downturn in farm  incomes; 
2)  an  increasing emphasis  on distribution aspects  in agriculture;  3)  the 
emergence  of environmental  considerations;  4)  farmers'  behavior  in elections; 
and  5)  the  changing position of industrialists on agricultural policy.  German 
unification will be  addressed in the  final chapter. 
Farm  Income 
Throughout  the  1950's  and 1960's,  farm  incomes  in the  FRG  grew roughly in line 
with  incomes  in the  rest of the  FRG's  economy  (Tangermann,  1976).  According 
to  the official  income  comparison in the Agricultural Reports  (A&rarbericht) 
of the  FRG,  labor  income  in agriculture,  after accounting for  implicit 
interest on capital and land,  was  always  considerably below comparative wage 
income  in non-agricultural occupations.  There  are  a  number  of unresolved 
questions  concerning  the method of income  comparison  (von Witzke,  1975),  and 
there are also doubts  concerning an  insufficient accounting of non-farm  income 
of farm  families  (Schmitt,  1983). 
However,  in the political debate  such methodological  concerns  have  never 
played any significant role.  In any  case,  farm  income  increased at 
approximately  the  same  rate as  income  outside agriculture,  and  the  gap  between 
the agricultural and non-agricultural  income  levels  received less  and less 
political attention as  the Ministry of Agriculture  increasingly tended to 
emphasize  rates of income  change  rather than absolute  income  levels. 
The  parallel trend of farm  and non-farm  incomes  continued until the 
mid-seventies.  Since  then,  however,  farm  incomes  lagged behind and fell 
considerably in real  terms.  From  1974/75  to  1987/88,  real  farm  income  per 
head dropped by  28  percent,  while  real wage  income  per head  in 
non-agricultural occupations  rose by  13  percent  in the  same  period 
(A&rarbericht,  1989).  There  are  a  number  of factors  behind this deterioration 
of the  farm  income  situation in Germany.  Price  developments  have  contributed 
to  this  change  in income  development.  Real  producer prices fell by  1  percent 
annually between 1950/51  and  1974/75,  while  they decreased by 1.8 percent per 
year  from  1974/75  to  1987/88  (calculated from  STJELF,  various  issues). 
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•• Another major  factor was  the significant deceleration of structural change  in 
German  agriculture.  As  pointed out above,  the  decline  in agricultural labor, 
which  averaged 4.8 percent per annum  from  1950/51  to  1973/74,  decreased to  2.8 
percent per annum  for  the period 1975  to  1987.  A simple  calculation can show 
that if outmigration had  gone  on at rates which prevailed until the  early 
1970's,  income  per head in agriculture would have  roughly kept pace with 
non-agricultural  income  growth  in the  second half of the  1970's  and 1980's. 
However,  this simplification rests  on  the  rather questionable  assumption that 
this change  in outmigration would not have  affected aggregate  income  of the 
agricultural sector. 
Whatever  the full explanation for  the rather significant drop  of real farm 
incomes  since  the mid-1970's  may  be,  the  consequences  of this  development  for 
the  FRG's  agricultural policy were  obvious.  There  was  rather strong 
opposition against policy changes  which  could further aggravate  the  farm 
income  situation so  the  debate  about  income  distribution in agriculture became 
more  acute in west Germany. 
There  was  also  a  lively debate  on  the  dangers  of "factory farms"  and  the 
virtues of "family farms".  The  debate  continues  today even  though it appears 
that farm  and herd sizes which are considered to be  of the  "factory"  type  are 
of the  size which  in some  other European countries would still be  considered a 
small  family  farm.  There  is a  strong  tendency  to  introduce restrictions on 
herd sizes and  some  people would even like  to  establish restrictions  on  the 
growth of acreage per farm.  If one  looks  into  the  size distribution of herds 
in west German  agriculture,  there  is no  reason at all to be  concerned about 
the  emergence  of "factory farms"  by  any standard with  the  exception of the 
poultry sector where  all restrictions would  corne  too  late anyway 
(Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fur  Ernahrung. 
Landwirtschaft und  Forsten,  1983). 
However,  there  is much  political interest in the  issue,  and it may  well be 
that at some  stage restrictions on herd sizes  could be  imposed.  It appears 
that this is becoming  a  preferred area of agricultural policy action in a  time 
in which  expansionary price support  runs  against  the  ceiling of public 
budgets.  Restrictions  on  the  growth of farms  do  not cost public money,  but 
they convey  the  impression that agricultural policy is active and that it 
helps  the  family  farm.  When  aggregate  farm  income  does  not  grow,  pressure  to 
redistribute it towards  the  smaller  farms  will  increase. 
Actual  restrictions  on  farm  or herd sizes were  not yet  imposed in the  FRG,  but 
in 1988,  the  above-mentioned bill for  supporting the  family  farm  ("Gesetz  zur 
Forderung der bauerlichen Landwirtschaft")  was  adopted which  contained the 
first steps  in this direction  (Wissenschaftlicher Bierat beim 
Bundesministerium fur  Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft und  Forsten,  1989).  The 
immediate  reason for  adopting  this bill was  the  fact  that as  of January 1, 
1989,  the  special value  added  tax  (VAT)  benefits  for  farmers,  which had been 
introduced in 1984  in compensation for  a  revaluation of the  green Deutschmark, 
had  to be  reduced  from  five  to  three  percentage points  (see  below). 
23 In the  Brussels  Council,  the  FRG  had obtained the right to replace  the  two 
percentage points of the  VAT  benefits by  some  type  of production-neutral 
payments.  These  new  payments  were  made  on  a  per-hectare basis  (OM  90  per 
hectare),  with  a  minimum  payment  of OM  1,000  and  a  maximum  payment  of OM  8,000 
per  farm.  The  minimum  and maximum  payments  meant  that smaller farms  receive 
higher benefits  compared  to what  they received under  the  VAT  benefit scheme. 
In addition,  eligibility limits were  introduced that were  related to  the 
absolute  number  of animals  per  farm  and  the number  of animals  per hectare.  The 
limits per  farm  are:  120  dairy cows,  400  beef cattle,  1,700 pigs,  and  50,000 
layers.  The  limits per hectare are:  4.5 cattle  (over  2  years),  21  pigs,  and 
300  layers  (Agrarbericht,  1989).  Farms  which  exceeded these  limits were 
completely excluded  from  the  new  payments.  This  meant  that larger livestock 
enterprises were  disadvantaged. 
The  fact that on this occasion limits were  defined for what  is considered a 
"family farm"  may  well  turn out  to play a  role  in future  agricultural policy 
decisions,  and  in retrospect,  this new  bill may  only be  the first move  in the 
direction of putting an agricultural policy brake  on  further structural 
adjustments  in German  agriculture.  Another step in the direction of 
redistributing payments  among  farms  was  the  introduction in 1985  of additional 
subsidies  to  farmers'  contributions  to  the  social security schemes  in 
agriculture where  smaller  farms  receive higher subsidies  than larger farms. 
Environmental  Concerns 
Growing  awareness  of environmental  problems  in agriculture is not surpr1s1ng 
in times  in which protection of the  environment has  become  a  priority issue. 
Environmental  concerns  are  now  a  central political theme  in Germany,  and.the 
rise of the  Greens  as  a  political party is both a  consequence  of,  and a  reason 
for,  this development. 
Heated debates  about  the relationships between  farming  and  the  environment  are 
frequent  in Germany  and  the  arguments  take various  tacks.  On  the  one  hand 
farmers  are accused that they  damage  the  environment  by using  too  many 
chemicals  which  end up  in food  and  groundwater;  that pig and poultry 
operations  emit noxious  odors  on  a  large scale;  that cutting down  hedges 
diminishes  the variety of species  in fauna  and  flora;  that draining  land 
reduces  the  size of natural marshlands,  etc.  On  the  other hand,  farmers  claim 
that they preserve  the  countryside,  cultivate natural  resources  and keep  the 
landscape attractive for  tourists.  At  the  same  time  they  complain about  their 
crops  and their land being damaged  by  emissions  from  industry.  There  is an 
endless  debate  about  dying woods  and acid rain,  and  a  number  of measures  have 
been adopted in order  to  limit the  damage  done  to  forests. 
The  public media  often report  on  these  issues,  and  such  environmental  concerns 
in relation to  farming  receive  much  more  critical attention in the  general 
public  than economic  issues  such  as  high  farm  and  food prices.  "Alternative 
farming"  is  a  favorite  idea of environmentalists  and  the  media,  and  the  role 
it plays  in many  discussions  is  completely out of proportion if compared  to 
its actual quantitative significance  (0.3  % of total agricultural acreage) 




.1 There  is some  truth in both types  of arguments,  i.e.  that farming has  some 
actual  and potential detrimental consequences  for  the  environment,  but that 
farmers  also provide positive ecological services  (Rat von Sachverstandigen 
fur Umweltfragen,  1985).  The  debate  on  these  issues  is likely to  remain 
lively in Germany  for  some  time  to come.  It is also  likely that this public 
debate will continue  to  figure much  more  prominently  than issues  such as  farm 
price policy or  trade liberalization in agriculture. 
The  Farm  Lobby  and Political Parties 
Agricultural policymaking in west Germany  is still dominated by  farmers' 
interests,  rather than by concerns  of the  general public.  It appears  that in 
recent years,  the  leverage which  the  farm  interest has  on agricultural 
policymaking has  increased rather than diminished in spite of the  decreasing 
number  of farmers.  To  a  large extent this was  a  reflection of the relative 
strength of different political parties after the  1984 elections.  The  effects 
have  been particularly acute  for  the Christian Democrats  (the  CDU)  and its 
Bavarian counterpart,  the  CSU.  Since  the  1984 elections,  the  CDU/CSU  has 
feared loss  of the  farm vote,  and with it the ability to  govern in the  FRG. 
This political trend began with the  1984 election of the  European Parliament. 
In April  1984,  milk quotas had been introduced in the  CAP,  mainly because of 
pressures  from 'the  FRG  government  (see below).  Though  the west German  farming 
industry and the  DBV  had always  argued for milk quotas,  the actual 
implementation of quotas  raised harsh criticism and much  bitterness among 
farmers.  Farmers  were  upset that milk production was  actually cut back under 
the  new  quota  system and by  the way  in which  quotas  were  allocated to 
individual  farms.  This  was  not how  FRG  farmers  had  imagined a  quota system to 
work. 
Disappointment was  particularly pronounced among  Bavarian farmers,  many  of 
whom  depend heavily on milk production.  A considerable number  of Bavarian 
farmers  expressed their anger by returning their  CSU  membership  cards. 
Moreover,  Bavarian farmer  groups  announced that they would abstain from  the 
European Parliament election,  and many  of them  did. 
For  the  CSU  and its leader,  Mr.  Strauss,  this development was  a  serious  shock. 
As  a  consequence,  Mr.  Strauss  took  the agricultural policy lead in the  Bonn 
coalition government  (of the  CDU/CSU  and  the  Free  Democratic  Party)  by 
pressing for  even more  farmer-friendly policies.  As  a  national newspaper put 
it,  "the absurd political rank which agricultural policy has  gained  ... in the 
cabinet of Helmut  Kohl  ... is largely a  result of political remote  control 
from  Munich"  (Suddeutsche  Zeitung,  July 9,  1985).  However,  not only Strauss 
and  the  CSU,  but also  the  CDU  and Chancellor Kohl  began to be  convinced that 
the  farm vote was  a  significant factor  in their political fortunes. 
The  more  fundamental  reason for  this  further  upswing  of the political 
influence of farmers  in the  CDU/CSU  was  the  combination of three  developments 
since  the  early eighties.  First,  west German  farmers  were  increasingly 
disappointed with  the way  in which agricultural policy developed,  and  they 
have  attributed their deteriorating economic  situation to agricultural policy 
rather than to market  developments  and  the overall  economic  situation.  A 
25 number  of farmers  began to express  their disappointment by abstaining from 
elections. 
Second,  simultaneously with the  change  in farmers'  voting behavior,  the 
CDU/CSU  began to  lose votes  in all elections-- at the  European,  the  federal, 
the state,  and  the  local level.  The  loss  in votes  for  the  CDU/CSU  was 
significantly larger than what  could be  explained by  the failure of some 
farmers  to  go  to elections.  However,  farmers  were  one  of the  relatively few 
groups  which  the  CDU/CSU  identified as  having  changed its voting behavior. 
Hence  the  CDU/CSU  considered it important  to regain the  farm vote. 
Third,  at the  same  time  the Greens  began to  turn up  in FRG  parliaments at all 
levels.  One  important consequence  of this  development  was  that the  margin of 
votes between  the  Social Democrats  and  the  Christian Democrats  had narrowed 
and competition for votes between these  two  political blocks became  even more 
intense.  In such a  situation,  any  identifiable homogeneous  group  of voters 
gains political leverage.  Farmers  are  one  of the  few  such homogeneous  groups. 
While  it is true  that the  farming vote  is only a  marginal percentage,  if 
success  or failure  in an election depends  on  one  percent of the votes,  even 
marginal  groups  can become  very important. 
Though  farmers  have  on many  occasions  had  a  more  than proportionate political 
weight  in Germany,  their influence  on political thinking in the  CDU/CSU  has 
rarely ever been as  pronounced as it was  after 1984.  This  resulted in a  large 
number  of farmer-friendly decisions  in national agricultural policy in the  FRG 
and a  further strengthening of the pro-farmer oriented attitude of the  FRG 
government  in Brussels'  debates  about  the  CAP. 
The  increasing weight of the  farming  interest in FRG  policymaking was  not 
effectively balanced by opposing views  of other  groups  in society.  The 
growing  ecological concern about modern  farming  practices has  not gone 
unnoticed.  However,  it was  treated as  an  important but separate  issue,  not 
related to  economic matters  such as price support and subsidies.  When  it came 
to  economic  issues,  the  Greens  and their political allies were  against price 
pressure  on  farmers,  and  they argued for  economic  measures  which would make  it 
easier for small  farmers  to  survive.  The  only politically important  group 
which recently has criticized excessive  economic  support for  farmers  are 
German  industrialists. 
Concerns  of German  Industrialists 
Criticism from  the  side of industrialists was  an interesting development.  For 
a  long  time,  FRG  industry was  silent about  agricultural policy matters.  This 
is certainly surprising given  the  strong export  dependence  of FRG  industry and 
its interest in a  liberal trading system.  West  German  industrialists are 
particularly concerned about  trade wars  triggered by protectionist 
agricultural policies in the  EC  and  the  FRG.  It is not exactly clear why  FRG 
industry was  silent about  its interests  and  concerns  for  such  a  long  time.  To 
some  extent it may  have  had  to  do  with close personal  and  family  relationships 
between  leading figures  in the  Bundesverband der  Deutschen Industrie  (BDI), 




Another  factor certainly was  (and still is)  the  fact  that some  sectors of west 
German  industry,  in particular the  chemical  industry,  producers  of farm 
machinery,  and  some  parts of the  food  industry,  are  secondary beneficiaries of 
agricultural protection.  However,  the situation changed in 1987  and  the  BDI 
became  an outspoken critic of the  CAP.  It is not quite clear what made  the 
situation change  although an  important consideration was  that agricultural 
policy should not be  allowed to block progress  in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 
After an  intensive  internal debate  in 1987,  the  new  president of the  BDI,  Dr. 
Tyll Necker,  succeeded in revising the  BDI's  attitude  towards  agricultural 
ipolicy.  The  new  position of the  BDI  was  plainly expressed in a  document  which 
received wide  publicity  (Bundesverband der  Deutschen Industrie,  1987).  In 
this  document  the  BDI  openly criticized,  for  the first time  in its history, 
the existing agricultural policy.  Because of the  importance of this  change  in 
the position. of the  BDI,  it is worthwhile  to consider  some  citations  from  the 
preface of this  document. 
"The  international reactions  to  EC  agricultural policy are  detrimental 
for  the whole  economy.  The  stress which  increasing worldwide  and  EC 
agricultural protectionism and  the  international subsidies  race place  on 
world trade  is alarming.  It is certain that all international trading 
partners can only lose  in the  long  run as  a  consequence  of this policy. 
The  burden on the  European political dialogue which results  from 
agricultural policy is depressing .... Presently there is the  danger  that 
EC  problems  resulting from agricultural policy seriously hamper  the 
completion of the  Common  Market. 
The  dependence  of farmers  on administrative decisions  is  inconsistent 
with the  guiding principle of the  overall  economic policy of the  Federal 
Republic--the social market  economy. 
Industry wants  to  emphasize  the  economically harmful misallocation of 
resources  which  results  from  current agricultural policy.  The  chronic 
financial  calamity in the  EC  budget,  related mainly  to agricultural 
expenditure,  handicaps  European progress  in other areas.  Tasks  which are 
important  for  growth  and  the  future  of the  Community  cannot be  advanced. 
Yet,  a  large part of public support  does  not even reach agriculture. 
A reform of EC  agricultural policy must  follow  the  guiding principle: 
'Less  dirigisme,  more  market' . 
Excessive prices stimulate further production growth,  increase  surpluses, 
and result in unbearable  financial burdens.  It is necessary  to separate 
market  and price policy from  incomes  policy .... Prices which  are better 
in line with markets,  and  regional  support of German  agriculture which  is 
production-neutral are  the better and less costly solution. 
At  the  international level,  a  concerted and balanced reduction of 
subsidies which  stimulate production must  be  aimed at,  in order  to avoid 
distortions of competition and  to provide  no  excuses  for maintaining old 
or  introducing new  subsidies.  We  call upon  the  government  of the  Federal 
Republic,  the  Council of Ministers  and  the  EC  Commission,  as  well  as  the 
27 governments  of other states,  above  all the  USA  and Japan,  to  develop  a 
multilateral solution in the  framework of the  GATT  negotiations." 
In the  main part of its 25  page  document,  the  SOl  provides  a  careful analysis 
of the situation of agriculture  and of the  consequences  of agricultural 
policy.  It expresses  sympathy with  the  economic  and social difficulties of 
farmers,  but the  BDI  clearly points out that current agricultural policies are 
an inefficient and  ineffective way  of improving agricultural conditions.  The 
negative  implications of these policies for  the  overall economy  and for 
industry are clearly spelled out.  The  document  also  argues  strongly for 
moving  away  from price  support and  towards  direct  income  aids. 
Individual industrialists are now  more  interested in agricultural policy 
matters,  and  the negative  implications of traditional agricultural policies 
for  the  economic well-being of industry are discussed with more  interest. 
However,  it appears  that this significant change  in the position of west 
German  industrialists has not made  much  of an  impact  on  the attitude of the 
German  government  toward agricultural policy.  But  the  industrialists' 
position has at least helped to support  the position of those people  in the 
Ministry of Economic  Affairs  who  try to act as critical watchdogs  in 
agricultural policy matters,  particularly in relation to  the  ongoing  GATT 
negotiations. 
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.' Chapter 2.  Germany's  Impact  on Agricultural Policymaking  in the 
European  Community 
In the previous  chapter,  the point was  made  that the  "philosophy"  on which  the 
FRG's  agricultural policy was  based is more  protectionist than that of some 
other member  countries  in the  European Community.  This  became  obvious  in the 
early negotiations  on  the  common  level of support prices in the emerging  CAP. 
As  described earlier,  the  FRG's  agricultural policymakers  tried to push  CAP 
prices as high as possible.  The  FRG  usually argued for particularly high 
price support and other  forms  of protection in the  Community.  However,  what 
is less  obvious  is  the  extent to which  the  FRG  was  able  to  influence  the 
overall development of the  CAP  in a  direction which fit the  FRG's  agricultural 
policy interest. 
It is impossible  to quantify the extent to which  any  individual member  country 
has been able  to  influence  the  course of events  in the  CAP.  However,  it 
appears  that' the  FRG  time  and again was  able  to exert a  particularly 
pronounced  influence  on the way  in which  the  CAP  has  developed.  This 
hypothesis will be  illustrated on the basis of four  selected examples  of 
strategic decisions  taken in the  CAP  in which it appeared that FRG 
agricultural policymakers were  able  to get their views  effectively across  to 
the other member  countries. 
While  such  individual cases  can provide no  more  than anecdotal evidence,  the 
evidence  shows  that decisions  taken on  these  occasions were  important for  the 
overall development of the  CAP.  The  FRG's  influence  on  these decisions was 
sufficiently pronounced  to  conclude  that  the  German  "philosophy"  on 
agricultural policy contributed significantly to  shaping  the general evolution 
of the  CAP. 
The  Introduction of Green Money  in 1969  and Later Modifications!! 
The  existence of "Green Money"  in the  CAP,  i.e.  the use  of special exchange 
rates  for agriculture,  has  allowed Germany  to keep  its support prices 
significantly above  those  in the rest of the  Community.  The  agrimonetary 
system,  and  the  related monetary  compensatory  amounts  (MCA's  or border taxes 
and  subsidies which  compensated for  the price differences  that arose because 
of differing agricultural exchange  rates),  were  not  intended to allow any 
member  country to  influence its level of price support  in any particular 
direction,  but over  time  countries  gained  some  degree  of control over national 
prices. 
For  countries with devaluing currencies,  the  agrimonetary  system resulted in 
domestic prices below Community  prices  (negative MCA's  or border  taxes  on 
exports  and subsidies for  imports),  and in countries with strong currencies 
the  agrimonetary  system allowed domestic prices  to be  maintained above  the 
common  price level  (positive MCA's  or border  subsidies  on exports  and  taxes  on 
11  The  following  three sections  are  largely based on various  issues  of Agra 
Europe  (German version) ·and Agrarwirtschaft. 
29 imports).  Since  the  Deutschmark has  consistently been a  strong currency 
relative to other European currencies,  the  result of the  agrimonetary system 
has  been that  FRG  farmers  regularly received prices  above  the  common  EC  level. 
Given  the  German  interest in high  farm price support,  it is no  surprise  that 
German  agricultural policymakers  have  always  argued strongly for  the 
Community's  agrimonetary system.  However,  it is also  true  that the  FRG  was 
not  the first country where  MCA's  were  used.  Because  of the historical 
sequence  of currency changes,  France  was  the first member  country to  introduce 
compensatory border measures  or MCA's,  after the  devaluation of the  french 
Franc  in August  1969. 
Immediately after the  federal  election in the  FRG  in September  1969,  which 
changed  the majority from  a  CDU/CSU-SPD  coalition (the  "Great Coalition")  to  a 
SPD-FDP  coalition,  the  Deutschmark,  which had been under strong upward 
pressure for  some  time,  was  allowed to float.  The  FRG  obtained permission in 
the  Community  to establish positive MCA's  of up  to  five  percent.  After  the 
new  government  had been  formed  in October  1969,  the  Deutschmark was  formally 
revalued by 8.5  percent against its original rate,  and MCA's  could be  applied 
in accordance with that revaluation. 
The  agrimonetary system and  the  resulting MCA's  were  considered only an 
interim  so~tion by  the  EC  Commission at the  time.  The  original decision was 
for negative MCA's  in France  to be  abolished by  the  beginning of the  1971/72 
crop year at the  latest.  When  the  Deutschmark was  allowed  to float  and  then 
was  revalued,  the  Commission vainly attempted to  prevent  the  introduction of 
positive MCA's  in Germany.  In fact,  the  Commission originally tried to block 
German  MCA's  and suggested that Germany  enforce  a  complete ban on all relevant 
agricultural  imports  which would have  made  MCA's  unnecessary. 
The  FRG,  after appealing  to  the  European Court,  finally succeeded in obtaining 
permission to apply positive MCA's  until the  end of 1969.  After that date, 
the  FRG  was  allowed  to  introduce national compensation for its farmers  through 
a  special relief on  the  VAT  for  farmers  and  through  acreage-based payments, 
co-financed by  the  Community.  While  MCA's  had not yet become  a  permanent 
feature  of the  CAP,  the  FRG  succeeded in establishing the  principle that 
farmers  had  the  right  to  be  compensated for  the  effects of currency 
revaluations. 
This  principle  proved  important when  in 1971,  in reaction to  the  international 
monetary crisis and  the  consequent  exchange  rate changes,  the  agrimonetary 
system was  introduced as  a  permanent  instrument of the  CAP.  After  the 
acceptance  of the  agrimonetary system,  the  debate  was  limited to  the  level of 
MCA's  and  the  speed of their reductions  through  green rate devaluations  and 
revaluations.  In these  debates,  successive  FRG  governments  were  successful  in 
maintaining positive MCA's  as high as  possible.  The  history of the  periodic 
arguments  in the  Council  and  the  Commission with  the  FRG  over adjusting German 
MCA's  downwards  is full  of individual success  stories for  FRG  agricultural 
policymakers. 
The  best example  of the extent to which  the  FRG  has  been able  to  exert  an 
influence  on  the  way  in which  the  agrimonetary system of the  Community  was 
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\ handled is the  "reform"  introduced in 1984.  This  reform,  which established 
the  "switchover"  mechanism which converted positive MCA's  in some  member 
countries  into negative MCA's  in others  through  the effective introduction of 
a  new  "Green ECU",  was  a  purely German  invention. 
The  FRG  Minister of Agriculture had  always  had political problems with  the 
German  farming  community when  he  returned from price negotiations  in Brussels 
only  to report that  FRG  farm price  increases were  less  than the  agreed 
increases  in common  ECU  prices because positive German  MCA's  had to be 
reduced.  To  remedy  this problem an official in the  FRG  Ministry of 
Agriculture  came  up  with the  idea that the  FRG  Minister would no  longer face 
this dilemma if there were  no  longer any positive German  MCA's.  This  could be 
accomplished by converting positive German  MCA's  into negative MCA's  in other 
member  countries.  The  FRG  Minister of Agriculture would no  longer come  under 
pressure to reduce positive German  MCA's  in Brussels  and  could not be 
criticized by German  farmers  for having made  a  specific German  concession to 
their disadvantage. 
The  technical solution for this new  system was  the  introduction of a  positive 
"corrective factor"  which is applied to  the  ECU  before  ECU  support prices are 
converted to domestic  currencies  in all the member  countries.  At  the  time 
this corrective factor was  equivalent to  the existing positive German  MCA's 
which were  converted into negative MCA's  in other member  countries of around  3 
percent. 
Later this corrective factor was  to  increase  in parallel with the  exchange 
rate of the strongest currency in any member  country  (in effect the 
Deutschmark),  so  that no  new  positive MCA's  could emerge.  Hence,  the value of 
the new  Green  ECU  was  14.5 percent  above  the value of the official  ECU  in 
July of 1991.  This meant  that the  target level of price support in the 
Community  (i.e.  the level of support prices which would prevail if all MCA's 
were  abolished)  was  higher  than it would have  been. 
This  new  "switchover"  system exerts an automatic  upward pressure  on  CAP 
support prices.  Other  member  countries.  and certainly the  Commission.  were 
strongly opposed  to building such an automatic  upward pressure  into  the  CAP 
support price mechanism.  In spite of its advantage  in avoiding  the  problem of 
dismantling positive MCA's.  the  solution was  viewed as  dangerously 
inflationary in countries with negative MCA's  as  well  as  by  the  German 
Minister of Economic  Affairs  and Finance. 
It may  well be  that at the  time  the  new  system was  introduced.  the 
consequences  of  the corrective factor were not fully appreciated although  some 
observers  have  pointed out these  consequences  were  obvious  from  the beginning 
(Petit et.  al .•  1987).  The  desire of the  FRG  to  reduce  domestic political 
difficulties over  reductions  in positive German  MCA's  finally prevailed over 
the views  of the  Commission  and of other member  countries.  and  the whole  of 
the  Community  eventually was  effectively led into  an inflationary agricultural 
pricing mechanism. 
The  FRG  government  also obtained permission by  the  Community  to grant national 
compensation for  that part of its positive MCA's  which it had  to dismantle by 
31 January I,  1985,  again co-financed by  the  Community.  In spite of the  delicate 
balance  of opinions  on this matter in the  Council,  the  FRG  government,  under 
pressure  from  the  DBV,  broke  the  rules  and  decided unilaterally to  provide 
higher compensation than what  had been agreed in the  Council  through  a  special 
relief on  the  VAT  for  farmers.  This  was  one  of the first and most  obvious 
indications of the  new  fear  in the  CDUjCSU  that  they  might  lose  the  farm vote. 
The  particularly surprising but revealing fact was  that Mr.  Stoltenberg,  the 
then  FRG  Minister of Finance,  was  highly instrumental  in topping-up  farmer 
compensation on  this  occasion,  though  this resulted in a  large additional 
burden on  the  FRG  budget.  Other member  countries protested but eventually 
gave  in.  "The  fact that this unilateral decision was  not seriously challenged 
in later Community  discussions,  and was  eventually accepted at the June  1984 
Fontainbleau summit,  probably reflects  the fact  that all the actors  involved 
recognized the political difficulties faced by  the  FRG  government  and,  as  a 
result,  accepted the  need  to modify the  compromise"  (Petit et.  al.,  1987). 
The  Introduction of Milk Quotas  in 1984 
Growing  surpluses  on  the milk market  and  the  resulting high and  r1s1ng budget 
expenditures  for  this market have  been  a  problem since  the  inception of the 
CAP.  Consequently,  EC  dairy policy has  always  been accompanied by a  lively 
debate  about its necessary reform,  and  a  number  of diverse  reform measures 
have  been  taken over  the years  including measures  such as  premiums  for 
slaughtering cows,  co-responsibility levies  on milk production,  and  a 
guarantee  threshold for total  EC  milk output. 
In this debate,  the  DBV  had  long  argued against measures  which would reduce 
producer prices,  and  for  the  introduction of quotas  for milk production on 
individual  farms.  One  of the  arguments  used by  the  DBV  was  that a  quota  system 
was  working satisfactorily on  the  sugar market  and  that it could be  applied 
equally well  to  the milk market.  The  German  government  had argued for  the 
introduction of milk quotas  in Brussels  as  early as  February 1969. 
In the  confused  1969  debate  over  reform of  EC  dairy policy,  the  then  FRG 
Minister of Agriculture,  Mr.  Hocherl,  had originally proposed a  scheme  which 
would have  led to  a  flat rate producer  levy of up  to  10  percent of the 
producer price if global  EC  milk production exceeded  a  given  threshold.  In a 
way,  this proposed  scheme  would have  combined  two  measures  which later became 
elements  of the  CAP  for milk,  i.e.  the  co-responsibility levy  and  the 
guarantee  threshold. 
However,  Mr.  Hocherl's  proposal  was  strongly criticized by  the  DBV  and by 
parliamentarians of Hocherl's  own  political party,  the  CSU,  who  correctly 
regarded such a  new  levy  as  a  method of reducing  the  producer price.  Mr. 
Hocherl,  who  obviously had not co-ordinated with  the  DBV  and members  of his 
party before he  tabled his  proposal  in Brussels,  then  suddenly  changed his 
proposal by suggesting that  the  global  EC  quantum  should be  allocated on  the 
basis of current actual output  to  the  individual dairies which  could  then 
allocate  their quota  to  their farmers. 
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" Through this apparently minor but absolutely decisive modification,  the 
Minister had effectively aligned himself with the milk quota proposal of the 
DBV,  and he  argued for it i~ the  same  way  by suggesting that a  solution had  to 
be  found similar to that on  the  sugar market.  Thus,  the first proposal for 
milk quotas  which  a  FRG  government  tabled in Brussels predates  the eventual 
introduction of quotas  by fifteen years. 
Mr.  Hocherl's  successor as Minister of Agriculture,  Mr.  Ertl  (1969-1983),  a 
member  of the Liberal Party  (FOP),  was  not in favor  of farm-level  milk quotas 
which  appeared to him  to  involve  too  much  bureaucracy in agriculture.  A 
completely different view,  however,  was  adopted by Ertl's successor,  Mr. 
Kiechle,  a  member  of the  CSU,  who  took office in May  1983.  Mr.  Kiechle  is 
from  a  Bavarian region with much  milk production,  and had been a  dairy farmer 
and  a  leading official of dairy organizations  in Bavaria.  Mr.  Kiechle had 
always  subscribed to  the view of the  DBV  that milk quotas  were  the  only way  of 
avoiding price cuts,  and as Minister of Agriculture he  immediately put this 
position  fo~ard.  This  is no  surprise since  quotas  are  fully in line with Mr. 
Kiechle's  general  slogan "quantities down,  prices up",  a  philosophy which  is 
fundamental  to his agricultural policy position. 
In the  Bonn  cabinet,  Mr.  Kiechle had to  overcome  the  skepticism of the 
Ministers of Economic  Affairs  and of Finance  who  were  fundamentally  opposed to 
even more  government  intervention in agriculture.  However,  his  argument  that 
quotas  would help  to curtail EC  expenditure  on  the  milk market  soon won 
support of the  cabinet majority. 
The  sequence  of events  in 1983  and early 1984,  which  finally led to  the 
adoption of the  so-called CAP  reform package,  including the  introduction of 
milk quotas  on March  31,  1984,  has been well  documented  (Petit et.  al.,  1987). 
In formal  terms,  the first step on  the  road towards  milk quotas  was  the 
proposal for  CAP  reform which  the  Commission presented to  the  Council  in July 
1983  (COM  500).  In this  document  the  Commission  argued that there were 
essentially only-two ways  in which  the  surplus  problem could be  solved. 
Either support prices would have  to be  cut significantly  (by  12  percent 
according  to  the  Commission,  a  figure  never explained or questioned but which 
supposedly was  based on  the  guarantee  threshold mechanism  for milk)  or milk 
production would have  to be  reduced  and constrained through  a  quota  system 
like that for  sugar. 
In the  following  debates  in the  Council  and  in the Athens  summit  of heads  of 
state in December  1983,  it turned out that most  member  states were  opposed  to 
milk quotas at the beginning.  The  only exception was  the  FRG.  The  Minister, 
Mr.  Kiechle,  had made  up  his mind  that quotas  were  necessary in order  to 
maintain reasonably high prices  (Petit et.  al.,  1987).  The  reasons  why  all 
the  other member  states originally were  against milk quotas  differed from 
country to  country,  but in most  cases  the  opposition was  pretty strong  (Petit 
et.  al.,  1987).  In the  course  of the  debate,  however,  more  and more  member 
countries  gave  in.  Finally,  after a  protracted process  of confrontations  and 
intense bargaining,  the  decision was  reached  to  establish a  quota  system for 
the  EC  milk market. 
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Minister had effectively aligned himself with  the milk quota proposal of the 
DBV,  and he  argued for it i~ the  same  way  by  suggesting that a  solution had to 
be  found  similar to that on  the  sugar market.  Thus,  the first proposal for 
milk quotas  which  a  FRG  government  tabled in Brussels predates  the  eventual 
introduction of quotas by fifteen years. 
Mr.  Hocher1's  successor as Minister of Agriculture,  Mr.  Ert1  (1969-1983),  a 
member  of the Liberal Party  (FOP),  was  not in favor  of farm-level milk quotas 
which appeared to him  to  involve  too much  bureaucracy in agriculture.  A 
completely different view,  however,  was  adopted by Ert1's successor,  Mr. 
Kiech1e,  a  member  of the  CSU,  who  took office in May  1983.  Mr.  Kiech1e  is 
from  a  Bavarian region with much  milk production,  and had been a  dairy farmer 
and  a  leading official of dairy organizations  in Bavaria.  Mr.  Kiech1e  had 
always  subscribed to  the view of the  DBV  that milk quotas  were  the  only way  of 
avoiding price cuts,  and as Minister of Agriculture he  immediately put this 
position forward.  This  is no  surprise since  quotas  are  fully in line with Mr. 
Kiech1e's  general slogan "quantities down,  prices up",  a  philosophy which  is 
fundamental  to his agricultural policy position. 
In the  Bonn  cabinet,  Mr.  Kiechle had to  overcome  the  skepticism of the 
Ministers of Economic  Affairs and of Finance who  were  fundamentally  opposed to 
even more  government  intervention in agriculture.  However,  his  argument  that 
quotas  would help  to curtail EC  expenditure  on  the milk market  soon won 
support of the cabinet majority. 
The  sequence of events  in 1983  and early 1984,  which  finally led to  the 
adoption of the so-called CAP  reform package,  including the  introduction of 
milk quotas  on March  31,  1984,  has  been well  documented  (Petit et.  al.,  1987). 
In formal  terms,  the first step on  the  road  towards  milk quotas  was  the 
proposal for  CAP  reform which  the  Commission presented to  the  Council  in July 
1983  (COM  500).  In this  document  the  Commission  argued  that there were 
essentially only. two  ways  in which  the  surplus  problem  could be  solved. 
Either support prices would have  to be  cut significantly  (by  12  percent 
according to  the  Commission,  a  figure  never  explained or questioned but which 
supposedly was  based on  the  guarantee  threshold mechanism  for milk)  or milk 
production would have  to be  reduced  and constrained through  a  quota  system 
like that for  sugar. 
In the  following  debates  in the  Council  and  in the Athens  summit  of heads  of 
state in December  1983,  it turned out that most  member  states were  opposed  to 
milk quotas  at the beginning.  The  only exception was  the  FRG.  The  Minister, 
Mr.  Kiechle,  had made  up  his mind  that quotas  were  necessary in order  to 
maintain reasonably high prices  (Petit et.  al.,  1987).  The  reasons  why  all 
the other member  states originally were  against milk quotas  differed from 
country to country,  but  in most  cases  the  opposition was  pretty strong  (Petit 
et.  al.,  1987).  In the  course  of the  debate,  however,  more  and more  member 
countries  gave  in.  Finally,  after a  protracted process  of confrontations  and 
intense bargaining,  the decision was  reached  to  establish a  quota  system  for 
the  EC  milk market. 
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that the  FRG  Minister of Agriculture played a  highly  important role  in this 
decision process,  but that the behavior of the  French Minister,  too,  had  a 
significant impact.  "In the  events  between the  publication of  COM  (500)  and 
the March  31  [1984]  decision,  Mr.  Kiechle  and Mr.  Rocard  seem  to have  stolen 
the spotlight;  the  adoption of the milk  quotas  as  well  as  the  other measures 
composing  the  'package'  are  largely attributable to  the  performance of these 
two  leading actors .... An  Orwellian paraphrase stating that all countries  are 
equal but  some  are more  equal  than others,  would certainly be  obvious"  (Petit 
et.  al.,  1987). 
The  French  government was  very strongly opposed  to  the  introduction of milk 
quotas  from  the beginning,  and--for  domestic political reasons--only very late 
in the  process  did France  change  its position and finally support  the  decision 
in favor  of quotas.  This  change  in the  French position in the  end was  highly 
instrumental in the  tactical process  of forming  a  majority for quotas.  Yet it 
cannot be  argued that the  introduction of quotas  was  in the  immediate  French 
interest.  A high level French official privately said that there was  simply 
no  other way  to  reach  a  unanimous  decision given the  determined way  in which 
the  FRG  Minister was  pushing for  quotas. 
The  FRG  was  the  only member  country that initially wanted milk quotas  and it 
was  successful in moving  the whole  of the  Community  in this  dire~tion. 
However,  this would probably not have  been possible without  the  determined 
support of the  EC  Commission provided by its July 1983  proposal  and by its 
support  throughout  the whole  bargaining process until March  1984. 
Not very much  is known  about  the  internal debate  regarding milk quotas  within 
the  Commission during the  1983-84 period except  that  DG  VI  (the Directorate 
General  for Agriculture)  was  very  important  in this debate,  and that  the 
proposal  document  COM  (500)  was  rather controversial among  the  Commissioners 
and was  finally adopted by  a  majority margin of one  vote  (Petit et.  al., 
1987).  It is not publicly known  to what  extent  the  Commission was  influenced 
by  the  fact  that the  FRG  Minister of Agriculture,  and later the  FRG 
government,  was  so  keen  to establish a  quota  system  for milk.  Irrespective of 
the  source,  the  introduction of milk quotas  certainly is a  case which 
illustrates the  important role of the  FRG  in formulating  important decisions 
in the  CAP. 
The  Blockage  of Grain Price  Cuts  in 1985 
Another  opportunity for  demonstrating his belief that price cuts are not  an 
appropriate  way  to  deal with surplus  problems  was  seized by Mr.  Kiechle  during 
the  negotiations  on  the  CAP  price package  for  the  1985/86  crop year.  In 
accordance with  the  guarantee  threshold mechanism  for  cereals,  the  Commission 
proposed  to  reduce  cereal support prices by  3.6 percent.  Though  some  member 
countries were  not exactly happy  about  such  a  price cut,  nearly all of  them 
were  prepared to  accept it. After all,  such  a  price  reduction would have  been 
fully in line with an earlier decision of the  Council  of Agriculture Ministers 
since  the  guarantee  threshold mechanism had been agreed as  a  type  of 
self-imposed restraint by  the  Council  itself in 1981. 
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t· The  only country which was  absolutely not prepared to  accept this price cut 
was  the  FRG.  Mr.  Kiechle,  who  had not yet been in office when  the  guarantee 
threshold for  cereals was  established,  strongly argued against any  reduction 
of cereal prices  in the  Council,  pointing out that this was  the wrong  way  to 
deal with the  Community's  cereal market problem and  that other ways  of 
reforming  the  CAP  for cereals had to be  found.  On  this occasion,  Mr.  Kiechle 
had  the  support of the whole  FRG  cabinet from  the  beginning.  Even  Chancellor 
Kohl  made  the  FRG's  strong opposition to  cereal price cuts  known  in bilateral 
talks with  EC  heads  of state. 
Negotiations  on  the price package  in the  Council  took even  longer  than in 
other years,  and  the main reason for the  impasse,  which  could not be  resolved 
in seven marathon meetings  of the  Council,  was  the  FRG's  resistance  to  grain 
price cuts.  Finally the  package  was  taken apart,  and decisions  on all other 
measures  were  taken,  except for support prices  for  cereals  (and rapeseed).  In 
order to reach a  compromise,  the  Commission later was  prepared to settle for  a 
cereal price· cut of only 1.8 percent.  However,  even that was  too  much  for Mr. 
Kiechle  who  would not accept more  than a  maximum  price cut of 0.9 percent. 
In the  end,  the  FRG  was  completely  isolated in the  Council.  The  possibility 
of taking a  majority vote was  seriously considered.  However,  at this stage Mr. 
Kiechle  reverted to  the  "Luxembourg  Compromise"  which  suggested that member 
countries could veto  Council  decisions which  threatened to violate their 
"vital"  interests. 
The  FRG  had always  maintained that the  "Luxembourg  Compromise"  was  against the 
spirit of European  integration and  that it was  inappropriate for  individual 
member  countries  to block majority decisions.  However,  on  this occasion the 
agricultural interests overruled the  long-run European policy interest of the 
FRG  government,  and Mr.  Kiechle was  given a  green light by  the cabinet to use 
the veto option in spite of the  European policy consequences  which  this might 
have.  As  a  result of this first German  veto  in the history of the  Community, 
the  FRG  endangered  the  reform of Community  institutions which had been planned 
for  the Milano  summit. 
After Mr.  Kiechle  threatened to veto  the  grain price cut of 1.8 percent,  five 
member  countries  (UK,  France,  Ireland,  Greece,  Denmark)  did not participate in 
the voting procedure  on  the  grounds  that they did not want  to  question the 
validity of the  "Luxembourg  Compromise"  even  though  they were  generally in 
agreement with the  Commission proposal. 
In the  end,  no  Council  decision was  taken on  cereal prices  for  the  new  crop 
year.  Instead,  the  Commission acted in place of the  Council  and unilaterally 
reduced  intervention prices for cereals for  the  1985/86  crop year by  the 
proposed margin of 1.8 percent.  Thus,  in addition to strengthening--against 
overall  FRG  interest--the validity of the  "Luxembourg  Compromise",  the  FRG's 
opposition to  a  price cut  in cereals had been  instrumental  in adding  a  new 
twist  to  the  already complicated relationship between  the  powers  of the 
Council  and  those  of the  Commission. 
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35 The  Introduction of Set-Aside  in 1988 
In order  to  reduce  pressure for further cuts  in cereals price,  Mr.  Kiechle  and 
the  DBV  had  favored  acreage  reductions.  This  strategy was  fully in line with 
Mr.  Kiechle's  philosophy of "quantities down,  prices  up".  As  a  first step in 
this direction,  the  FRG  unilaterally embarked  on  this option and  installed 
premiums  for set-aside in Lower  Saxony  as  an experimental pilot program  in 
1986.  The  existence of this program,  and experiences  gained with it, were 
later used by  the  German  government  to  push  the  Community  towards  a  CAP 
program  for  land set-aside. 
The  debate  about  a  Community  program for set-aside was  closely interlinked 
with  the negotiations  about  a  stabilizer scheme  for cereals  in 1987  and early 
1988.  The  FRG  government pushed hard for  the  introduction of Community-wide 
set-aside and made  it a  precondition for  accepting  a  stabilizer scheme.  In 
order to  convince  other member  countries,  the  FRG  government  raised this  issue 
not only  in the agricultural Council,  but at various political levels, 
including the  Council of Foreign Ministers  and  the  Summit. 
The  debate  on set-aside was  most  intensive in the  agricultural council.  At 
one  point,  Mr.  Kiechle  pushed this  debate  in a  rather interesting direction. 
He  came  up  with a  completely new  proposal  for  the  EC  cereals market  regime. 
According  to  this proposal,  the mechanism of "financial solidarity"  in the  CAP 
would have  been significantly changed for cereals,  such  that each  individual 
member  country would have  been made  financially responsible  for additional 
grain surpluses  produced by its farmers.  The  idea has been succinctly 
described by  the  Secretary of State  in the  Federal Ministry of Agriculture, 
Dr.  Eisenkramer: 
"A  substantial problem results  from  the  current financial  system of the 
Community,  which  so  far  does  not contain any  incentives  for  adopting,  at 
the national level,  measures  to  reduce  production growth,  but rather 
supports  the efforts of some  individual member  countries  to pursue  an 
expansionary national  farm policy at the  expense  of the  Community  budget. 
For  this  reason Germany  has  proposed,  for  example,  for  cereals  in its 
function as  a  guide  crop,  a  mechanism  for  financial  sanctions which 
would,  on the basis of an  EC  maximum  quantity,  secure  that the 
governments  of member  countries actually adopt measures  to limit 
production.  Under  this mechanism,  each member  country which  does  not 
adhere  to  the  common  decisions  for market relief would be held 
financially responsible."  (Eisenkramer,  1988  as  translated by 
Tangermann). 
The  mechanism  envisaged by  the  FRG  Ministry at the  time  has  never been 
described  in any detail  in public.  But  it may  be  that  the  general  concepts 
behind it were  similar  to  an  academic  proposal which had been  advanced 
somewhat  earlier  (Thoroe  and  Tangermann,  1987). 
The  idea is rather straightforward. 
solidarity",  the  shadow  price of  an 
member  country  in the  EC  is not  the 
Under  the  existing "financial 
agricultural product for  any  individual 
world market  price but  a  price close  to 
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•• the  domestic price because  import  levies  flow  into,  and export refunds  are 
paid out of,  the  Community's  budget rather  than the budget of the member 
country concerned  (Koester,  1977).  For this  reason the  incentive for  each 
individual member  country to  adopt national policies which  expand agricultural 
output is much  larger under  common  financing  than it would be under national 
financing.  Incentives  for persuading farmers  through national measures  to 
produce  less are  also much  weaker  than they would be  if each  individual member 
country had  to  finance its own  agricultural market policy. 
It is therefore  tempting  to  suggest that some  link should be established 
between the volume  of agricultural production in each member  country on  the 
one  hand  and  the financial contribution of that member  country to  the 
Community  budget  on  the other hand  (Thoroe  and Tangermann,  1977).  This  would 
mean  that for  each extra ton of production over  and  above  some  reference 
quantity,  the country where  this production occurs would have  to pay  the 
equivalent of the  export restitution for  one  ton into  the  Community  budget. 
"Financial solidarity" would  thus be  eliminated at the margin,  though it would 
continue  to prevail for all fundamental  financial  flows  in the  Community. 
The  FRG  Minister's proposal for national quotas  obviously went  one  step 
further by suggesting that member  countries  should establish measures  such as 
farm  level quotas  or set-aside programs  in order to  adhere  to  the  maximum 
quantities allocated to  them.  However,  since Mr.  Kiechle's proposal also 
provided for  "financial sanctions"  in case  individual member  countries did not 
stick to their maximum  quantities,  it could be  seen as  a  new  financial 
mechanism  for  the  CAP. 
It has never been clear whether Mr.  Kiechle at the  time  really wanted  to 
establish national quotas  and  a  corresponding new  financial  mechanism  in the 
CAP,  or whether his proposal was  mainly  a  tactical move  in his  fight  for  a 
set-aside program  in the  Community.  It appears  that Mr.  Kiechle's proposal 
for national  quotas  has not really been discussed seriously nor  in any detail 
in the  Council.  However,  it has  certainly played an  instrumental role in 
preparing the  decision for  introducing set-aside in the  Community. 
In retrospect,  the  1987  Kiechle  proposal  may  one  day  possibly appear  as  a 
precursor of a  system of mandatory production control  for  cereals  in the  CAP. 
If some  member  countries should continue  to  apply  the  current set-aside 
program rather loosely,  it could well be  that German  agricultural policymakers 
revert to Mr.  Kiechle's proposal  for  a  quota  system because it would be 
politically difficult for  them  to maintain a  situation where  German  farmers 
cut back  on cereals production while  farmers  in other member  countries 
continue  to  expand  (Tangermann,  1989a). 
On  the  set-aside  issue,  Germany  was  less  isolated in the  Council  than on the 
issue of milk quotas.  Some  other member  countries  came  round  to  the view that 
set-aside should be  given a  chance,  though  for  reasons  which  in part differed 
from  those  considered in the  FRG.  For  example,  the  United Kingdom  joined the 
FRG  relatively early in the  Council  debate,  though not because it saw 
set-aside as  a  means  of avoiding price cuts,  but because it considered it less 
problematic  than other possible alternatives,  particularly mandatory  supply 
control. 
37 Other  member  countries were  strongly opposed  to set-aside as  an  instrument to 
solve  the  Community's  cereals market  problem.  They  would rather have  accepted 
price cuts.  These  member  countries  for  some  time  tried to  convince  the 
Council  that set-aside,  if it were  introduced,  should be voluntary in the 
sense  that each member  country could decide whether it wanted  to offer such a 
program  to its farmers.  However,  Mr.  Kiech1e  was,  and still is,  of the  firm 
and  internally consistent opinion that set-aside makes  sense  only if it has  to 
be  offered to  farmers  in all member  countries,  and hence  he  fought  strongly 
for  the  introduction of such  a  mandatory  scheme. 
In the  end,  set-aside won  the  day  and became  an element  in the political 
package  of "CAP  reform"  as  adopted by  the  Brussels  swrunit  in early 1988.  The 
introduction of set-aside in the  CAP  is yet another  example  of the  strong 
influence which  the  "philosophy"  of German  agricultural policy exerts  on the 
fundamental  decisions of the  CAP. 
38 
.. 
/' Chapter  3.  Consequences  of Agricultural Trade  Liberalization for  Germany 
Given  the strong tendencies  towards  high price support and protection in 
German  agricultural policy,  any multilaterally agreed move  in the direction of 
agricultural trade liberalization would significantly change  the policy 
environment  for  German  agriculture.  The  exact consequences,  however,  would 
depend  on the nature of the policy changes  required and on  the extent to which 
individual policy instruments would have  to be  changed.  Different groups  in 
society would be  affected rather differently by such policy changes,  and the 
size of losses  and  gains has  been analyzed in a  number  of studies.  At  the 
same  time,  there are possibilities for  compensation to  the losers.  These 
issues will be discussed in this chapter. 
Nature  and Extent of Policy Changes 
The  nature  and extent of policy changes  required for agricultural trade 
liberalization depends  and how  trade liberalization is defined.  Trade 
liberalization is not necessarily synonymous  with the  complete  elimination of 
all agricultural policies.  Some  policy measures  which  are  arguably not  trade 
distorting may  well be maintained.  New  and additional policy measures  may 
also be  introduced simultaneously with  trade liberalization in order  to 
support  the move  towards  free  trade  in agriculture and  to  enhance  its positive 
effects on  the allocation of resources. 
The  issues  to be  considered in this  context are essentially those which are 
discussed under  the heading of "policy coverage"  in relation to defining an 
aggregate measure  of support  (AMS)  for  use  in GATT  arrangements.  As  long as 
this  debate  about policy coverage  has  not  come  to  a  conclusion,  it is 
impossible  to  provide  a  definition of trade liberalization which  is precise 
and practical in the  sense of indicating the  types  of policy changes which may 
be  required as  a  consequence  of the Uruguay  Round  negotiations~  In addition, 
before multilateral agreement has  been reached on  the  time  schedule  for policy 
adjustments,  the  sequence  and  speed of policy changes  must be  considered. 
Some  types  of policy measures  are  obvious  candidates  for elimination if true 
trade  liberalization is the  goal.  Border measures  and domestic 
subsidies/taxes which are used to  support domestic  farm product prices  and 
isolate  them  from  price developments  in international  trade  are obvious 
candidates.  It is safe  to  assume  that trade liberalization implies,  at a 
minimum,  the elimination of price support.  This  is  the  operating assumption 
of most  quantitative studies of the  effects of trade liberalization.  There 
are rarely any  quantitative analyses  of the effects of removing  other  types  of 
agricultural policy measures  because it is analytically much  more  difficult to 
quantify  the  effects of non-price policies. 
Price  support is  the  dominant agricultural policy measure  in the  CAP  as  is 
obvious  from  the existing producer  subsidy equivalents  (PSE)  estimates.  For 
most  of the major  commodities,  output-dependent price policies contribute more 
than  95  percent  to overall PSE's  as  measured  in the existing studies 
(Tangermann,  1988). 
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member  countries  and  there is no  doubt  that these national policies add 
considerably to  the  existing Community  programs,  at least in terms  of public 
expenditure.  At  the  same  time it is true  that many  of the national measures 
are not directly output-dependent,  and  that a  large part of them are  therefore 
potential candidates  for exclusion from  AMS  commitments  and,  hence,  from  the 
set of measures  which would have  to be  eliminated under  trade  liberalization. 
Some  of these national measures  in German  agricultural policy will be 
discussed below in relation to how  they could be  dealt with in multilateral 
negotiations. 
For  the  remainder of the present chapter,  trade  liberalization implies  the 
modification or elimination of price support.  The  magnitude  of price changes 
which  may  be  necessary in west Germany  in order to  eliminate all price support 
will be  discussed in the next section in the context of price assumptions  made 
in the  study by  Braune  and Henrichsmeyer  (table  3.2  and  graphs  3.1  to 3.3). 
Losers  and Gainers  from Trade Liberalization 
A number  of quantitative studies have  looked  into  the  consequences  which 
different agricultural price policies would have  in west  Germany.  For  the 
purposes  of this paper,  these  studies  can be classified into three  general 
categories. 
First,  there are studies which have  concentrated on  an analysis of economic 
conditions within agriculture and  on  the way  in which  they would be affected 
by different policies.  Such  studies have been based on rather comprehensive 
and  complex quantitative models  of the  farming  industry which provide much 
detail on  a  dis  aggregated level.  In the  context of the present paper,  such 
studies  can essentially help  to  identify losers  from  agricultural policy 
reform. 
Second,  there  are studies based on more  aggregate  models  which  investigate, 
along  the  lines of welfare analysis,  the  effects of policy changes  on  the 
large groups  of producers,  consumers  and  taxpayers.  These  studies provide 
information,  among  others,  on  groups  gaining  from  agricultural policy reform. 
Third,  the effects of agricultural  trade liberalization have  recently been 
studied with  the help of computable  general equilibrium  (CGE)  models.  Such 
studies  improve  our understanding of the  implications of agricultural policy 
changes  for other sectors  in the  economy  and  for overall economic well being. 
Losers:  Changes  in Farm  Income  1/ 
Given  the  preoccupation of German  agricultural policymakers with  farm  incomes, 
it is no  surprise that studies  on  the  effects of agricultural policy changes, 
commissioned by  the  Federal Ministry of Agriculture before  German  unification, 
focused  on  the  implications of policy changes  on west  German  farm  incomes. 
1/  Helpful  comments  from  Wilhelm Henrichsmeyer  on this section are greatly 
appreciated. 
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,. The  most  comprehensive  and detailed study done  for  the Ministry is that by 
Braune  and Henrichsmeyer  (1988).  The  methodological base  of the  analysis is a 
large scale linear programming model  of agricultural production,  factor  and 
input use,  and  income,  which is differentiated with regard to  regions  (42 
regions),  farm  size groups  (four different size groups  in each  region),  and 
commodities  (32  different production and  input activities in each  size 
group).  The  central aim  of this study was  to provide projections of the 
medium  and  longer  term developments  of agricultural production and  income  in 
west  Germany  under different scenarios  regarding future price policies until 
1992  and  2000. 
The  first price scenario can be  called the  "restrictive" price policy.  Under 
this  scenario,  it is  assumed  that,  beginning in 1985,  support prices are 
continuously adjusted such that producer prices are  reduced by  an annual rate 
of 3.5 percent in real terms  for all commodities  on average.  Such  a  price 
policy would be  more  restrictive than past price policy.  For  example,  from 
1975  to  1985' real producer prices went  down  by  an annual  rate of 2.3  percent 
(calculated from  STJELF,  various  issues).  For  the  "restrictive" price policy, 
Braune  and Henrichsmeyer present results  for both 1992  and  2000. 
The  second price scenario may  be  called the  "rigid" price policy.  Under  this 
scenario,  the  annual  rate of decline  in real producer prices  is 5.5 percent. 
For this  "rigid" price policy,  Braune  and Henrichsmeyer  only present results 
for  1992. 
For  individual  commodities,  assumptions  on real price  developments  deviate 
from  the  assumed  trend of the  average producer price  index depending  on;  1) 
expected productivity developments,  2)  the  respective market  situations  and, 
3)  the nature of the market  regimes.  Price  assumptions  for  individual 
commodities  are reported in table  3.1.  Grain and pigmeat prices are  assumed 
to decline more  sharply than the  average,  while prices  for  the  two  products 
under  quotas,  i.e.  sugar and milk,  and  rapeseed prices,  are  assumed  to  decline 
less  than the average. 
Table  3.1--P~ice assumptions made  by  B~aune/Hen~ichsmeye~: 
Rapeseed  a) 
Barley b) 
Soft Wheat 
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a)  oilseeds,  b)  coarse grains,  c)  -3.0  from  1992  to 2000. 
Sou~ces: Braune  and  Henrichsmeyer  (1988). 
To  what  extent  the  price developments  assumed  in this  study would bring 
domestic  prices  in Germany  into line with world market prices,  and hence  to 
what  extent  the  scenarios  analyzed can be  considered to  model  trade 
41 The  most  comprehensive  and detailed study done  for  the Ministry is that by 
Braune  and Henrichsmeyer  (1988).  The  methodological base of the analysis is a 
large scale linear programming model  of agricultural production,  factor  and 
input use,  and  income,  which  is differentiated with regard to  regions  (42 
regions),  farm  size groups  (four different size groups  in each region),  and 
commodities  (32  different production and  input activities in each  size 
group).  The  central aim of this study was  to provide projections of the 
medium  and  longer  term developments  of agricultural production and  income  in 
west Germany  under different scenarios  regarding future price policies until 
1992  and  2000. 
The  first price scenario  can be called the  "restrictive" price policy.  Under 
this scenario,  it is assumed  that,  beginning in 1985,  support prices are 
continuously adjusted such that producer prices are  reduced by an annual  rate 
of 3.5 percent in real terms  for all commodities  on average.  Such  a  price 
policy would be  more  restrictive than past price policy.  For  example,  from 
1975  to  1985" real producer prices went  down  by  an annual  rate of 2.3  percent 
(calculated from  STJELF,  various  issues).  For  the  "restrictive" price policy, 
Braune  and Henrichsmeyer present results for both 1992  and  2000. 
The  second price scenario may  be  called the  "rigid" price policy.  Under  this 
scenario,  the  annual rate of decline  in real producer prices is 5.5  percent. 
For  this  "rigid" price policy,  Braune  and Henrichsmeyer  only present results 
for  1992. 
For  individual commodities,  assumptions  on real price  developments  deviate 
from  the  assumed  trend of the  average producer price  index depending  on;  1) 
expected productivity developments,  2)  the  respective market situations  and, 
3)  the nature of the market  regimes.  Price assumptions  for  individual 
commodities  are reported in table  3.1.  Grain and  pigmeat prices are  assumed 
to decline more  sharply than the  average,  while  prices  for  the  two  products 
under  quotas,  i.e.  sugar and milk,  and  rapeseed prices,  are  assumed  to decline 
less  than the  average. 
Table 3_'--Price assumptions  made  by  Braune/Henrichsmeyer: 
Rapeseed  a) 
Barley b) 
Soft Wheat 
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a)  oilseeds,  b)  coarse grains,  c)  -3.0  from  1992  to 2000. 
Sources:  Braune  and  Henrichsmeyer  (1988). 
To  what  extent the  price  developments  assumed  in this study would bring 
domestic prices  in Germany  into line with world market prices,  and hence  to 
what  extent the  scenarios  analyzed can be  considered to  model  trade 
41 liberalization,  depends  of course  on  the  assumptions  one  makes  on world market 
prices.  Braune  and Henrichsmeyer have  not  looked  into this  issue since their 
study was  concerned only with domestic  price policy.  However,  one  can 
interpret their scenarios  in trade liberalization terms  if one  adds 
assumptions  on world market prices. 
Table  3.2 presents Tangermann's  estimates of what  the price scenarios  studied 
by  Braune  and Henrichsmeyer  could mean  in terms  of PSE  developments.  In 
addition,  graphs  3.1 to  3.3 plot the price scenarios  against Tangermann's 
assumptions  about  future world market prices. 
Table 3.2--AssuIptions on  world Erleet prices and  resulting PSE's  in the EC 
Arnal change of real world Erleet price c) 
Resulting  1992  1992  2000 
Trade  PSE  "Restrictive"  "Rigid"  "Restrictive" 
Percent 
Rapeseed  a)  -0.8  38.3  28.7  29.2 
Barley b)  -0.8  ·13.7  ·31.9  ·60.7 
Soft  Wheat  -0.7  5.2  ·10.1  -35.1 
Corn  b)  ·0.7  6.4  ·8.6  ·33.4 
Sugar  -0.7  50.5  42.5  29.4 
Mille  1  36.0  28.6  15.1 
Beef  0  34.5  24.1  16.4 
Veal  0  1.7  ·9.7  ·30.7 
Pigmeat  ·1  -8.7  ·21.4  ·44.9 
a)  oilseeds,  b)  coarse grains,  c)  world  market  prices projected from  1984·1986  base. 
Sources:  Econ.  Res.  Serv.,  USDA,  1988,  and  assumptions  and  calculations by 
Tangermam. 
The  following procedure has been adopted in making  these projections of world 
market prices.  As  a  starting point,  data from  the  USDA  estimates of PSE's  for 
the  EC  have  been used  (USDA,  1988).  From  these data,  the  average  EC  producer 
price for  1984-86  has been calculated in ECU/ton  and may  not be  the  same  as 
the base year prices used by Braune  and Henrichsmeyer  since  the latter used 
German  price averages  in Deutschmark.  The  implicit world market price for 
1984-86 has  then been reconstructed by deducting  the policy transfers 
resulting from  trade measures  (transfers  in millions of  ECU,  divided by  level 
of production)  from  the  EC  producer price. 
Assumptions  on  future  rates of change  of real world market prices are based on 
the estimates by  Scandizzo  and Diakosavas  (Scandizzo  and Diakosavas,  1987). 
These  are derived from  trends  in the  commodity  terms  of trade  ($U.S.  commodity 
prices relative to  the U.S.  index of unit value  of exports  of manufactured 
goods)  on the basis of long-run  time  series for  the period 1900  to  1982. 
Their results for  the  average  annual  change  in these  terms  of trade have been 
used as  assumptions  on world market price  developments  for wheat,  corn,  and 
sugar  as  given in table  3.2. 
Assumptions  on  the  remaining products  have  been subjectively set by 
Tangermann.  Though  the  analysis by  Scandizzo  and Diakosavas  was  done  in terms 
of U.s.  dollars,  it was  assumed  that  the  same  developments  in real  ECU  terms 
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Graph  3.1 
EC  and  World Prices in  Real  Terms 
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according  to purchasing power parity.  On  the  same  grounds,  it was  considered 
reasonable  to apply Braune's  and Henrichsmeyer's  assumptions  on real price 
developments  in Deutschmarks  to  the  ECU  producer prices  given in PSE  estimates 
by  the U.S.  Department of Agriculture. 
These projections of world market prices have been made  without explicit 
regard to  the possible effects of policy changes.  In principle,  they should 
map  the  trend of world market prices with current policies in the  absence  of 
global  trade liberalization.  If agricultural trade were  liberalized as  a 
result of a  multilateral agreement,  prices  in international trade might  go  up. 
It appears  clear from  a  number  of analyses  that such policy-induced changes  of 
world market prices may  be  relatively small  compared with annual price 
fluctuations.  Hence,  in projections of world market prices over  some  years, 
it may  be difficult to distinguish between  "normal"  fluctuations  and  the 
effects of trade liberalization.  It is particularly difficult to decide  on 
the appropriate base period from which  to project international prices  into 
the  future.  As  an illustration,  two  different base periods  for world market 
prices,  1984-86  and  1986,  are  shown  in graphs  3.1 to  3.3. 
The  PSE's  given in table  3.2 have been calculated using world market prices 
projected from  the  1984-86 base.  It should be noted that PSE's  as  calculated 
here  are not the usual  PSE  numbers,  but only the partial PSE's  resulting from 
trade policies which  measure  exclusively the  gap between  EC  prices  and world 
prices.  Overall  PSE's  would be higher to  the extent that structural and other 
policies  transfer  income  to  farmers. 
As  can be  seen from  the  graphs  and  from  the  PSE  projections,  EC  prices,  as 
implicitly assumed by  Braune  and Henrichsmeyer,  would  indeed get close  to,  or 
even below,  world market prices.  The  tendency  for  this  to happen,  under  the 
assumptions  made,  is particularly pronounced for cereals,  pigmeat,  and veal. 
Domestic  EC  and west German  prices  for  other commodities  would remain well 
above  international prices.  Domestic  prices for  rapeseed,  sugar,  milk,  and 
beef would still be  significantly higher  than world market prices,  even under 
the  "rigid" price scenario for  1992  and under  the  scenario  for  2000. 
The  study by  Braune  and Henrichsmeyer,  therefore,  does  not fully analyze  the 
effects of trade  liberalization for west  German  agriculture.  However,  the 
overall level of domestic prices studied in these  scenarios  may  come  close  to 
what  could be  expected under  trade  liberalization if one  considers  that world 
market prices may  increase  as  a  result of multilateral trade  liberalization. 
It may  not be  completely unreasonable  to  interpret the  "rigid"  scenario  for 
1992  and  the  scenario  for  2000  as  approximating  the effect of trade 
liberalization. 
Selected aggregate  results of the  study are  summarized  in table  3.3. 
Production trends  would differ markedly  among  commodities.  Cereal production 
would  go  down  as  a  result of price reductions.  Oilseeds  (essentially 
rapeseed)  production would  increase significantly because  of the  assumed 
positive price  trend for  this  commodity  group.  Given  the  different assumed 
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.. movements  of cereals and oilseeds prices relative to world market  levels  (see 
graphs),  trade liberalization would probably lead to  smaller price cuts for 
cereals,  but larger price reductions  for  oilseeds,  such that the production 
trends of these  two  commodity  groups  would be  less divergent  than what  is 
estimated in the  Braune/Henrichsmeyer study. 
Table 3.3--Aggregate results of Braune  and  Henrichsmeyer 
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a)  full·time equivalents of "labor  required" as defined by  Braune/Henrichsmeyer. 
b)  in real  terms. 
Source:  Braune  and  Henrichsmeyer,  1988. 
Production of sugar and milk  in the  model  is determined by quotas.  For  sugar, 
no  change  in quota volume  has been assumed.  The  reduction of milk  quotas 
included in the  model  is  the  quota reduction which has  taken place  since  1986. 
Under  true  trade liberalization,  profitability of both sugar and milk 
production would be  reduced  to the extent that quotas  would no  longer be 
binding and production of both sugar and milk would likely go  down. 
Production of beef and veal would be  reduced significantly because  of the 
reduced number  of dairy cows  in reaction to cuts  of milk quotas  and  lower meat 
prices.  Pigmeat production would  increase  somewhat  because  of lower  feed 
costs  and because  of greater demand  for pigmeat  due  to  lower  consumer prices. 
Labor  input would decrease by roughly one-fourth until 1992  under  the  "rigid" 
policy scenario,  and by one-third from  1985  to  1999  under  the  "restrictive" 
scenario.  Such  reductions  in the size of the agricultural  labor  force  may 
sound  dramatic but  they are  by  no  means  unprecedented. 
The  projected development  of the  agricultural  labor  force  would mean  a 
reduction of 3.8 percent annually  from  1985  to  1992  under  the  "rigid" 
scenario,  and  a  decrease  of 3.1 percent  annually  from  1985  to  1999  under  the 
"restrictive" scenario.  Such  rates of decline  in the agricultural labor force 
47 have  been observed for  a  long  time  in west  Germany  and were  significantly 
higher until the mid-seventies  (table 3.4). 
The  projected development of the  labor  force  in agriculture is highly relevant  ~, 
when it comes  to  assessing future  developments  of farm  incomes.  According  to 
the  study by Braune  and Henrichsmeyer,  a  "rigid" price policy maintained until 
1992,  or  a  "restrictive" policy pursued until 1999,  would result in a 
reduction of total net value  added in German  agriculture by  around 40  percent 
in real  terms.  This  would be  a  very significant loss  of  income  for  the 
farming  industry,  and quite  obviously for  the  industries  linked to agriculture 
and  in those rural areas where  the  farming population is still a  major  factor. 
Income  per capita in agriculture would decrease  much  less because of the 
decline  in the agricultural labor force.  Net value  added per unit of labor in 
agriculture would  decrease by around fifteen percent. 
Clearly,  und~r the  more  gradual  reform scenario  (the  "restrictive" price 
policy until 1999),  the  decline  in income  per capita in agriculture would be 
less pronounced  than under  the more  rapid type  of reform  (the  "rigid"  price 
policy until 1992)  because  farmers  would have  more  time  to  adjust. 
The  significance of this decline  in farm  incomes  is obvious  if one  compares it 
with expected  income  developments  outside agriculture. 
Table 3.4--Annual  rates of decline of the agricultural 
labor force a)  in West  Genaany 
PerIod 
1961  •  1965 
1965  - 1970 
1970  - 1975 
1975  - 1980 
1980  - 1985 
1985  - 1988 








a)  Full-time equivalents  ("Voll-AK"). 
Source:  STJELF,  various  issues;  Agrarbericht,  1989. 
In their study,  Braune  and Henrichsmeyer project an annual  increase of real 
gross wages  for workers  outside agriculture of 2.1 percent  from  1985  to  1992 
and 2.6 percent  from  1992  to  1999.  Under  these  assumptions,  farm  incomes  per 
capita would drop  to  65  percent of what  they would have  been had  they 
increased at  the  same  rate as  wages  outside agriculture.  Looked at in a 
different way,  total net value  added  in agriculture  in 1999  under  the 
"restrictive" scenario would be  roughly six billion Deutschmarks  (in 1985 
prices)  below what it would have  to be  if farmers'  incomes  per capita were  to 
increase at the  same  rate as  gross  wages  outside agriculture.  Hence  this  sum 
could indicate an order of magnitude  of possible  claims  for  compensation. 
The  validity of compensation claims  would be  questionable  for at least  two 
reasons.  First,  it appears  that  the  model  used by  Braune  and Henrichsmeyer 
does  not  include all the  adjustments within agriculture  that would likely 
occur  in reaction to  changing  economic  conditions.  Second,  even without an 
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,. explicit reform of the  CAP  in the direction of trade liberalization,  farm 
incomes  may  come  under pressure because  of the  mounting problems  on  EC 
agricultural markets.  Hence,  farmers'  incomes  may  not  increase  in line with 
non-agricultural  incomes. 
It would be wrong  to attribute the  total decline of farm  income  relative to 
non-farm  income  to  any  reduction in price support  that occurs  after a 
multilateral agreement  to  liberalize agricultural trade.  It would be 
necessary  to forecast  the  development  of farm prices which would occur in the 
absence  of multilateral trade  liberalization in order  to single out  the 
additional effects of a  multilateral agreement. 
Income  developments  as  projected by  Braune  and Henrichsmeyer differ 
significantly within agriculture.  Income  effects in different farm  size 
groups  averaged across all regions  are  summarized  in table  3.5.  Under  the 
"rigid" policy scenario,  from  1985  to  1992,  real  income  per labor unit would 
drop  most  (by  26  percent)  in the  largest size group  (50 hectares  and more), 
while  in the  smallest size  group  (10 hectares  and less)  real  income  would  even 
increase  (by  6  percent)  in spite of the price cuts.  These  results appear 
rather plausible since it is usually assumed  that larger farms  benefit more 
from price support  (von Witzke,  1979). 
Table 3.5--Real  incaae per  labor unit a)  in fan. size groups 
Projected by Braune  and HenrichSilleyer 
1985  1992  1992 
Size Group  Base  "Restrictive  "Rigid" 
Percent 
<  10  ha  100  111  106 
10  •  20  ha  100  94  78 
20  •  50  ha  100  101  81 
>  50  ha  100  91  74 
Average  100  99  83 
a)  Real  net  value added  per  labor  unit "required". 
Source:  Calculated  from  Braune  and  Henrichsmeyer,  1988. 
Such different  income  effects of policy changes  in different  farm  groups  would 
significantly affect  the  income  distribution within agriculture.  Table  3.6 
presents Braune's  and Henrichsmeyer's  results  in terms  of the  income  position 
of different farm size groups  relative  to  average  income  in agriculture.  Per 
capita incomes  in agriculture differ significantly among  farm  size  groups  in 
the base  situation (1985).  Net value  added per labor unit in the  largest size 
group  is nearly three  times  as  large  as  that in the  smallest size  group.  It 
should be  pointed out  that  income  here  is only on-farm  income;  total  income 
differs  less between  farm  groups. 
Reductions  in price support,  however,  reduce  the  income  gap  between  the 
different size  groups.  Under  the  "restrictive" price scenario,  incomes  are 
less unequal  among  farm  groups  in 1992  than  they were  in 1985,  while  under  the 
"rigid" price scenario,  the  spread is even further  reduced. 
49 Table 3.6--Inca.e per  labor unit a)  in fan. size groups  relative to average 
inca.e in agriculture 
1985  1992 
Size Group  Base  "Restrictive" 
Percent 
<  10  ha  65  73 
10  •  20  ha  73  70 
20  •  50  ha  116  119 
>  50  ha  180  166 
Average  100  100 
Std.  Deviation b)  46  39 
a)  Real  net value added  per  labor  uni t  "requi red". 
b)  Standard deviation of  the four  index  values above. 









Another  dimension of much  political interest is the  regional  implication of 
agricultural" policy reform.  The  projected development of real value  added per 
labor unit in different states  ("Bundeslander")  of west  Germany  is summarized 
in table 3.7.  At  this level of disaggregation,  there is not much  difference 
between different regions  of west  Germany.  Regional  income  changes  under  the 
different policy scenarios would not diverge  much  from  the  aggregate  income 
changes  in west  Germany.  From  a  political point of view,  it may  be 
interesting to note  that agricultural  income  in ~avaria tends  to suffer most 
from  cuts  in support prices.  However,  the  income  difference between Bavaria 
and other states is not really large. 
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a)  Real  net  value added  per  labor unit "required". 











Since  the  implications of the  different scenarios  do  not differ very much 
among  the different states,  the relative positions of the states vis-a-vis  the 
average  for west  Germany  do  not change  significantly.  Table  3.8 presents 
index values  relative  to  the  German  average.  From  this  table,  the very 
significant North-South differential in agricultural  income  per capita in west 
Germany  is obvious.  In 1985,  value  added per labor unit in Schleswig-Holstein 
(i.e.  in the  north)  was  nearly  70  percent above  that in Bavaria  (i.e.  the 
south).  However,  the  spread among  states does  not  change  much  under  the 
different scenarios. 
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.' Income  implications of the different policy scenarios differ markedly at the 
more  dis  aggregated level of the  42  individual  regions  distinguished in the 
Braune/Henrichsmeyer study.  For  example,  under  the  "rigid" policy scenario, 
changes  in real net value  added per labor unit from  1985  to  1992  vary between 
a  gain of 5.1 percent in the wine-producing region of Badisches Rheintal  and a 
loss  of 34.7 percent in Franken und Oberpfalzer Wald,  a  dairy and cereal area. 
Table 3.8--Net value added per  labor Wlit a)  in Genaan States relative 
to average in Ger.any 
1985  1992  1992 
Base  "Restrictive"  "Rigid" 
Average  for  Germany  = 100 
Schleswig· Holstein  140  143  138 
Niedersachsen  122  120  119 
Nordrhein·Westfalen  101  108  113 
Hessen  101  99  91 
Rheinland  Pfalz/Saar  98  100  101 
Baden-Wurttemberg  85  88  91 
Bayern  83  83  18 
Germany,  Total  100  100  100 
Standard Deviation  19  19  8 
a)  Net  value added  per  labor  unit "required". 
Source:  Calculated from  Braune  and  Henrichsmeyer,  1988_ 
• 
Gainers:  Changes  in Consumer  and Taxpayer Welfare 
While  farmers  would  lose  from  agricultural  trade liberalization,  consumers  and 
taxpayers  would gain.  The  extent of these gains,  as  well  as  the  size of the 
overall loss  to agriculture,  has  traditionally been studied with  the help of 
partial equilibrium welfare analysis.  One  such study for  the  European 
Community  as  an aggregate,  as well  as  for  individual member  countries,  has 
been provided by Buckwell,  Harvey,  Thomson  and Parton  (BHTP)  (Buckwell  et. 
al.,  1982).  The  base year  for  their estimates was  1980.  Unfortunately,  it 
appears  that no  other comprehensive  study that specifies  the  taxpayer  and 
consumer effects of agricultural trade  liberalization in west Germany  has been 
published more  recently. 
The  BHTP  model  includes production and  consumption of 16  commodities- all 
cereals,  sugar beet,  beef and veal,  pork,  poultry,  eggs,  butter,  cheese, 
skimmed  milk powder,  cream,  and  condensed milk.  Supply  and demand  estimates 
are based on assumed matrices of own  and cross-price elasticities.  Changes  of 
world market prices are  derived  from  assumed  supply  and  demand  elasticities in 
the rest of the world. 
According  to  BHTP,  complete  agricultural  trade  liberalization in the  EC,  i.e., 
removal  of all CAP  price support,  would have  resulted in a  reduction in the 
index  of real producer prices of  38.3  percent  from  the  1980 base.  This  is 
slightly higher  than  the  37.2  percent reduction estimated in the  Braune  and 
Henrichsmeyer  study under  the  rigid price assumption.  As  a  result of the 
corresponding decrease  of production and  increase  in consumption,  the  degree 
of self-sufficiency in west  Germany  would have  dropped  from  96  to  63  percent. 
51 The  total loss of annual  farm  income  in west  Germany  resulting from  this price 
reduction would have  been 6.5 billion ECU  (1  ECU-$1.392).  West  German 
taxpayers would have  saved 2.7 billion ECU  per year  and  the  annual  consumer 
gain would have been 9  billion ECU.  Annual  overall economic welfare  in west 
Germany  would  thus have  increased by  5.2 billion ECU.  This  overall welfare 
gain would have  amounted  to  "only"  around 0.9 percent of west German  GDP  in 
1980.  However,  there are  few  individual policy changes  which  can increase 
overall welfare by a  similar magnitude. 
The  overall welfare  increase  from  trade liberalization results  from  the  fact 
that consumers  and  taxpayers  pay more  than what  farmers  receive  from  existing 
price support.  According  to  BHTP,  west German  taxpayers  and  consumers  lost 
1.8  ECU  for each  ECU  which west German  farmers  gained~  A large part of this 
welfare loss  could be  saved through  some  other  form  of income  transfer to 
farmers  which would not distort production and resource allocation decisions. 
Among  all individual member  countries of the  Community,  the  FRG  would have 
derived the highest welfare gain from  liberalizing the  CAP.  Nearly half of 
the aggregate  EC  welfare gain which could have been made  in 1980  by 
liberalizing the  CAP  would have  accrued to  the  FRG.  In per capita terms,  FRG 
gains would have been much  higher than in any other member  country.  German 
taxpayers  and  consumers  would have  made  an annual  gain of 469  ECU  per head, 
while  the  average  gain in the  Community  (EC-9)  would have  been 321  ECU.  In 
the  Community  on aggregate,  taxpayers  and  consumers  paid 1.5  ECU  per  ECU 
received by farmers. 
The  reason why  west  German  gains  from  liberalizing the  CAP  are particularly 
high is because  the  FRG  was  a  net importer of agricultural products  and 
because  the  degree of self-sufficiency in west  Germany  (96  percent in 1980 
according to  BHTP)  is below that in the  Community  on average  (112  percent). 
This  means  that west German  taxpayers  are making net contributions  to  the 
disposal of surpluses  generated in other member  countries. 
According  to  BHTP,  these net contributions of west-German  taxpayers were 
equivalent to 0.89 billion ECU  in 1980.  Moreover,  west  German  consumers  are 
paying high internal  EC  prices for  imports  from  EC  member  states rather  than 
lower world market prices.  The  reSUlting  income  transfer from  German 
consumers  to  farmers  in other  EC  member  countries was  0.85 billion ECU  in 
1980.  Thus  the  total cost to  the  German  economy  of pursuing agricultural 
policy in a  Community  framework  rather  than with a  national policy was 
equivalent to 1.74 billion ECU  in 1980. 
In other words,  a  significant part  (roughly one  third)  of the  total welfare 
gain which  the  FRG  would have  made  from  liberalizing the  CAP  would have 
resulted from  eliminating the  income  transfers which  flowed  from  west German 
consumers  and  taxpayers  to  farmers  in other member  countries.  Looked  at from 
a  different perspective,  when  the  FRG  government pressured Brussels  to raise 
CAP  support prices,  the  FRG  transferred even more  income  to  farmers  in other 
member  countries.  For marginal price  changes  the  effects are  even more 
pronounced  than for  total liberalization.  According  to  BHTP,  with  a  small 
uniform price increase,  west German  taxpayers  and  consumers  lost 2.24  ECU  per 
ECU  gained by German  farmers. 
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In the  BHTP  study,  it was  assumed  that only the  EC  liberalized its 
agricultural policy.  If other countries liberalized their agricultural 
policies,  world market prices would  increase by  more  than what was  implied in 
the  BHTP  study.  Hence,  both the loss  in farm  incomes  and  the gain in consumer 
welfare would be  smaller although  the  reduction in the  taxpayer burden would 
not change with complete  liberalization. 
Since  the  FRG  was  still a  net agricultural  importer,  the  overall welfare gain 
would have been smaller than under unilateral  EC  liberalization.  However,  it 
would still have been positive and significant.  Moreover,  because both 
production and consumption have  grown  since 1980,  and because  EC  prices have 
increased,  the absolute magnitude  of the  results would now  tend to be higher 
than it was  in 1980. 
Spillover Effects:  Overall Economy 
While  the  studies cited in the  two  preceding sections were  exclusively 
concerned with  the agricultural implications of farm price policies,  a  study 
by Dicke,  Donges,  Gerken,  and Kirkpatrick  (1988)  looked into  the effects of 
agricultural policy on the overall economy  in the  FRG.  The  model  designed and 
used by Dicke,  Donges,  Gerken,  and Kirkpatrick  (DDGK)  is a  general equilibrium 
model  for  the west German  economy,  derived from  the Australian ORANI  model 
(Dixon et al.,  1982).  The  model  has  13  sectors  (agriculture,  food processing, 
coal mining,  seven manufacturing,  and three service sectors).  Agriculture is 
treated as  one  homogeneous  sector. 
Some  of the model's  characteristics  include rigid real after-tax wages  and,  by 
implication,  determination of employment  by  labor demand  according to nominal 
gross  wages;  full mobility of labor and capital between sectors although with 
final wage  rate and interest differentials between sectors;  differentiation 
between skilled and unskilled labor;  imperfect substitutability between home 
and overseas  goods;  small-country assumption for  FRG  imports  and  large-country 
assumption for  FRG  exports;  constant nominal  government  expenditure  on goods 
and services;  a  balanced government budget with  an endogenous  direct tax rate; 
and  an exogenous  balance of trade  surplus with  an  endogenous  exchange  rate. 
In the  study,  two  different policy scenarios are analyzed;  agricultural 
liberalization,  and full liberalization in all sectors  of the  FRG  economy. 
Under  agricultural liberalization,  both border protection and  domestic 
subsidies are  removed.  Border protection for agriculture  in the base 
year  (1980)  is assumed  to be  equivalent to  the nominal  rate of protection of 
54  percent derived from  the Anderson and Tyers  estimate  (Anderson and Tyers, 
1987).  This  appears  to  imply that  DDGK  have  assumed  that  the  PSE  reSUlting 
from  trade measures  is around  35  percent.  This  would be  roughly in line with 
the  USDA  estimate of the  overall PSE  for all products  in the  EC  for  the 
1982-86  average  (USDA,  1988). 
In addition,  the  DDGK  study apparently assumed  that domestic  subsidies  to  FRG 
agriculture are  around  70  percent of the protection provided  through border 
measures  (Dicke  et al.  1988).  The  total  PSE  for  FRG  agriculture in the base 
situation,  according to  the  study,  would  then appear  to be  around  60  percent. 
53 This  would be  significantly higher than estimates  for  the total PSE  in the  EC 
provided by USDA  and  OECD.  Hence,  the  reduction of value  added in FRG 
agriculture,  as  assumed by  the  study in its liberalization runs,  may  be 
significantly higher  than what  one  would expect on  the basis of available  PSE 
estimates.  The  DDGK  study also assumed that world market prices for 
agricultural products would rise by  10  percent when  the  FRG  liberalized 
because other countries were  implicitly assumed  to liberalize their 
agricultural trade as well. 
The  macroeconomic  effects of both agricultural and full liberalization in the 
FRG,  according to  the  DDGK  study,  are  summarized in table 3.9.  West  German 
GNP  would  increase by  3.3 percent if agricultural protection in west Germany 
were  eliminated.  This  overall gain is very large,  much  larger than estimated 
in any of the partial equilibrium studies.  Indeed,  it is surprising to learn 
that removal  of protection in a  sector with no  more  than two  percent of total 
GNP  could boost overall GNP  by more  than three percent. 
Table 3_9--Macroecana.ic results of the DOGK  Study 
Macroeconomic  variables: 
GNP •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Real  H\Come •••••••••••••••••• 
Real  consumption •••••••••••••• 
Aggregate  imports  and 
exports ••••••••••••  "  •••••••• 
Real  exchange  rate  •••••••• 
E~loyment of  unskilled 
labor •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
E~loyment of skilled 
labor •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Rea1  wages  after 
tax  ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Rea1  wages  before 
tax  ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Consuner  price 
index •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Government  finance: 
Average  direct tax  rate  •••••• 
Direct  tax 
revenue •••••••••••••••••••••• 
Revenue  from  direct and 
indirect taxes ••••••••••••••• 
Subsidies excl.  export 
subsidies •••••••••••••••••••• 
Government  expenditure ••••••• 
Real  government 
expenditure •••••••••••••••••• 
Percentage Changes  in Variables 
Agricultural  Full 

































a)  Defined  with  respect  to the consuner  price index. 
Source:  Adopted  from  Dicke  et. al.,  1988. 
In purely technical  terms  this is not  impossible,  since it could well be  that 
people  are retained in a  sector where value  added "per  worker  is  low  (or  even 
negative).  If these  people were  released to  other sectors where  they actually 
made  a  positive contribution to value  added,  GNP  could increase by much  more 
54 than the  loss  in the protected sector.  Moreover,  since  the  tax burden on 
other sectors  and  on consumers  is reduced,  economic  activity in the  country 
concerned may  expand significantly. 
Nevertheless,  it seems  surprising that such a  relatively small sector as 
agriculture should be  able  to hold back an entire economy  to  such an extent. 
It is even more  surprising that liberalization of agriculture would achieve 
more  than one-third of the overall gain in GNP  which  could be  made  if all 
sectors of the west German  economy,  including other highly protected sectors 
as  coal mining,  iron and steel,  and textiles and clothing,  were  liberalized. 
Another  interesting result of the  DDGK  study relates  to  the overall employment 
effects of agricultural protection in the  FRG.  According  to  the  study, 
aggregate  employment  in Germany  would  increase by  3.8 percent for unskilled 
labor and by 4.0 percent for skilled labor if agricultural protection were 
removed.  In absolute  terms  this would mean  the creation of 850,000  new  jobs 
in west Germany  if agricultural trade were  liberalized.  If this expansion of 
employment  were  actually achieved,  west Germany  would  reduce its massive 
unemployment  by around two-fifths. 
The  fact  that agricultural protection could reduce  overall employment has been 
indicated by  a  number  of general equilibrium studies.  The  study by Stoeckel 
(1985)  on the macroeconomic  effects of the  Common  Agricultural Policy,  and 
studies  on other countries  summarized by Stoeckel  (1988),  generate similar 
results.  Such results run counter  to  one  of the  main arguments  for 
agricultural protection advanced by  the  farm  lobbies  and agricultural 
policymakers.  Agricultural support is necessary because it contributes  to  the 
protection of jobs  in agriculture which would  otherwise be  lost.  Such 
arguments  have been advanced vigorously since overall west  German  unemployment 
has  risen to such dramatically high levels  (around  9  percent)  in the 1980's. 
Intuitively,  this argument is rather convincing,  and nearly every debate  on 
agricultural policy in west Germany  raises this point. 
However,  for an economist it is not surprising to  find that protection retards 
rather  than creates employment.  Protection reduces  the efficiency of the 
economy  and its international competitiveness.  Yet,  it is not  easy to get 
this message  across  to  the general public because  the  economic  relationships 
which  cause  this result are rather complex.  One  major  factor behind the 
economic  growth  that occurs because of agricultural trade  liberalization is an 
increase  in aggregate  demand  (table 3.9).  Real  government  expenditure  on 
goods  and services  expands because  the  government  saves  on subsidy payments 
and has higher tax  income.  Moreover,  private real consumption  increases  in 
part due  to  a  reduction in the  consumer price  index.  However,  increasing real 
consumption is also caused by higher overall  income  which results  from  growing 
production in all non-agricultural sectors except  food processing  (table 
3.10). 
Expanded non-agricultural output also  increases  employment.  This  is  a  result 
of  two  main  factors:  1)  wage  costs  to  industry are  reduced  (real wages  before 
tax),  and  2)  the  real  exchange  rate depreciates  (by  1.8 percent)  leading to 
expanded exports  and  import substitution. 
55 Table 3.10--Sector results of the DOGIe  Study 
Percentage  Changes  In  OUtl2!:!t 
Liberalization  Labor  Consuner  Land 
eroduction sector:  Agricultural  Full  Demand  a)  Demand 
1.  AgrIculture,  forestry, 
and  fishery •••••••••••••••  -24.7  -15.4  23.8  3.8  17.2 
2.  Food  processing and 
beverages •••••••••••••••••  -10.3  -1.1  -10.3  2.0 
3.  Coal  mining •••••••••••••••  5.4  -64.5  5.5  1.5  3.6 
4.  Iron and  steel ••••••••••••  7.8  5.8  7.9  2.1 
5.  Basic  commodities ••••••••  5.7  16.1  5.9  2.1 
6.  Aerospace •••••••••••••••••  7.5  -25.3  7.6  0.0 
7.  Electrical engineering, 
data processing •••••••••••  9.0  30.8  9.2  1.2 
8.  Metal  working  and 
mechanical  engineering ••••  5.3  18.2  5.4  1.3 
9.  Clothing  and  textiles  •••••  15.1  -24.9  15.3  2.2 
10.  Other  consuner  goods ••••••  4.2  8.9  4.4  1.3 
11.  Construction and 
housing ...•.  ., .••..••.•••..  2.8  11.1  3.2  2.6 
12.  Market  services  ••••••••••••  3.4  8.7  3.7  3.8 
13.  Non·market  services  •••••••  1.8  4.1  1.8  1.7 
a)  As  relative wages  are held constant,  skilled and  unskilled sectoral 
employment  alter in the same  proportion to overall  sectoral employment. 
Source:  Adopted  from  Dicke  et. al.,  (1988) 
The  consequences  of agricultural liberalization for  the non-agricultural 
sectors are probably the most  interesting results of the  DDGK  study.  As 
already mentioned,  it was  only recently that west German  industrialists have 
begun to criticize the  CAP.  Earlier lack of criticism by  industry may  have 
been caused by  insufficient insight into  the way  and  the extent to which 
agricultural protection affects  the  economic well-being of industry. 
Agricultural liberalization would  even lead to pronounced output expansion in 
"troubled"  industries such as  coal mining,  iron and steel,  and clothing and 
textiles  (table 3.10).  Even  more  important  in an economic  context are  the 
significant output  increases which would  occur  in such  important sectors as 
electrical engineering,  data processing,  metal  working,  mechanical  engineer-
ing,  and aerospace. 
The  volume  and structure of German  foreign trade would also  change  signifi-
cantly,  as  shown  in tables  3.9  and  3.11.  In nearly all non-agricultural 
sectors,  the volume  of imports would  go  down  and  exports would  expand.  The 
output and export expansion in non-agricultural sectors,  as  estimated by  the 
DDGK  study,  is a  striking indication of the extent to which agricultural 
protection taxes  other industries  in west  Germany. 
In addition to  the results of partial analysis studies concerning the overall 
gain in economic welfare and  GNP  which would result from  agricultural trade 
liberalization in west Germany,the  general equilibrium study by  DDGK  identi-
fies  those  industries which would be  the major beneficiaries of agricultural 
policy reform in the  FRG.  From  these  results,  it is obvious  that German 
economic  po1icymakers  should contribute  towards  a  successful outcome  of the 




" individual industries in the Germany  economy  should also have  a  strong 
incentive to press  for agricultural policy reform. 
Table 3.11--Sectoral Trade Shares and Changes  Resulting frCII  Agricultural 
Trade  Liberalization as Esti.ated by  DOG[ 
1980  Shares  in Percent  and  Percentage Changes  in variables 
ProciJction 
Sector: 
1980  Share  of:  Volume  of:  Price of: 
IlIIPOrts  a) Exports  b)  IlIIPOrts  Exports  IlIp)rts Exports 
Agriculture,  forestry, 
and  fishery··············  7.7 
Food  processing and 
beverages  ••••••••••••••••  5.8 
Coal  mining  ••••••••••••••  .4 
Iron and steel···········  3.9 
Basic commodities  •••••••• 39.7 
Aerospace  ••••••••••••••••  1.0 
Electrical  engin~ering, 
and  data processing  ••••••  6.9 
Metal  working  and 
mechanical  engineering  ••• 10.6 
Clothing  and  textiles ••••  6.9 
Other  consumer  goods······  7.5 
Construction and 
housing  ••••••••••••••••••  1.6 
Market  services ••••••••••  8.0 














33.9  -33.0 
71.9  2.3 
-9.6  2.9 
·3.5  9.2 
·.4  5.4 
.7  6.6 
-1.8  14.4 
-4.7  7.3 
-15.3  6.6 
·6.4  2.8 
.4  1.3 
.5  3.2 



























a)  Import  price in domestic  currency  inclUding  tariffs:  Foreign  prices are 
fixed.  , 
b)  Foreign currency export  price including  the effect of  any  export  subsidies. 
N.A.- Not  available. 
Source:  Adopted  from  Dicke  et al.,  1988. 
Could Gainers  Compensate  Losers? 
The  results of both the partial and  the  general equilibrium welfare  analyses 
show  that there would be  a  significant overall welfare gain for  the  FRG  if the 
CAP  were  liberalized.  In terms  of sectoral  income  distribution,  this means 
that non-farmers  gain more  than what  farmers  lose.  In aggregate  terms  there 
is no  doubt  that agricultural policy liberalization would easily create  the 
means  to  compensate  farmers  for  their  income  losses.  Since non-farmers'  gains 
are  larger than farmers'  losses,  either farmers'  incomes  could be  raised after 
liberalization,  or non-farmers'  welfare  could increase,  or both. 
The  issue of compensation for  farmers  is not whether it can be  done,  but how 
it can be  implemented  in practice.  This  is a  purely political question, 
loaded with sensitivities  (see Tangermann,  1989c).  Like  farmers  in other 
countries,  and possibly even more  so,  west  German  farmers  argue  that they  do 
not want  to live on welfare payments.  This  became  very obvious  when  the first 
detailed proposal  for direct income  aids  to  farmers  was  published in the  FRG 
(Koester and Tangermann,  1976),  and it was  again demonstrated when  the 
Scientific Advisory Council  to  the  Federal Ministry of Agriculture  issued a 
report which  argued against  a  specific  incomes  policy for agriculture  (and in 
particular against price support)  and suggested that farmers  in need could 
turn to  the  general social welfare  scheme  available  in the  FRG  (Wissens· 
chaftlicher Beirat,  1982).  The  reaction of west  German  farmers  to 
57 such proposals was  plainly hostile and  the authors  of these proposals have 
been anathematized for  a  long  time. 
The  political issue of how  to  compensate  farmers  for  any  income  losses 
resulting from price cuts  is not so much  one  of developing schemes  which 
exactly offset the effects of prices cuts without distorting production and 
investment decisions,  but one  of finding ways  to  achieve  compensation which  do 
not look like welfare.  Probably  the best way  of doing  so  is to  develop 
programs which arguably pay  farmers  for something  they do,  rather than paying 
farmers  for not doing anything. 
One  such possibility is to pay farmers  for giving up  the  "right to produce". 
This  is essentially what happens  under  the  recently introduced set-aside 
scheme.  However,  such schemes  have  the disadvantage  that,  since  they reduce 
the market surplus,  they trigger political demands  for price  increases  in 
later rounds.  A better alternative is to pay  farmers  for  leaving agriculture. 
Early retirement payments,  introduced in the  CAP  mainly because of pressure 
from  the  FRG,  is one  example  of a  sensible policy. 
A different approach,  which can easily be  combined with payments  for  leaving 
agriculture,  is to pay  farmers  for preserving the  environment.  In principle, 
such payments  should be highly regionalized and closely linked to activities 
which  improve  ecological conditions  in the  individual regions.  However,  from 
the point of view of finding a  politically feasible means  of compensating 
farmers  for  income  losses resulting from  significant price cuts,  it may  be 
worth considering schemes  which are less specific and more  generous  in income 
terms.  One  context in which such considerations may  be  important is in 
defining the policy coverage  for an Aggregate Measure  of Support  in the 
context of GATT  arrangements.  Some  of the  issues  involved will be  discussed 
in somewhat  more  detail in chapter  5. 
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.' Chapter 4.  The  "German  Approach"  to Multilateral Agricultural Policy Reform 
The  results of studies presented in the previous  chapter have  shown  that west 
Germany  could make  significant overall economic  gains if agricultural trade 
were  fully liberalized.  Moreover,  there is no  doubt  that the export-oriented 
sectors of Germany  have  a  strong economic  interest in a  successful overall 
outcome  of the Uruguay Round  negotiations.  This  is even more  true with the 
financial  needs  of German  unification  (see Chapter  6).  Hence,  to  the extent 
that the  success of the Uruguay Round  depends  on progress  in agriculture, 
German  negotiators should have  every incentive  to work  constructively for a 
positive approach  towards  agricultural trade liberalization. 
Agricultural interests have usually carried the  day  in the  FRG  as  described in 
chapters  1  and  2,  and west Germany  is strongly opposed to liberalization of 
trade  in agricultural products.  As  indicated earlier,  west German  farm 
incomes  woulo  come  under significant pressure if the  level of price support in 
the  European Community  had  to be  reduced significantly,  at least in the short 
and medium  run.  Given the relatively unfavorable  development of farm  incomes 
in west Germany  since  the middle of the 1970's,  there is strong and  increasing 
resistance against any  further pressure  on  farm  incomes.  From  this 
perspective,  it is no  wonder  that German  agricultural interests argue  strongly 
for at least maintaining the current level of price support. 
German  political efforts still concentrate  on internal CAP  decisions  and on 
specific German  policies.  GATT  matters  do  not figure very prominently in the 
German  agricultural policy debate.  However,neither the  DBV  nor  the Minister 
of Agriculture have  been completely silent about  the  Uruguay  Round 
negotiations.  It is therefore possible  to make  a  few  statements  regarding 
their thinking about agricultural policy reform in relation to multilateral 
negotiations  on agricultural trade.  . 
The  Position of the  Farmers  Union 
The  DBV  has critically commented  on all EC  proposals  for  the agricultural 
negotiations  in the Uruguay Round.  After pointing out  that German  agriculture 
is in major difficulty because of unfavorable  income  developments,  and because 
of further pressure  due  to policy adjustments  in the  CAP,  the  DBV  warns  the  EC 
Commission  and  the  Council  of Ministers not  to use  the  GATT  negotiations as 
another  lever to put pressure  on agriculture.  "Trade policy,  too,  must  make  a 
contribution towards  fulfilling the  commitment  of the Landwirtschaftsgesetz 
and  the Treaty of Rome."lI 
More  specifically,  the  DBV  cites a  number  of claims: 
o  "In all international negotiations,  the  structural differences of 
agriculture  in all parts of the world,  which have  developed 
historically,  have  to be  taken into account; 
1/ All quotes  and citations in this section are  from  Deutscher  Bauernverband, 
1987  and were  translated by Tangermann. 
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and  levies,  must not be  the  subject of international negotiations; 
o  integration of imports  of all substitutes,  as well  as  oils and fats, 
into the  import  regime  of the  Community,  with the objective of better 
market stability; 
o  liberalization of international trade is not  a  sufficient motivation 
for  trade negotiations.  The  specific situation of agricultural 
production  (dependence  on weather,  rhythm of production,  perishability 
of many  products,  inelastic demand)  requires  government efforts for 
stabilizing markets  and prices,  without which agricultural policy 
objectives cannot be  obtained; 
o  the  'free'  world market for agricultural products  is no  more 
than a  residual market  on which all trade partners want  to sell their 
surpluses  recklessly.  The  DBV  invariably maintains its view that a  way 
out can only be  found  in a  framework of international arrangements.  A 
pure market  economy  orientation cannot be  realized because of the great 
influence of temporarily strongly fluctuating demand  from centrally 
planned countries  and because of the strong market position of large 
trading companies  and parastatal boards.  The  DBV  invariably maintains 
its view that centrally planned countries  should not acquire 
agricultural products  from  western countries below certain minimum 
prices; 
o  acknowledgement  of measures  which stabilize the  internal  EC  market as 
"advance concessions"  for stabilizing world agricultural markets.  In 
the  GATT  negotiations  this has  to be  taken into account in solving 
open questions  (e.g.  substitutes)." 
In the  remainder of its statement,  the  DBV  then comments  on individual 
elements of the  EC  proposal.  In doing so,  the  DBV  repeatedly emphasizes  its 
request for  including cereal substitutes,  oilseeds,  and protein crops  in the 
protective system of the  CAP.  However,  the  DBV  expresses  its doubts  as  to 
whether cuts in domestic  CAP  support prices are  an appropriate negotiating 
offer for finding acceptance  for  "balancing  EC  markets"  among  the  Community's 
negotiating partners. 
The  DBV  repeatedly warned  the  Commission  against using the  GATT  negotiations 
as  a  way  of lending force  to  the  Commission's  attempts at reducing support 
prices  in the  Community.  It feels  that the  Commission uses  the  international 
trade negotiations  as  an alibi for  pushing  through its  'Greenbook policy'  of 
price pressure  internally in the  Community  (Commission of the  European 
Communities,  1985).  Finally,  the  DBV  warns  against making  PSE's  a  negotiating 
instrument: 
"The  underlying basis  of this measurement  instrument,'wor1d market 
prices',  depends  on  so  many  uncertainties  and  inaccuracies  (e.g. 
currency changes)  that it lacks  any measure  of objectivity.  Moreover, 
there are  doubts  whether past efforts of the  Community  towards  reducing 
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.' its production  (e.g.  introduction of quotas)  can be  gauged at all with 
this  instrument.  Aids  and subsidies exist also  in the  industrial 
sector,  as  for  example  for coal,  steel and aircraft.  Since  no  efforts 
are currently made  in the  GATT  to  implement  PSE  calculations for  these 
sectors as well,  an isolated application of these calculations  to 
agriculture has  to be  rejected." 
It comes  as  no  surprise that a  farmers'  union in a  country where  agriculture 
is as highly protected as it is in Germany  should have  such skeptical views  on 
international efforts to liberalize agricultural trade. 
The  Position of the Minister for Agriculture 
The  German  Minister of Agriculture has  not been very outspoken on current GATT 
negotiations.  Like most other people  in German  agricultural policy he 
concentrates  on current CAP  issues and  on domestic  German  agricultural 
policies.  However,  on various  occasions he has  made  it clear that his 
position on the Uruguay Round  negotiations  is not very far  from  that of the 
DBV. 
It is clear that farmers  and agricultural policymakers  in Germany  have  a 
tendency to strongly resist any major  move  towards  true liberalization of 
agricultural trade.  On  the other hand,  German  agricultural policymakers have 
had to learn that past agricultural policies have  had a  number  of undesirable 
results and that the current policies cannot be  continued without adjustments. 
The  German  perspective on agricultural policy reform is more  determined by 
domestic  concerns  than most countries. 
It is  the  development of domestic  EC  markets  and  the  emergence  and  growth of 
surpluses  in an  increasing number  of agricultural products  in the  Community 
that is at the  core of agricultural policy concerns  in Germany.  The  fact that 
world markets  for agricultural products  do  not offer much  hope  for expanding 
EC  exports significantly is becoming understood  in Germany.  However,  it is 
not  so  much  the  implications of  EC  surpluses  for  international trade,  but 
domestic  financial  consequences which have  triggered the reluctant 
preparedness  to consider agricultural policy reforms  in Germany. 
Budgetary problems  in the  CAP  remain in spite of all the allegedly new 
mechanisms  like "stabilizers"  and  "budget discipline",  which  in reality are 
not really new  at all  (Tangermann,  1989).  Farmers  and agricultural 
policymakers  in Germany  are much  impressed by the financial difficulties of 
the  CAP  which have arisen after 1983,  and by  the  consequent major political 
attempts  to embark  on what is incorrectly considered a  fundamental  "reform"  of 
the  CAP,  that there is still sufficient sense of urgency  in German 
agriculture.  Therefore,  it would be wrong  to  think that German  agricultural 
policy is not prepared to consider any  further  changes  to  the  CAP. 
The  type  of policy changes  which  the  German  agricultural  community  might be 
prepared to accept are certainly not  in the  direction of true agricultural 
trade  liberalization.  Which  types  of policy adjustments  would  come  closer to 
the  thinking of German  agricultural policy makers?  Given  the  German 
preoccupation with  the  domestic  consequences  of agricultural policies and  the 
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acceptable policy adjustments would be defined primarily  from  the point of 
view of how  they could solve  the  Community's  agricultural policy problems 
without doing  too much  harm to  farmers. 
Whether  and how  such policy adjustments  could also be  integrated in the 
framework of multilateral trade negotiations would  appear  to be  a  secondary 
concern for  German  agricultural policymakers.  It would appear  to be useful  to 
look  into  the  types  of agricultural policy adjustments which might  come  close 
to  German  thinking in the agricultural community  before later considering the 
way  in which German  agricultural policymakers  might want  to  influence  GATT 
negotiations  so  that their domestic  concerns  are  taken  into account. 
The  credo of the  German Minister of Agriculture,  Mr.  Kiechle,  is to  "essen-
tially orientate production in the  European Community  to  the needs  of 320 
million consumers".1/  In other words,  Mr.  Kiechle's view is that Europe's 
farmers  should produce no  more,  but also no  less,  than what  domestic  consumers 
in the  European Community will buy.  His  arguments  for  this orientation are: 
o  "Only  then can one  reckon on  a  stabilization of domestic prices for 
agricultural products; 
o  only then will it be possible  to  avoid trade conflicts on world markets 
which would be  disadvantageous  for  everybody; 
o  only then can we  avoid the  export of cash money  which we  can 
better use at home; 
o  only then can agriculture shake off the reputation of wasting  money." 
One  of-Mr.  Kiechle's  slogans  is  "produce  less".  According  to him,  there are 
only  two  ways  to  reach this,  "either drastic price cuts,  or direct quantity 
reductions,  i.e.  limitations at the  source".  It is clear that he dislikes  the 
first alternative,  and he hastens  to make  the point that "in Brussels,  we  have 
fought  for direct quantity limitations,  for milk as well  as  for  crops".  The 
adoption of such a  strategy fits one  other slogan of Mr.  Kiechle:  "quantities 
down,  prices up". 
In relation to  the set-aside program introduced in 1988,  Mr.  Kiechle  argues 
that set-aside is "an offer to  farmers:  non-production is remunerated".  In 
explaining why  there is no  alternative to set-aside,  he  argues  that "for farm 
quotas  for cereals  there  is no  accountability bottleneck in the marketing 
channel,  but there is no  support in Brussels  for national quotas".  The  remark 
on cereal quotas  for  individual member  countries  obviously relates  to  the 
corresponding proposal made  by Mr.  Kiechle  during  the  1987  CAP  debate  about 
introducing set-aside.  ' 
1/ Citations  and quotes  are  translations by Tangermann of a  1988  press 
statement by Minister Kiechle. 
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"besides quantity controls and remunerating  farmers  for  less production,  the 
only other options  are alternative uses  for production of agricultural 
products  and direct  income  aids  in order to help agriculture in the  fight 
against surpluses  and  income  problems".  He  points  out that the  German 
government  is making  considerable efforts to promote  research on the use of 
agricultural commodities  as  renewable  resources  for  industrial purposes  and 
energy production.  However,  he  also notes  that agricultural products  are not 
yet competitive with fossil fuels. 
With  regard to direct  income  aids,  the position of the  German  Minister for 
Agriculture is interesting.  He  has  strongly argued that "general direct 
income  aids  cannot replace price policy for  the  following  reasons: 
o  Since  savings  in expenditure  on market  regimes  are not sufficient to make 
the necessary means  available,  budget appropriations would have  to be 
raised dramatically.  In the  EG,  it would not be  possible to  reach 
consensus  on this.  Equally,  the  complete  or partial re-nationalization of 
income  transfers,  as  proposed by  some  people,  would not find agreement. 
o  Agricultural  incomes  would  increasingly become  dependent  on public 
budgets  and  the struggles  for allocating public  funds  which are  always 
scarce. 
o  Policymakers,  administrators,  and  farmers  would be  confronted with nearly 
unsolvable  questions  as  to how  to allocate  funds.  This  also applies  to 
the criteria currently discussed,  such as  for  example  the number  of 
family workers,  acreage,  or returns  in a  base year. 
o  Other  groups  in society would  feel  disadvantaged vis-a-vis an agriculture 
with  incomes  guaranteed by  government." 
Mr.  Kiechle points out that price cuts,  with or without direct  income  trans-
fers,  are not an acceptable approach for  solving agricultural policy problems. 
He  feels  that farmers  need sufficient prices  for their products  in order to be 
adequately remunerated for their capital input and their labor.  He  also 
believes  that as  long as  the  scope  for agricultural price policy is limited 
because of surpluses,  agriculture  increasingly needs  other  forms  of  income-
enhancing support. 
In spite of these critical remarks  about direct  income  aids  as  an agricultural 
policy option,  Mr.  Kiechle has  pointed out that "direct income  aids  and other 
government measures  have been steadily expanded."  He  pointed out  in 1988  that 
the west  German  government  spent 8,300  Deutschmark per  farm  through  the 
agricultural security system  (Kiechle,  1988).  The  dilemma between the 
philosophical aversion to substituting direct aids  for price support on  the 
one  hand,  and  the political desire  to let farmers  know  that the  German 
government  is coming  to  their aid in times  of pressure  on  farm prices  on  the 
other hand,  has  not yet been settled in German  agricultural policy. 
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roughly summarized as: 
o  keeping support prices as high as possible; 
o  where  resulting surpluses can no  longer be  sustained,  for financial 
reasons  or because of threatening trade conflicts,  support prices  should 
not be  cut,  but production should somehow  be  reduced  through either; 
1)  direct farm  level quotas  where  technically feasible,  as  in the  cases 
of milk and sugar,  2)  paid reduction of inputs,  in particular acreage 
set-aside,  or 3)  paid extensification for  environmental  purposes; 
o  increasing diversion of agricultural production capacity away  from 
traditional markets,  into  the production of renewable  resources; 
o  if all these measures  are not sufficient to secure  an acceptable 
development of farm  incomes,  direct aids may  have  to be used to a  larger 
extent;  such aids  should come  in a  form which  does  not  smack  of social 
welfare;  in principle  the German  government  is prepared to  finance  such 
direct aids out of its national budget. 
German  Preferences for  GATT  Arrangements 
It has  been emphasized above  that these views  about what  should happen in 
future  agricultural policy in Germany  are primarily determined by domestic 
considerations.  In that sense  they cannot directly reveal what  German 
agricultural policymakers  would like to see happen  in the  Uruguay  Round. 
Moreover,  when  it comes  to making  statements  about agricultural negotiations 
in the  GATT,  even German  agricultural policymakers  cannot completely lose 
sight of the  fact that  they are constrained both by non-agricultural interests 
in Germany  and by the views  of governments  in the  other member  countries of 
the  European Community.  Preferences  for  future  agricultural policy 
developments  expressed by German  agricultural policymakers  are probably a 
useful  guide  for  speculating about what  German  agricultural policymakers would 
like to achieve  in the agricultural negotiations of the  Uruguay Round  if they 
were  not constrained by  influences  from  other sectors  and other  EC  member 
countries. 
Quantity versus  Price Approaches 
Preferences  for direct quantity controls,  as  often pronounced by German 
agricultural polic.ymakers,  reflect a  profound mistrust of market  forces  in 
agriculture.  The  idea that prices should be  allowed  to  guide  agricultural 
production does  not find any  support  in these quarters.  When  it comes  to 
international markets  for agricultural products,  this mistrust of market 
forces  is  even more  pronounced,  and world market prices are considered 
irrelevant. 
Minister Kiechle certainly does  not believe  that developments  on world markets 
should be  allowed  to  influence  domestic  markets  for agricultural products.  So, 
free  trade would be  unthinkable  for him.  According  to  a  1985  speech,  Kiech1e 
does not even believe that  the world market price is any kind of measure  for 
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speech,  Mr.  Kiech1e  also claimed that this  "imaginary and strongly fluctuating 
price"  is completely distorted through an endless  number  of public 
interventions,  and,  that for  important  commodities,  the world price is not 
nearly in line with production costs in low-price  countries,  let alone costs 
in the United States.  He  continued by saying,  "World market prices are 
generally either the  result of production costs  in  'coolie countries'  with 
expropriation of human  labor,  or they result from  subsidized surpluses which 
cannot be  sold on domestic markets  - be it the USA,  Canada,  Australia or New 
Zealand  - and are sold with direct or indirect subsidies,  on the  so-called 
world market. "1/ 
opposition to world market prices would,  according to Mr.  Kiech1e,  be valid 
even if the  EC  Commission promised that  income  problems  would be alleviated 
through direct  income  aids.  A policy of massive price cuts might  in the  long 
run achieve market balance,  but in the  eyes of Mr.  Kiech1e  only few  of those 
now  working in agriculture would live  to  see  that since price cuts  over 
several years  in a  row  would ruin the majority of farmers. 
From  this perspective there is no  point in comparing domestic prices with 
world market prices because  the  calculation of rates of protection is a 
useless exercise.  The  logical conclusion is that rates of protection are not 
a  sensible thing to negotiate  in international trade  talks.  For most  people 
in the German  agricultural community,  it is unthinkable  that the  European 
Community,  or any other country for  that matter,  should be prepared to bind 
its domestic agricultural prices  in any way  to  international prices  in 
multilateral negotiations. 
The  official position of the  German  government  regarding negotiations  about 
using some  type  of aggregate measure  of support appears  to be  somewhat  in 
contradiction to this perspective.  However,  as will be  discussed below,  there 
is a  particular type  of logic  in German  thinking about  the current 
negotiations which reconciles  these  seemingly contradicting positions. 
The  "German  approach"  to agricultural negotiations  in the  GATT  (assuming  the 
farming  lobby and agricultural po1icymakers  controlled the negotiations), 
would not be based on  the notion of removing  the  gap  between  EC  and world 
market prices.  But  German  agricultural policymakers would probably agree  that 
the  international trading system needs  improvement  since  they are  aware  that 
continuing problems  in agricultural trade would  trigger undesirable  trade  con-
flicts.  However,  their approach would not  favor  trade liberalization. 
In line with their preferences  for particular types  of domestic agricultural 
policies,  German  agriculturalists may  be  inclined to  argue  for  agreements 
which would bring the quantities  traded under control.  In particular,  they 
might be  prepared to  agree  that aggressive export subsidization,  which  leads 
to  a  belligerent capturing of export markets,  is both unfair and uneconomical 
and that it should not be  possible without  limits. 
1/ Kiechle  may  have  mentioned  the United States because of an earlier proposal 
by  the  Commission  to bring  CAP  prices  in line with domestic  U.S.  prices. 
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point.  Though  the suggestion is often advanced that certain markets belong to 
certain traders,  German  agricultural policymakers  are not unhappy  about 
increasing agricultural exports  from  Germany.  Whenever  the latest trade 
statistics become  available,  Minister Kiechle usually takes  the  opportunity to 
comment  about  increasing agricultural exports  from  Germany  and points out that 
this export performance proves both the efficiency of the German  farming  and 
food  industry and  the  success  of German  agricultural policy: 
"When  it comes  to agricultural exports,  the  Federal Republic  is going 
strong.  She  is the  fourth largest agricultural exporter in the world  . 
... German  agricultural exports  to western countries are distinguished 
by quality and specialty .... Around  twenty percent of returns of German 
farmers  come  from  food  exports.  How  much  farmers  depend  on sales 
outside our borders  is shown by the degree  of self-sufficiency in 
important agricultural products.  In the past year it has been 106  % for 
wheat,  124  % for  sugar,  118  % for beef,  and  105  % for milk"  (Kiechle, 
1989). 
On  such occasions,  there is usually no  mention of the  fact that such exports 
depend  on subsidies  and that they cause  serious  economic  problems both 
domestically and internationally.  In the  eyes  of German  agricultural 
policymakers,  exports  from  their own  country are  a  good  thIng while  exports 
from  other countries are a  potential threat to  a  well-functioning internation-
al market  system.  However,  the multi-faceted nature  of political argumenta-
tion,  and  the differences of wording,  emphasis,  and  sometimes  even substance 
among  speeches  to different audiences  is a  common  phenomenon,  and probably 
should not be  taken too  seriously. 
The  existing pride  in growing agricultural. exports  from  Germany  is not at all 
comparable  to  the  French philosophy that their agricultural exports have  a 
major,  if not central,  role  to play in the overall economic  development  of 
France.  In Germany  there  is nothing which would  even remotely resemble  the 
French philosophy of the  "divine right to export"  in agriculture.  Moreover, 
German  agricultural exports consist more  of processed agricultural products 
than  raw materials. 
In spite of the  occasional positive domestic  remark about agricultural exports 
from  Germany,  it is probably true  in multilateral trade negotiations  that 
German  agricultural policymakers  would be prepared to  end the battle for 
markets  in international agricultural trade.'  Hence,  some  type  of a 
multilateral solution by which all countries were  assured their "natural" 
markets,  without having to fight for  them  through  a  doubtful price mechanism, 
would probably come  close  to German  thinking.  What  would likely be  sought by 
German  agricultural politicians is an extension of their domestic  philosophy 
to  international trade.  Since  they feel  that  the price mechanism  does  not 
result in an acceptable  outcome,  they would naturally prefer quantity control. 
Keeping  CAP  Mechanisms  Intact 
There  is a  second closely related element  in what  might be  the  "pure"  German 
approach  to agriculture in the  GATT.  According  to  thinking in the  German 
66 agricultural community,  each country should be  free  to pursue its domestic 
agricultural policies.  It may  be necessary to  impose  constraints on  the 
extent to which  domestic policies cause  international difficulties.  Hence,  it 
may  be unavoidable  to agree  on certain trade  implications of agricultural 
policies.  However,  each  individual country should then be  allowed to pursue 
its own  domestic agricultural policies as  long as  the  trade  implications of 
these policies remain within the  agreed limits. 
German  agricultural policymakers would certainly not want  to  forego  the right 
to stabilize domestic market prices for agricultural products  independent of 
world market  developments.  A two-price  system,  where  domestic prices are kept 
above,  and  independent of,  international prices would appear  to be  an absolute 
essential in the  eyes of German  farm policymakers.  In more  technical terms, 
this means  that the  EC  system of variable levies  and export restitutions is 
sacrosanct  from  the German  point of view.  It is not without pride that the 
remark is often made  in Germany  that the device of variable levies was  a 
German  invention. 
The  "positive"  implications,  for domestic price formation,  of this type  of 
market  regime  are fully in line with that element of German  agricultural 
philosophy which maintains  that world market prices are  irrelevant for  the 
farming  industry.  It is unthinkable  for German  agricultural policymakers  that 
German  farmers  should ever be  exposed  to  the vagaries of world market prices, 
even if it were  only the movements  of international prices and not their 
level.  . 
In CAP  jargon,  the  system of variable  import  levies  and export restitutions is 
often paraphrased as  the principle of "Community  preference".  In technical 
terms  import  levies  and export restitutions would not have  to be variable in 
order to guarantee  EC  farmers  preference over  farmers  in other parts of the 
world since fixed tariffs and export subsidies would also ensure  that  EC 
farmers  receive higher prices  than those prevailing on world markets.  The 
view goes  unchallenged in the  domestic  agricultural policy debate  in the 
Community  that there needs  to be  a  fixed  threshold price below which  supplies 
from  abroad cannot enter the  Community  market  in order to guarantee  EC  farmers 
the  desired preference. 
The  principle of  "Community  preference"  is usually taken to  imply  a  regime  of 
variable  levies  and its concomitant  on surplus markets,  variable export 
restitutions.  Since  this principle is always  considered to be  one  of the 
three  "pillars" of the  CAP  (the otner  two  being "unity of the market"  among 
member  countries,  and  "financial solidarity"),  there  is generally strong 
support in most  member  countries  for not giving up  this principle in 
international negotiations. 
In Germany,  this principle is considered so  fundamental  that no  negotiations 
on it would appear acceptable.  Statements  like  "Community  preference as  a 
constituent pillar of the  Common  Agricultural  Policy must  be  maintained" 
(Kittel,  1989)  are  a  common  element  in statements by German  agricultural 
policymakers  about  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  on agriculture. 
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A third highly important element  in the  German  position on  the Uruguay Round 
negotiations  is the desire  to  "close  the  loophole  in the  CAP"  that allows 
imports  of cereal substitutes,  meals  and cakes,  and possibly oi1seeds  and 
vegetable oils into  the  EC.  It is felt in Germany  and  in some  other  EC  member 
countries  that the  scope  for  lowering price support in the cereals sector is 
severely limited by  the  fact that "substitutes"Y come  in so  freely into  the 
EC  market.  There  is almost no  discussion about agricultural policy in 
Germany  in which this issue is not raised,  both by  farmers  and by agricultural 
po1icymakers. 
Farmers  are generally upset since they feel  that the  "open flank"  of the 
Community's  agricultural market  regime  undermines  any  attempt at stabilizing 
the domestic  EC  cereals market.  They  cannot see why  they should have  to 
compete  wit~ what  they consider inferior products substituting for home-grown 
cereals.  Agricultural po1icymakers  often make  the point  from  today's 
perspective that the arrangements  made  in the Dillon Round  of the  GATT,  which 
established open entry for substitutes,  were  a  mistake.  Consequently,  the 
Uruguay  Round  is seen by many  people  in Germany  as  the historical opportunity 
to correct the  imbalances which have  resulted from  earlier GATT  negotiations. 
It is  impossible  to overestimate  the  importance  attached by German 
agricultural po1icymakers  of finding a  solution to  the  "substitutes problem" 
during  the Uruguay Round  negotiations. 
Given  the  enormous  weight of this issue  in the  German  agricultural policy 
debate,  it is necessary to make  a  few  more  comments  although it will not be 
possible  to  cover this subject with any  degree of comprehensiveness.  The 
economic  merits  and  drawbacks  of doing  something about  the  "substitutes 
problem"  need not be  discussed here  since  there  is a  rather comprehensive 
study on  the  economic  and political consequences  of finding a  balanced 
solution to  the  "open flank"  problem in the  CAP  (Koester,  et.  a1.,  1988). 
Moreover,  a  number  of studies have  looked at these  issues  from  the  specific 
German  perspective  (Wissenschaft1icher Beirat,  1985).  What  is more  important 
in the  context of the present study is the political background to  the  debate 
about substitutes in Germany. 
There are  three specific issues which  should be  considered in an attempt  to 
understand the German  position on  the  "open flank"  problem.  First,  there is 
the  question of why  German  farmers  think differently about substitutes  than 
farmers  in some  other member  countries.  Second,  there  is the  question of why 
this  issue figures  so  prominently in German  agricultural policy debate. 
4/ The  term "substitutes" is often not clearly defined in the agricultural 
policy debate.  It always  includes  energy-rich non-grain feeds  such  as  manioc, 
sweet potatoes  and brans.  It usually  includes  more  protein-rich items  such as 
corn gluten feed.  It is less clear whether  oi1cakes  and meals  are also 
included,  and sometimes  the  term  is used so  broadly that it includes oilseeds, 
fats  and oils.  In what  follows,  the  term  "substitutes"  is deliberately used 
vaguely in the  same  way  that it is used in the agricultural policy debate 
unless it is explicitly defined in the  text. 
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.' Third,  it is  important  to understand why  this  issue is such an  important  item 
on  the  agenda  from  the German  perspective for  this current round of GATT 
negotiations. 
It may  be  somewhat  surprising that west German  farmers  should express  much  of 
an interest in reducing the availability of substitutes on  EC  markets.  After 
all,  of total  EC  imports of cereal substitutes  (including corn gluten feed, 
but excluding oilseed meals  and cakes,  according to  the  definition in Annex  D 
of the  common  market  regime  for cereals),  one-quarter to one-third goes  to 
Germany  (Agrarbericht,  1989),  and around one-quarter of German  livestock 
production is based on feeds  imported from  third countries  (Winterling,  1986). 
From  the  above,  one  would assume  that the  German  farming  industry would have 
an interest in maintaining access  to  imported feeds  which play such an 
important role in German  livestock production and which,  because of their low 
prices,  should only increase  the profitability of livestock operations in 
Germany.  Frpm  this point of view one,  would assume  that the  German  farming 
industry should join the  Dutch opposition against limiting access  to  low 
priced feeds,  and argue  strongly against changing  the current  import  regime 
for substitutes. 
An  assumption that west  German  farmers  should oppose  restrictions on cereal 
substitutes would overlook three  important aspects  of the German  situation. 
First,  a  large part of German  livestock production is based on mixed  farming 
systems,  where  livestock operations  and crop production are  combined on the 
same  farm.  This  means  that there is a  large number  of farmers  who  use cereals 
grown  on their own  farm  for  feeding  their livestock.  As  long as prices  for 
livestock products  on  EC  markets  are relatively depressed because of the 
availability of cheap  imported feeds,  farmers  with mixed operations  find that 
the  implicit returns  from  their cereals production are depressed to  the extent 
that they use  these  cereals in their own  livestock production.  Since  these 
farmers  tend to be  the majority of German  farmers  in terms  of numbers,  if not 
in terms  of the volume  of their livestock production,  their views prevail over 
the  interests of the highly specialized livestock producers which benefit from 
the availability of cheap  feeds. 
This  is certainly different from  the  Dutch situation where highly intensive 
livestock operations based on purchased feeds  have  a  much  higher weight in the 
overall farming structure.  Moreover,  in Germany  there  is a  number  of large 
crop  farms  which are highly specialized in cereals production and  these 
farmers  have  no  interest whatsoever  in cheap  feeds.  On  the contrary,  their 
interest is in high cereal prices.  These  farmers  see their interests 
undermined by thaavailability of low-priced substitutes which  tend to 
constrain the  scope  for higher price  support for cereals  and other crops. 
These  farmers  have  traditionally played an  important role  in the  German 
farming  lobby,  and their views  have  often dominated  those  of the more 
livestock-oriented sectors  in the  German  farming  industry. 
Also,  use  of cereal substitutes in German  livestock production is highly 
concentrated in northern German  regions  close  to  sea ports.  Consequently,  the 
"substitutes problem"  has  also become  an  issue  in the  struggle between 
different regions. 
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from  livestock producers  in northern Germany  who  have  access  to  cheap  imported 
feed.  Since  the  number  of farmers  who  have  access  to  low-priced imported 
feeds  because of geography is much  smaller than  the  number  of farmers  who  make 
less use of substitutes in their feed rations,  the political balance  tends  to 
lean towards  the  interests of farmers  who  would rather see  the availability of 
substitutes reduced.  In a  country like the Netherlands,  where  the 
geographical distribution of different types  of farming activities is much 
less uneven than in Germany,  regional differences  about  the desirability of 
access  to cheap  imported feeds  are  less pronounced. 
There  is also a  tehdency to downplay  the political and  economic  interests of 
highly intensive livestock operations  in Germany.  The  national mood  is 
generally opposed to  "factory farming"  because of fundamentalist currents in 
German  agricultural philosophy.  Typical  examples  of "factory farming"  are 
large poultry operations  and highly intensive pig operations which are  located 
in those northern German  regions  in which  the use  of substitutes is most 
pronounced.  It is probably true that the availability of cheap  feeds  has 
contributed to  the establishment and  growth of such operations.  However,  this 
factor is probably less  important politically than the  fact that the mood  is 
now  generally against such types  of farms. 
The  recent  introduction of the "bill for  the  support of peasant agriculture" 
(Gesetz  zur  Forderung der bauer1ichen Landwirtschaft)  is an indication of this 
political trend' in Germany.  In a  situation like this,  large and highly 
intensive livestock operations are  generally regarded with much  suspicion,  and 
their interest has little weight  in the agricultural policy debate.  These 
farms  also have  the strongest interest in maintaining access  to  cheap  imported 
feeds.  However,  since the  general mood  is against  them,  they find it 
difficult to be heard. 
The  second reason why  the  substitutes issue figures  so  prominently in the 
current agricultural policy debate  in Germany  has  to do  with both the overall 
difficulties of the  CAP  and  the specific German  attitude as  to how  to overcome 
them.  Surpluses have  grown  so dramatically,  and  the  resulting financial 
burden has  become  so  unbearable,  that reform is unavoidable.  CAP  reform has 
generally negative  implications for  farmers  because  farmers  experience price 
cuts  and more  price cuts are  expected. 
Because  of the restricted financial situation in the  CAP,  there is not much 
scope  to pursue agricultural policy actions which might  look positive  from  the 
point of view of farmers.  Everything is geared to restrictive policies,  and 
farmers  feel  threatened from  all sides.  Hence,  there  is  enormous  political 
pressure  to  engage  in some  actions which offer hope  for  farmers.  The 
political temptation to  engage  in something that could be viewed positively by 
farmers  and not cost public money  is irresistible.  Restricting the 
availability of substitutes on  EC  markets  is one  of the  few  potential actions 
that satisfy these criteria.  So  it is not surprising that policymakers have 
seized the  opportunity to make  this  one  positive promise  to  farmers. 
The  temptation to restrict substitutes  in Germany  is even more  pronounced  than 
in the  rest of the  Community  given the  German  approach  to  CAP  reform.  The 
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German  approach is to  reduce  quantities produced in order to gain scope  for 
continuing high price support.  However,  if there  is an  "open flank"  through 
which  imported products  can enter Community  markets,  the  strategy of reducing 
EC  production in order to  support domestic prices  is severely undermined.  The 
strategy of "quantities down,  prices up"  requires  a  closed system.  If markets 
were  open to  inflows  from  abroad,  even in the  form  of substitutes,  the  concept 
is not workable. 
German  agriculturalists also believe  that it is better to  do  something about 
quantities  than to cut prices.  This easily lends  support  to  the view that the 
quantities coming  into the  EC  market  should be  restricted.  Such  a  strategy 
would also be  in line with Mr.  Kiechle's view that  the  EC  should not expand 
its costly exports but that the domestic  EC  market  should be  reserved for  EC 
farmers. 
It would be politically difficult to get the message  across  to  farmers  that 
they should reduce their production if any  drop  in domestic  production is 
potentially outweighed by  increased imports.  German  farmers  tend to  argue 
that if they have  to  reduce  their output,  it would  only be  fair to request 
that foreign suppliers should also  reduce  their shipments  to  the  EC.  This 
attitude is even more  prevalent after set-aside was  introduced into the  EC 
because of German  pressure.  German  farmers  feel  that they are making  a 
determined contribution to what  should be  a  general effort to  reduce  cereals 
production in the  EC.  They  are unhappy  that farmers  in other member  countries 
have not begun to make  a  proportionate contribution.  They  find it completely 
incomprehensible  that continued or even expanded  imports  of substitutes could 
be  allowed to  overwhelm their efforts at securing a  better balance  on the  EC 
cereals market. 
It is politically imperative  for Germans  to  argue  for restrictions on 
substitute  imports  and it does  not matter whether  the  economics  of the  case 
are really sound.  What  appears  to be  largely overlooked in the  German  debate 
is that restrictions on substitutes would probably provide  only limited 
breathing space.  For many  years,  imports  of cereal substitutes  into the  EC 
have  been essentially stagnant at around 15  million tons  a  year.  Although 
they have  surged somewhat  because of fuller integration of Spain and Portugal 
into the  Community,  large  increases  in the near future  are not expected. 
Consequently,  a  binding at the  current amount  of substitute  imports  would not 
alleviate  the actual market situation very much.  Any  reduction in the current 
volume  of substitute  imports  would have  a  one-off effect which may  reduce  the 
EC  cereals surplus by  a  volume  roughly equivalent  to  the  reduction in the 
volume  of substitute  imports  by channeling more  EC  grain into feed rations. 
This  may  provide  scope  for  a  small  increase  in  EC  cereal prices. 
However,  everything else would  go  on as before after this had been achieved. 
The  necessary annual  decrease  in EC  cereal prices would have  to  continue at 
the  same  rates as  in the  absence  of restrictions  on substitute  imports.  This 
was  pointed out by  the  German  Scientific Advisory Council  (Wissenschaft1icher 
Beirat,  1985)  which also  indicated that  the existing self-restraint 
arrangements  on manioc  made  it difficult to  do  anything else  on  manioc. 
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a  rather limited breathing-space without  changing  the underlying trend in 
agricultural market  conditions  in the  European Community.  This  fact appears 
to be  completely  ignored by most  German  farmers  and agricultural policymakers 
who  seem  to believe that the  CAP  could enter into  a  completely new  era if it 
were  possible  to  do  something about substitute imports.  Accordingly,  there 
are  enormous  hopes  among  German  agriculturalists that something could be 
achieved on substitutes. 
There  is yet a  third reason why  the substitutes problem is such an  important 
item on  the German  agenda  for  the  current round of GATT  negotiations.  Apart 
from  the  arrangements with Thailand and  othe~ suppliers of manioc,  there have 
been several attempts at "closing the  loophole".  For  example,  in 1983  the 
Commission wanted to negotiate restrictions  on exports of corn gluten feed to 
the  EC.  There  is also a  long history of attempts at introducing a  consumption 
tax on  veget~ble oils in the  EC. 
The  German  government has  generally been guarded in these  debates.  In fact, 
the German  government has  always  opposed  introducing a  tax on vegetable oils, 
and German  opposition appears  to be  a  major  reason why  such attempts have 
failed.  Why  is it,  then,  that Germany  now  attaches  such great  importance  to 
do  something about substitutes  in the Uruguay  Round  negotiations?  . 
The  earlier FRG  opposition to further restrict substitute  imports,  and to  the 
introduction of a  consumption tax on vegetable oils,  was  not based on 
agricultural policy considerations.  Agricultural policymakers  in the  FRG  were 
always  keen to  reduce  the availability of cereal substitutes and  they would 
also have been happy to see  the  EC  agricultural budget relieved through  a  tax 
on vegetable oils.  FRG  opposition to  the proposed tax originated in the 
Ministry of Economic  Affairs which was  concerned about  the negative overall 
trade  consequences  which  could result.  The  Minister of Economic  Affairs  took 
the  US  arguments  against  EC  restrictions in the substitutes and oilseeds 
sector seriously and was  afraid that if the  EC  adopted such measures,  the 
United States might retaliate and  thereby damage  US-EC  trade relations.  The 
Economics  Ministry of course was  afraid that German  exports  might  suffer in 
the  end. 
Contrary to most  other agricultural  issues  on which  the views  of the Minister 
of Agriculture usually prevail in the  FRG  cabinet,  the Minister of Economics 
managed  to carry the  day.  The  argument  that unilateral  EC  action would 
violate the  Community's  GATT  obligations  and  that the  Community  could, 
therefore,  not pursue  such measures  without prior agreement with  the United 
States  (which could not be  won  on earlier occasions)  convinced the cabinet 
that it should not allow  the Minister of Agriculture  to  agree  to  such measures 
in Brussels.  Moreover,  the  FRG  government had maintained its general line 
that GATT  obligations had to be  taken seriously and  that international  law had 
to be  respected. 
The  case  is different now  that a  new  round of GATT  negotiations has  begun. 
Germany  would probably still not agree  to unilateral introduction of 
restrictions by  the  EC.  However,  the German  government  would find it 
difficult to  argue  that one  should not  even try to  discuss  the  "rebalancing" 
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it is clear that one  would not act without having  reached a  multilateral 
agreement. 
There  is a  need  to explain to  farmers  in Germany  and other  EC  member  countries 
why  the  European Community  should be prepared to negotiate  a  significant 
reduction in agricultural support.  For  the u.s.  Administration,  the  domestic 
political situation is much  easier in this regard.  U.S.  farmers  tend to 
believe that they would eventually gain from  a  global  liberalization of 
agricultural trade,  even if this would also mean  that the  support  they 
currently receive  from  domestic us  policies would have  to be  reduced.  Hence, 
it may  be  easier for  the U.S.  Administration to  argue  for  a  universal 
reduction in,  if not complete  elimination of,  agricultural support. 
EC  farmers  in general,  and most  German  farmers,  are convinced that they can 
only lose  from  a  global reduction in agricultural support.  The  EC's  GATT 
proposal  should offer a  reduction in agricultural support for more  general 
trade  reasons  and  take another step  in the direction of reforming the  CAP. 
There  is thus  a  political need to  include  something positive for  EC  farmers  in 
a  GATT  package which otherwise  looks  terrible from  the perspective of EC 
agriculture. 
The  need to  include at 1ea9t one positive element in a  GATT  package  is 
imperative  for  Germans.  German  farmers  are absolutely horrified by  the 
prospect of agricultural trade liberalization.  If one wants  to prevent German 
farmers  and  the German Minister of Agriculture  from  losing all interest in the 
agricultural negotiations of the  Uruguay  Round,  one  has  to provide  them with 
at least one  potentially positive element  in the negotiating package.  This 
element is the hope  for  improvement  in the substitutes sector.  This  was  the 
view of the  German  Ministry of Economic  Affairs when  they finally accepted, 
contrary to their earlier opposition,  that "rebalancing"  of the  CAP  could 
become  an  item on the list of the  EC  proposals  for  the Uruguay  Round 
negotiations. 
It is still true that the  German  government,  including the Minister of 
Agriculture,  would not  argue  for unilateral action by  the  EC  on these  issues. 
Contrary to  the view of many  German  farmers,  the  German  government  is still 
committed to avoid violations of GATT  obligations.  It therefore wants  to use 
the  occasion of the Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  and  the possible reshuffling 
of GATT  rules  on agriculture during  these negotiations,  as  an opportunity to 
gain the  legal right to  somehow  reduce  imports  of substitutes.  It would have 
been difficult for  the Ministry of Economic  Affairs  to  argue  that the 
possibility of doing  something about substitutes should not even be  considered 
in the negotiations. 
Given all these  factors it should not  come  as  a  surprise that  the substitutes 
issue is an  important  element  in German  thinking about  the  agricultural 
negotiations  of the Uruguay  Round.  Whenever  the Uruguay Round  is discussed by 
German  agricultural policymakers,  the  topic  of substitutes  figures 
prominently.  Leading officials from  the Ministry of Agriculture have  even 
gone  so  far as publicly stating that substitutes were  the  central  theme  of  the 
Uruguay  Round. 
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may  even have  gone  too  far because hopes  may  have been raised which at the end 
of the  day  may  be difficult to fulfill.  Some  farmers  in Germany  may  have 
adopted the view that a  "solution"  of the substitute problem is the central 
indication for success  of EC  negotiators  in the Uruguay  Round.  If it should 
finally turn out that the  EC  does  not manage  to make  progress  on this issue, 
the  emphasis placed on this topic by German  agricultural policymakers  may 
seriously undermine  Germany's  desire  to successfully conclude  the Uruguay 
Round. 
It is not generally understood among  German  agriculturalists that the 
Community  would have  to make  concessions,  and possibly very significant 
concessions,  if it wants  to achieve  the right to  "rebalance"  the  CAP.  It is 
also not generally known  that there is a  specific background to  the  compromise 
between the Ministry of Economic  Affairs  and  the Ministry of Agriculture which 
cleared the  ~ay towards  inclusion of the substitutes  item on the negotiating 
list. 
When  the Ministry of Economic  Affairs  gave  the  green light to negotiations  on 
substitutes,  it did so because  there might be  an opportunity for making 
concessions which  could make  restrictions  on substitutes acceptable  for  the 
Community's  trading partners.  However,  the Ministry of Economic  Affairs made 
it perfectly clear that such concessions  could not  come  from  the manufacturing 
sector.  In other words,  the Ministry of Economic  Affairs  accepted 
negotiations  on substitutes only on  the precondition that any  concessions 
would have  to be made  within agriculture. 
Officials in the Ministry of Agriculture know  this.  As  a  high Ministry 
official,  Mr.  Kittel stated,  "for a  modification of the  import  regime  the 
Community  has  to make  concessions.  For  the  time being,  it is not yet 
predictable how  such an arrangement would affect production and trade of 
cereals".  However,  this aspect has  not received much  attention in the  general 
public,  and many  farmers  may  believe that the  Community  will be  able  to make 
progress  on substitutes without  losing ground on other agricultural issues. 
The  "Ideal"  Package  from  the German  Point of View 
Considering the  German  preferences  for  GATT  "solutions",  as  discussed in the 
previous  section,  a  package of arrangements  emerges  which  German  agricultural 
policymakers  might  ideally want  to  achieve  in the Uruguay  Round  negotiations. 
Such  a  package  could consist of four  major  elements;  1)  GATT  acceptance  of  CAP 
instruments;  2)  inclusion of substitutes  (rebalancing  the  CAP);  3)  binding of 
self-sufficiency;  and,  4)  a  food aid convention. 
GATT  Acceptance  of CAP  Instruments 
The  first element  in the  "German"  package would be  assurance  that the  CAP 
system of variable levies  and export restitutions is fully accepted in the 
GATT.  For  the  time  being,  there is some  ambiguity  in the  GATT  about  the  legal 
status of variable levies.  Variable  levies are usually counted among  the 
"grey area"  measures  which are neither explicitly prohibited nor explicitly 
allowed in the  GATT.  EC  policymakers  and German  officials do  not get tired of 
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the Dillon Round,  but they know  this was  at best a  de  facto  acceptance,  not an 
explicit legal recognition. 
Since  this legal ambiguity results in a  slightly uneasy feeling on the side of 
EC  and German  agricultural policymakers,  they emphasize  time  and again that 
the  CAP  regime  cannot be  put on  the negotiating table.  The  ideal solution, 
from  the German  point of view,  would be  to gain explicit legal GATT 
recognition of the variable levy and export restitution system of the  CAP. 
More  important  than this formal  legal recognition would be explicit acceptance 
that they are free  to set the  domestic  support price level  independently of 
world markets. 
Inclusion of Substitutes 
As  a  second element in their preferred GATT  package,  German  agricultural 
policymakers' would want  to  reach an arrangement  regarding substitutes. 
Ideally such an arrangement would  allow the  Community  to set quotas  for  the 
volume  of substitute  imports  since this would allow the  Community  to control 
imports  so  that they do  not interfere with  EC  market  developments.  However, 
German  agricultural policymakers  might  also be prepared to consider a  set of 
self-restraint agreements  in which  exporters of substitutes promise  to limit 
the  amount  shipped to  the  EC  market.  Even  an agreement  that substitute 
imports  would not exceed recent levels would be preferred over  the current 
situation with unlimited access at low or zero tariffs. 
As  stated previously,  it is not quite clear what  the  term  "substitutes" would 
really include for  German  agricultural policymakers.  It would certainly 
include everything which  is on  the  "official"  EC  list of substitutes as 
annexed  to  the  EC  cereals market regulation,  i.e.  all energy-rich feeds, 
including corn gluten feed.  German  agricultural policymakers would probably 
also want  to  include oilseed cakes  and meals  in a  GATT  arrangement  regarding 
substitutes.  Whether  they would also attach great  importance  to  including 
oils and fats  in a  new  import  regime  is less clear. 
German  agricultural policymakers  would probably have  a  tendency  to stress the 
need to  include oilseeds in the variable levy regime.  They  would at least want 
to  impose  tariffs on  imports of oilseeds  in order to  save  on deficiency 
payments  for  EC  oilseed production while  gaining more  scope  for higher prices 
for  EC  oilseed producers.  It would be difficult,  for  technical reasons,  to 
impose  import restrictions on oilseeds  and meals,  but not for oils and fats. 
Restrictions  on oils and fats  may  also  increase  demand  for butter in the  EC, 
thereby help'ing milk producers.  It would  thus  appear  that the  "substitutes" 
would  include oils and fats  as well.  German  agricultural policymakers  realize 
that they would have  to offer something  in order to achieve  such results. 
Elements  three  and  four  in the package  might  include  such offers. 
Bind Degree  of Self-Sufficiency 
The  third element  in the  "German"  package  could be  an  agreement  to bind 
degrees  of self-sufficiency or maximum  amounts  of production in individual 
countries  for major agricultural products.  Such  an  arrangement  could follow 
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government of the  FRG  was  positively inclined to  accept an arrangement  on 
maximum  degrees  of self-sufficiency in cereals·  (90 percent)  close  to what  the 
United States had requested and had even considered a  compromise  with the 
United States  on  a  higher rate of U.S.  support.  With  a  little more 
negotiating time,  an arrangement  on binding degrees  of self-sufficiency in 
cereals might have been possible in 1967  if the United States had not dropped 
the  idea in order to  reach an agreement at the last second  (Schauz,  1989). 
The  German  government would no  longer accept binding the  degree  of 
self-sufficiency in cereals at 90  percent for  the  European Community.  Cereals 
production in the  Community  (of the six original member  countries which were 
negotiating in the Kennedy  Round)  has  grown  considerably since  the  end of the 
1960's,  and any new  agreement would have  to be based on  a  more  recent refer-
ence period. 
It is not possible to say with any  degree  of reliability what  the exact 
degrees  of self-sufficiency or maximum  quantity of production would be 
acceptable to  the German  government.  In addition,  any arrangement would have 
to be  concluded for  the  European Community  so  the quantities agreed would have 
to be set for  the  EC,  and not just Germany. 
However,  the  CAP  has  recently evolved in a  way  which provides  a  slightly 
sounder basis for speculation about what  degree of self-sufficiency or maximum 
agreed quantities of production might be acceptable  to  German  agricultural  ~  .. 
policymakers.  With  the  recent introduction of "stabilizers" in the  CAP,  there 
are now  "maximum  guaranteed quantities"  (MGQ's)  for  a  number  of commodities 
(Commission of the  European Communities,  1988).  The  MGQ's  have been set from 
a  purely domestic point of view and their main purpose  is to  trigger cuts  in 
domestic  support prices once  EC  production exceeds  these  threshold quantities. 
They  were  set after intensive debate  in the  Council  of Ministers  and indicate 
quantities of production which are politically acceptable  among  the member 
countries. 
Like  in any negotiations,  there is a  tendency  to start from  a  position more 
favorable  than what might be  acceptable  in the  end.  German  negotiators 
(through their influence on  the  Commission which actually negotiates  in 
Geneva)  would try to get away  with bound production quantities or degrees  of 
self-sufficiency' as high as possible.  However,  the MGQ's  currently set in the 
CAP  would certainly influence  thinking on  these matters.  It would not appear 
impossible  that Germany  might  finally be prepared to bind quantities of 
production which more  or less correspond to  the MGQ's  currently in force  in 
the  EC.  Alternatively,  and more  likely,  a  binding of the  degrees  of 
self-sufficiency corresponding to  these MGQ's  might be  considered. 
The  proposal  could even differ from  commodity  to  commodity.  Take  the  example 
of cereals.  The  MGQ  currently in force  in the  EC  is 160  million tons.  This 
quantity was  set by  the heads  of state in February  1988  in a  process  of 
intensive political bargaining.  The  exact figure  of 160  million tons,  as 
such,  does  not have  any  economic basis.  However,  in the  debate  about where 
the  MGQ  for cereals  should be  set,  some  elements  in the  EC  market balance for 
cereals were  occasionally referred to. 
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". In determining the MGQ,  it was  argued that account  should be  taken of the fact 
that the  Community  imports  around 15  million tons  of cereal substitutes.  It 
was  thus  argued that the  MGQ  for  ce~eals had  to be  above  domestic  EC  cereals 
utilization in order to  include  the equivalent of substitute  imports because 
it was  not fair to penalize  EC  farmers  for  the  inflow of substitutes. 
This  type  of argument  could be based on  a  historical precedent in the  CAP  for 
cereals.  When  the original "guarantee  threshold"  for cereals was  introduced 
in 1982,  the decision was  taken to link the actual  threshold quantity to  the 
volume  of substitute imports.  The  higher the volume  of substitute imports,  as 
defined in Annex  D of the  CAP  market  regime  for cereals,  the higher was  the 
guarantee  threshold and,  correspondingly,  the smaller the  cut of support 
prices for cereals envisaged in the mechanism. 
The  current stabilizer scheme  for cereals no  longer provides  a  link with  the 
volume  of substitute imports.  However,  given the  German  interest in doing 
something  ab~ut substitutes in the  GATT  negotiations,  it is conceivable that 
German  negotiators might have  an interest in establishing a  link between an 
agreement  on cereals and an arrangement regarding substitutes.  Such  a  link 
could take  a  form  analogous  to  the earlier guarantee  threshold mechanism  for 
cereals  in the  EC. 
For  example,  an  agreement could be  sought by which  the  EC  binds its volume  of 
cereals production or the  corresponding degree  of self-sufficiency to  160 
million tons,  plus or minus  any  change  in the volume  of substitute imports 
from  its base  in a  given reference period  (say,  15  million tons).  It could be 
argued that with such a  link between the binding on cereals and an arrangement 
for substitutes,  a  GATT  agreement along  the  lines considered here may  be more 
easy to sell domestically in Germany.  German  negotiators could also argue 
that negotiating partners in the  GATT  might  find it easier to accept an 
arrangement  on substitutes if the quid pro  quo  is lowering  EC  cereals 
production. 
The  logic of internal  EC  debates might  lend support to  such a  proposal.  As 
was  mentioned above,  the  German  Minister of Agriculture would like to 
establish national maximum  quantities of cereals production for  each 
individual  EC  member  country.  He  has  not been able  to  convince  other member 
countries  to accept such a  new  regime  and  instead opted for  the much  looser 
instrument of set-aside. 
However,  German  agricultural policymakers  and  farmers  are unhappy  that other 
member  countries have not really seriously embarked  on this new  policy.  In 
such a  situation it might be  tempting for German  po1icymakers  to use  the  GATT 
negotiations  as  a  means  of pushing the other member  countries of the  European 
Community  in the direction of firmly bound national production limits.  A 
multilateral GATT  agreement  to bind production volumes  or degrees of 
self-sufficiency may,  therefore,  look particularly attractive from  the  German 
point of view. 
Food  Aid Convention 
The  fourth  element  in the  "ideal"  German  package  for  GATT  negotiations  could 
be  an  extended Food  Aid Convention,  with  a  larger volume  of total food aid 
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commitments. 
German  negotiators might also be  sympathetic  toward  increasing the  EC 
commitment  to contribute to  the International Emergency  Food Reserve.  Along 
similar lines,  German  negotiators might be prepared to  consider a  multilateral 
agreement  on holding internationally coordinated emergency stocks.  In this 
regard,  too,  there would be  a  historical parallel with the Kennedy  Round 
negotiations. 
It should be  emphasized that the  "ideal"  German  package  described here is 
nothing other than speculation on what  German  agricultural policymakers  might 
want  to  achieve  in the  GATT  negotiations if they were  unconstrained by factors 
which would not make  it politically possible for  them  to actually pursue such 
an outcome.  However,  in order to  support the hypothesis  that the four points 
mentioned heFe  might be major elements  in the German  package  for  GATT 
negotiations,  this section will conclude with some  citations from  the 
agricultural policy program of the  CDU  and  CSU,  worked  out in 1986 
under  the chairmanship of the  then Prime Minister of Lower  Saxony,  Ernst 
Albrecht: 
o  "CDU  and  CSU  adhere  to  the  fundamental  principles of the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy--Community preference,  common  prices,  common 
financing .... CDU  and  CSU  say yes  to  the  system of  EC  agricultural 
market  regimes.  The  system of market  regimes  has,  in principle,  proven 
successful;  it has,  however,  to be  adapted  to  the  new  conditions  on  EC 
markets  and world markets." 
o  "For re-establishing market balance,  CDU  and  CSU  consider a  package  of 
measures necessary at the  EC  level: 
1)  putting a  floor under  coarse grain prices.  For quality cereals  an 
effective price floor at a  higher level; 
2)  limitation of imports  of oilseeds,  vegetable fats,  and  concentrated 
feeds  through  GATT  negotiations or self-restraint agreements; 
3)  long-term security for production of oilseeds,  in particular 
rapeseed; 
4)  utilization of export possibilities; 
5)  expansion of food aid;  .....  (CDU/CSU,  1986) 
The  firm  commitment  of the senior party in the  current government coalition to 
such agricultural policy principles would  appear  to  suggest  that these policy 
lines will be  followed at least as  long as  the current Federal Government  is 
in power. 
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" Chapter  5:  Constrained GATT  Options  for Germany 
The  preceding chapter discussed the kind of GATT  arrangements  that German 
agricultural policymakers would like to achieve  if they were  unconstrained in 
their political actions.  In reality there are constraints which limit the 
degree  to which  German  agricultural policymakers  can achieve  the  results  they 
desire  in the  GATT  negotiations.  These  constraints  include: 
o  the views  of other groups  in German  society,  as  represented in the 
German  government  by other ministries,  above all the Ministry of 
Economic  Affairs and  the  Foreign Office; 
o  the interests of other member  countries in the  European Community; 
o  the effective negotiating power of the  Commission of the  European 
Community,  both internally in the  EC  and internationally in the  GATT; 
o  the interests and negotiating strategies of other contracting parties 
in the  GATT. 
There  is little doubt  that the  outcome  of the Uruguay  Round  negotiations will 
differ significantly from what German  agriculturalists would like to obtain, 
and  Ge~an agricultural policymakers  are  aware  of the constraints under which 
they have  to operate.  They  may  not even try to push for  those solutions which 
they would like to achieve  knowing  that they are unattainable.  In that sense 
the preceding chapter is purely hypothetical.  If it has  one  purpose,  it is to 
provide  some  basis for understanding why  German  negotiators may  adopt certain 
positions in the  ongoing talks. 
The  present chapter will adopt  a  more  realistic point of view.  Its major 
objective is to explore solutions which may  not completely upset Germany's 
negotiating partners,  both  in the  European Community  and  in the  GATT,  while at 
the  same  time  taking into account at least some  of the  concerns  of German 
agricultural policymakers. 
The  options  considered in this chapter may  still be  far  from  the sort of 
compromise  that finally comes  out of the Uruguay  Round.  There would not be 
much  point in trying to outline a  possible  GATT  compromise  for  two  reasons. 
First,  trying to outline a  feasible  compromise  would essentially mean  trying 
to predict the  outcome  of the Uruguay  Round  negotiations.  The  final result 
achieved in the negotiations will,  by definition,  turn out to be  the  only 
compromise  which was  really feasible.  Second,  an outline of the  feasible 
compromise,  if it could be  provided at all,  would not necessarily contain much 
useful  information on  the  topic of this study,  since what  is "feasible" 
depends  not only on  the  German  position,  but also  on  the position of all the 
other negotiating partners,  not  the  least of which  is the position of the 
United States.  The  purpose  of this  study is not  to describe  the  amalgam  of 
all parties'  interests in the negotiations,  but  to  provide  a  better insight 
into  the  German  approach  to  the negotiations. 
The  approach adopted in the first section of this chapter will be  to  look at 
each  individual element  in the  "ideal"  German  package  in order  to see whether 
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liberalization of agricultural trade without completely losing any German 
touch.  The  second section of this chapter will then discuss  the political 
implications of such solutions  from  a  German  point of view,  as well  as 
incentives which may  help  to move  German  policymakers  in the direction of 
considering such solutions more  seriously. 
Modifications of the  "German"  Package 
The  first element of the  ideal German  package mentioned in chapter 4  was 
assurance that the mechanisms  of the  CAP  remain intact,  in particular its 
variable levies and export restitutions.  German  agricultural policymakers 
would also hope  the  European Community  can retain the  right to set its support 
prices at levels considered appropriate  from  a  domestic point of view. 
This position is diametrically opposed to agricultural trade liberalization. 
True  liberal,ization would require  that all price support be  eventually 
eliminated and that domestic  market prices move  up  and  down  with  international 
prices. 
Tarrification 
Most  people would  agree that full liberalization is a  target which  can only be 
reached after some  adjustment period.  A strategy of liberalizing agricultural 
trade  therefore must  envisage arrangements  for  the  interim period during which 
agricultural price support is gradually eliminated.  The  most liberal strategy 
for  the adjustment period,  in the  sense of providing the greatest possible 
scope  for market  forces  to  influence  international trade in agriculture,  is 
"tariffication",  i.e.  conversion of all existing non-tariff barriers into 
bound tariffs,  which are  then gradually reduced  towards  zero. 
Tariffication is exactly what  German  agricultural policymakers  would not want 
to  agree  to.  If the  European Community  had to  convert its variable levies 
into bound tariffs,  it would  lose  the ability to control domestic market 
prices  independently of world markets.  EC  and  German  markets  for agricultural 
products would  then become  subject to  the  "vagaries"  of international trade, 
and producer prices could fluctuate  in unpredictable ways.  For  German 
agricultural policymakers  this is absolutely inconceivable. 
Tariffication could be  handled in the Uruguay  Round  if the  new  tariffs are set 
at such a  high level initially that they  do  not effectively constrain the 
Community's variable levies at existing levels of the  EC's  threshold prices. 
These  tariffs would bind the  core  CAP  products which  currently are subject to 
a  variable levy regime.  In legal GATT  terms  this would not be  impossible 
since  a  contracting party,  which has  at some  stage bound  a  tariff,  can always 
apply an actual tariff which  is lower  than the bound rate.  In addition,  the 
new  tariff could also be varied from  time  to  time,  like a  variable  levy,  as 
long as it does  not exceed  the  bound tariff rate. 
It would also be possible  to  tailor a  GATT  agreement  where  contracting parties 
would bind the  maximum  levels of per unit export subsidies  for  their 
agricultural exports  in parallel with  the  introduction of new  bound tariffs 
where bindings  did not already exist.  This  is not necessarily what  those 
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II parties have  in mind for tariffication.  However,  one  could argue  that rather 
than completely prohibiting export subsidies,  a  more  balanced and politically 
more  promising analogue  of the  conversion of non-tariff barriers into tariffs 
would be  to bind levels of export subsidies  (Tangermann,  1989b).  Bound  levels 
of export subsidies could then be set so high  initially that they would not 
constrain existing levels of export subsidization in the  EC. 
Would  an arrangement  along  such lines constitute  a  possible  compromise  between 
trade  liberalization and  the  German  position?  Proponents  of trade 
liberalization would probably argue  that such an arrangement would not really 
change  anything,  and that it therefore would not constitute  the necessary 
improvement  in the current state of affairs.  Understandable  as  this view may 
be,  it would not be  quite correct. 
If the  European Community  were  to bind tariffs and export subsidy levels for 
those  commod~ties where it currently uses variable  levies  and export 
subsidies,  it would constitute a  major  change  in the  legal status of the  CAP 
in the  GATT.  The  European Community  currently has  no  specific GATT 
obligations for  these  commodities.  There  is no  specifi~ constraint to  the 
level of domestic  support prices which  the  Community  may  set for  these 
commodities. 
The  only general constraint which  the  Community  currently must honor for  these 
commodities  is the  "equitable share"  rule for  exports under Article XVI  of the 
GATT.  However,  this constraint is weak  in practice.  Moreover,  where  the 
world market  for  a  given commodity  happens  to  grow  rapidly such that  EC 
exports  could be  expanded significantly without violating the  "equitable 
share"  rule,  the  Community  domestic  price support could be  raised 
significantly. 
The  binding of tariff and subsidy levels  for  commodities  with variable levies 
and export restitutions in the  EC  would be useful since it would significantly 
change  the  legal framework  in which  the  CAP  can operate.  However,  the 
practical value  of such  a  concession by  the  EC  would  remain small  for  the 
Community's  trading partners as  long as  the  bound  levels of tariffs and export 
subsidies  are so high that they do  not effectively constrain price support 
under  the  CAP.  This  would quickly change  if the  bound  levels of tariffs and 
export  subsidies were  then negotiated down  so  they would begin to  lower  EC 
prices  and production.  At  this stage  the nature of the  CAP  would  suddenly 
change  dramatically.  Domestic  market prices  in the  EC  would  then no  longer be 
determined by politically-set support prices,  but by world market price 
developments  and  the  fixed levels of tariffs and export subsidies. 
Occasionally,  the  EC  might still temporarily revert  to  the old variable 
levy/export restitution regime  in periods when  world market prices are  so high 
that the  level of support prices desired in the  EC  does  not require  the 
Community  to make  full use  of the  bound levels of tariffs and export 
subsidies.  However,  the  Community  would essentially be  in a  new  world where 
its sovereignty in setting its institutional prices would be  severely 
constrained.  This  is exactly what  Germany's  agricultural policymakers would 
find completely unacceptable. 
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compromise  solution.  Either it does  not change  anything in the practice of 
the  CAP  or it would  change  the nature of the  CAP  so dramatically that German 
agricultural policymakers would find it completely unacceptable. 
The  Aggregate Measure  of Support  (AMS) 
Is there  any other solution which  could more  truly serve  as  a  compromise?  A 
natural candidate for  such a  compromise  is the  aggregate measure  of support 
(AMS)  approach.  An  AMS-type  arrangement would make  it possible to constrain 
the  level of overall trade-distorting support and thereby make  progress 
towards  more  liberal trade.  It could also be  designed with enough flexibility 
for  the  Community  to  implement  its agricultural policies  in a  way  that 
domestic  EC  prices are not directly governed by world market price 
fluctuations. 
There  are many  possible variants of the  AMS  approach which  could lead to 
rather different results.  A compromise  solution could lean more  to  the side 
of trade liberalization or more  to  the side of domestic policy sovereignty, 
depending on how  the  AMS  approach is designed.  The  extent to which an AMS 
agreement would be acceptable  to German  policymakers  would probably depend  on 
its particular design.  However,  before  such details are discussed it is 
worthwhile  to consider more  generally the  German  position towards  such a  type 
of an arrangement. 
Germany  supports use  of an AMS  approach  in the negotiations.  For example,  the 
press statement of the  Federal Ministry of Agriculture  on  the mid-term 
agreement of April 1989  says  that "in Geneva  the  EC  has  been able  to make  sure 
that,  instead of the  complete  elimination of support as  originally requested 
by  the United States,  negotiations will now  only be  on  a  longer-term base with 
a  gradual substantive reduction of agricultural support,  to  the extent that it 
is trade-distorting.  As  determined by  the  EC  Council  in November  1988,  this 
can be  done  through  a  general method for measuring agricultural support where 
the  advance  concessions  made  since  1986  will be  taken into account"  (Federal 
Ministry of Food,  Agriculture,  and Forestry,  1989).  From  many  semi-official 
statements,  it is quite clear that Germany  favors  an agreement  on an aggregate 
measure  and that within the  European Community,  the suggestion that the  EC 
should work  for  an AMS  agreement has  the definite support of the  German 
government. 
Why  is it that German  agricultural policymakers  favor  an arrangement which in 
the  end would constrain the  room  of maneuver  for  the  CAP?  Given  the  lack of 
public debate  on this  issue  in Germany,  one  can only speculate about  the 
answer  to this question. 
First of all,  it has  to be  emphasized that any  such constraint on  domestic 
policies is not really what  German  agricultural policymakers  would like  to 
accept.  It is only in the  face  of other options which  could be  forced upon 
them  that German  policymakers  may  have  a  relative preference for  this 
approach.  They  may  feel  that anything else could only be  worse.  In 
particular,  if the  only possible choice were  between tariffication and an AMS 
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I' approach,  there is no  doubt  that German  agricultural policymakers would opt 
for  the latter solution. 
From  the  German  point of view,  there is also one  positive aspect which  an AMS 
approach could offer--at least if it is designed according to German  tastes. 
German  representatives would like to design an AMS  agreement  such that credit 
is given to countries which pursue  domestic  supply control.  If this were 
done,  any existing and future  attempt by  the  EC  to control  domestic production 
would not only cure  the  Community's  domestic budget problem,  it would also win 
the  Community  credit at the  international level.  Apart  from  fully-fledged 
commodity  agreements,  an AMS  agreement  is probably the  only way  to receive 
credit at the  international level for controlling domestic  supplies. 
With  such an  AMS  approach,  it would be possible to  trade-off reductions  in 
domestic production against increases or lack of reductions  in domestic 
support  pric~s.  Given the strong preference of leading agricultural 
policymakers  in Germany  for  the strategy of "quantities down,  prices up",  it 
is clear that they would like the  AMS  approach.  Hence,  it may  be 
understandable  that if they cannot avoid being  forced  into  some  type  of 
international discipline  they would at least want  to make  sure that they can 
pursue  their preferred agricultural policy strategy within this  framework.  An 
appropriately designed AMS  approach might  provide  that chance. 
An  additional reason stated by German  officials for why  an AMS  approach would 
be appropriate is that such an approach would allow the  Community  to receive 
credit for  the  domestic  reform measures  which have been adopted under  the  CAP 
in recent years.  The  German  point of view on this issue is fully in line with 
thinking in other member  countries  and  in the  Commission. 
An  AMS  approach might also make  it easier to  find a  common  denominator  on GATT 
negotiations.  One  of the potential advantages  of an  AMS  approach  in the 
overall  GATT  negotiations  on agriculture is that,  because of its flexibility, 
the  AMS  can cater to different types  of agricultural policies under  one 
general umbrella.  An  AMS  agreement would  impose  balanced discipline on 
everybody  in the  GATT  without  requiring  implementation of the  same 
agricultural policy measures. 
This property of the AMS  approach carries over  to  the  level of internal  EC 
decisionmaking.  There  is no  doubt  that different member  countries of the 
Community  have  different views  about how  the  CAP  should develop  as well  as 
what  should come  out of the Uruguay Round  negotiations.  Agreement  on a 
negotiating mandate  for  the  Commission  requires  that a  common  position on  the 
GATT  negotiations be 'formulated.  It is easier to do  this using  the  AMS  ap-
proach  than if more  detailed positions must  be  formulated  on  individual policy 
measures. 
An  AMS  approach would also make  it easier for  the  Community  to  impose 
discipline within the  CAP  to correct the distortions between member  states 
caused by national  ~gricultural policies.  In addition,  the  statement made  by 
a  high level official in the  Federal Ministry of Agriculture that Germany  has 
an interest in keeping access  to  EC  markets  constrained while  other  EC  member 
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subsidies makes  an AMS  approach even more  appealing. 
With  regard to  the details of how  to design an AMS  approach,  German 
policymakers would certainly have  preferences.  Without  going  into all the 
details which would have  to be  considered in implementing an agreement  on  the 
basis of an AMS  (Hartwig,  Josling,  and Tangermann,  1989),  four  considerations 
appear  to be  of particular significance  from  a  German  perspective.  These 
aspects are: 
o  specificity regarding policy measures; 
o  policy coverage; 
o  treatment of domestic  supply control; 
o  definition of the external reference price. 
These  areas pf particular interest to Germany  became  obvious  when  the 
Scientific Advisory Council  to  the Federal Ministry of Agriculture drafted and 
issued its report on  the Uruguay  Round  negotiations  (Wissenschaft1icher 
Beirat,  1988).  In this report,  the Advisory Council  outlined alternative 
options for an AMS  approach,  some  of which may  be  more  acceptable  than others 
from  the point of view of German  policymakers. 
Specificity of Commitments 
Regarding  the specificity of policy commitments,  the central issue is whether  \. 
GATT  agreements,  and commitments  for  individual contracting parties,  are 
defined in terms  of support rates or whether  an agreement  on a  given reduction 
in all countries'  AMS  is only used for  defining the overall target,  with 
concrete commitments  specified in terms  of individual policy measures.  It 
appears  that German  po1icymakers would have  a  preference for  the  former 
approach because it would  leave more  flexibility for  implementing agricultural 
policies. 
Any  binding of agricultural policies is difficult in the  eyes  of German 
agricultural po1icymakers,  but if it has  to be  done,  they would least like to 
bind individual policy measures.  If the  European Community  had  to  respect a 
ceiling for agricultural support rates it would at least want  to have  the 
freedom  to  chose which policy instruments it should adjust  in order to honor 
the overall ceiling for  support. 
In the  report by  the Advisory Council,  it was  pointed out that there is an 
obvious  tradeoff.  Binding aggregate  support without  agreeing on country plans 
for  specific policy measures  means  that there  is more  freedom  to  switch 
between policy instruments.  However,  this  freedom  can also be used by other 
countries,  and  they may  switch  to policies which  from  the home  country's point 
of view are  less acceptable.  Hence,  more  freedom  for  implementing one's  own 
policies goes  hand in hand with less security regarding other countries' 
policies.  However,  faced with this  tradeoff it appears  that German 
po1icymakers  would rather  forego  the  security regarding other countries' 
policies if they  can retain more  flexibility in implementing  EC  policies. 
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the binding of the overall value of support for all agricultural commodities 
rather  than for  individual commodities.  However,  it appears  that this will 
not be  feasible  in the negotiations  and that it might  imply more  dangers 
in terms  of what  other countries could then do  than it is worth  in providing 
more  flexibility for  the  EC. 
Policy Coverage 
As  for policy coverage,  it appears  that there is not yet a  very definite 
position in Germany.  It is clear that the  same  type  of tradeoff as  in the 
case of policy specificity exists.  If policy coverage  is limited,  there is 
more  scope  for  compensatory policies  in the  EC  and Germany.  At  the  same  time, 
other countries could do  all sorts of things with their policy instruments 
which have not been included in the  AMS  and this could cause  trouble for  the 
EC.  Though  ~t appears  that no  clear view on how  to proceed in this regard has 
yet emerged  in Germany,  it is clear that German  agricultural policymakers 
would  like to keep  their preferred national policies outside  any AMS. 
Their prime  candidate for exclusion from  an AMS  would certainly be  the 
contributions which  the German  government  makes  to  the  special social security 
schemes  for German  agriculture  such  as  old age  pensions,  health insurance,  and 
accident  insurance.  In 1989,  the  German  government  planned to  spend more  than 
5 billion Deutschmarks  on social security schemes  in agriculture.  This  is 54 
percent of the  Federal  government's budget for national agricultural policy in 
Germany  (Agrarbericht,  1989),  and around one-quarter of total Federal 
expenditure  on agricultural policy including German  contributions  to  FEOGA. 
Current  annual  government contributions  to  the  social security system for 
farmers  amount  to  7,700  Deutschmark per  farm  on average.  Given  the  economic 
and political weight of this part of agricultural policy in Germany, 
agricultural policymakers would find it completely unacceptable  to see their 
room  for maneuver  constrained in this regard.  They  would  argue,  with  some 
justification,  that government contributions  to social security schemes  for 
agriculture in Germany  have  to be  regarded as  decoupled payments  and should 
not be  included in any AMS  agreement. 
Another  candidate for exclusion from  an  AMS  would be  the  compensatory payments 
in disadvantaged areas.  After a  considerable  increase in the areas eligible 
for  these payments  in 1986,  around  50  percent of Germany's  agricultural area 
is now  defined to be  "disadvantaged".  Total expenditure  on this program was 
budgeted at 755  million Deutschmark in 1989.  Per  farm  payments will be  around 
3,000 Deutschmarks  on average. 
Since  these payments  are basically made  per unit of livestock or per unit of 
certain crops,  they  cannot really be  called decoupled.  On  the other hand, 
there  is a  ceiling for payments  per hectare,  and  in most  cases  this ceiling is 
binding such  that a  large part of these  payments  are effectively made  on  the 
basis of a  flat per hectare rate,  though  the  farmer  has  to produce  the 
eligible products  in order  to  receive payments.  One  could  therefore  argue 
that this program is decoupled at the margin. 
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for  reducing,  rather than expanding production  (Agrarbericht,  1989),  and if an 
AMS  approach became  reality in the  GATT,  and  decoup1ed payments  were  not 
counted against  the  AMS,  there would be  another reason for actually modifying 
the  program in this direction.  The  German  government would also argue  that 
payments  for set-aside should not be  included in the  AMS. 
Domestic  Supply Control 
The  third aspect,  treatment of domestic  supply control,  would be  a  central 
issue  in German  thinking.  Given the strong preference of German  agricultural 
po1icymakers  for  supply control,  they would want  to design an AMS  approach 
which  grants credit in those cases where  domestic  supply is effectively 
constrained.  Indeed,  taking supply control into account  in an AMS  approach 
may  be  a  necessity for Germany,  since  the possibility of receiving credit 
where  domest~c production has  been reduced  through  supply control measures  is 
probably  one  of the main reasons  why  German  agricultural po1icymakers  may  have 
any  interest at all in an AMS  approach. 
There  are different ways  in which  one  could take  supply control  into account 
in an AMS  approach  (Tangermann,  Jos1ing,  and Pearson,  1987).  A solution which 
might be acceptable for German  agricultural po1icymakers  could be  to  give 
countries  the choice whether  they want  to bind per unit AMS  (ECU  per  ton)  or 
the value  AMS  (total ECU's).  In cases where  effective domestic  quotas  are  in 
place such as  for  sugar and milk,  the  EC  could then opt for binding  the value 
AMS,  which would  open up  the possibility of reducing  the volume  of quotas 
allocated to  farmers  rather than lowering producer prices. 
The  External Reference  Price 
German  preferences  are also clear regarding choice of the external reference 
price.  With all the German  mistrust of international market prices,  it cannot 
come  as  a  surprise that German  agricultural po1icymakers  are unlikely to  agree 
to bind the actual  AMS  as  measured against current world market prices. 
Germany  is rather firmly  on  the side of the  EC  Commission  in arguing for 
defining  the  AMS  so  that it is measured against  a  fixed external reference 
price  in domestic  currency.  The  Commission's  concept of the  SMU  (support 
measurement unit),  which  is largely the  PSE  as  used in the  OECD  but with  some 
arguably decoup1ed policies disregarded and with  a  given constant world 
reference price in ECU  instead of the actual world price,  is fully in line 
with German  thinking on  these matters. 
For German  agricultural po1icymakers,  it appears pointless  to adjust domestic 
market prices  to  the  fluctuations  of international prices or to  changes  in 
exchange rates.  They  might  argue  that they have not  fought  for  over  two 
decades  to  insulate German  farm prices  from  exchange  rate shocks  through  the 
Community's  agrimonetary system only to  allow German  prices ,to  be  fully 
exposed by  a  GATT  agreement  to  the vagaries  of international capital markets 
and weather  shocks  in other parts of the world. 
If an  AMS  approach based on  a  fixed external  reference price were  adopted in 
the  GATT,  then bindings would essentially apply  to  domestic prices of the 
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.' countries  concerned,  rather than to  the  gap  between domestic  and  international 
prices.  In some  sense  such a  scheme  would have  similarities with the 
"stabilizer"  scheme  adopted in the  EC  in 1988.  For  example,  in the cereals 
sector it is likely that the maximum  guaranteed quantity of 160 million tons 
will be  exceeded in most years,  so  that  the price cut of three percent will be 
made  in most years.  Hence,  the stabilizer scheme  for cereals essentially 
amounts  to a  commitment  to cut  EC  cereal support prices by a  fixed percentage 
per year in nominal  ECU  terms  over a  given period.  If an AMS  with fixed 
external reference prices  in domestic  currency were  bound,  and an annual 
reduction of this AMS  by a  given percentage were  agreed,  the result would be 
similar.  Since  the  German  agricultural community  is now  used to  the  prospect 
of regularly declining support prices,  it might  accept  a  similar commitment  at 
the multilateral level if the annual price cuts  envisaged were  not  too high. 
It is difficult to judge whether German  negotiators would be prepared to  go 
beyond completely fixed external reference prices so that domestic prices were 
at least somewhat  responsive  to international prices and exchange rates 
without going all the way  towards  a  rigidly bound AMS  measured against world 
market prices.  There  are different technical ways  in which  such a  middle 
route could be  implemented. 
For  example,  instead of annual  averages  of actual world market prices,  a 
moving  average  of world market prices  and  exchange  rates could be  used.  As 
the  number  of years  included in calculating such  a  moving  average  is 
increased,  the  average would  tend to become  more  and more  stable and any 
degree  of stability of the external reference price could be  chosen. 
Another  approach has been described in the  report by the Scientific Advisory 
Council  (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat,  1988;  analyzed by Tangermann,  1988). 
Under  this approach,  the overall period over which  the  agreed AMS  cut has  to 
be  made  would be broken down  into a  number  of sub-periods  and  the overall AMS 
cut would also be broken down  into an equal number  of tranches.  For  example, 
the overall period could be  10  years with  5  sub-periods  of 2  years  each and an 
overall cut of 50  percent broken  into  5  tranches  of 10  percent each.  Within 
each sub-period,  the  external  reference price would be  kept fixed at the  level 
in the  beginning of the sub-period,  and  the  AMS  which was  calculated against 
this reference price would have  to be  reduced by  the  agreed tranche  during the 
given sub-period.  With  the beginning of the next  sub-period,  a  new  AMS  for 
this sub-period would be  calculated on  the basis of actual world market prices 
observed at that  time.  If world market prices have  fallen or  th~ currency of 
the country concerned has  revalued,  this new  AMS  could well be higher  than the 
AMS  of the preceding sub-period. 
This  would not require  an  immediate  adjustment of domestic prices  to  the  lower 
level of the  reference price.  It would mean  that the  absolute size of the  AMS 
cut  to be  achieved during this period is larger  than  the  preceding period.  The 
absolute size of the  cut in domestic  prices  required would  also be  larger.  In 
this way  domestic prices would  gradually follow  the  moving  target of the 
international price level without  ever having  to  fully fluctuate with it 
(Tangermann,  1988). 
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somewhere  between fully fixed external reference prices  and fully re-coupled 
domestic prices is difficult to predict.  The  agrimonetary  regime  of the 
European Community  with its MCA  may  provide  some  clues. 
German  agricultural policymakers might have  sought  to keep  the German  green 
rate completely fixed since  1969  but this would have  moved  German  prices 
completely out of line with prices in the rest of the  Community.  German 
agricultural policymakers had to accept green rate adjustments  from  time  to 
time  depending  on the  Deutschmark exchange  rate.  One  could argue,  therefore, 
that German  agricultural policymakers  now  understand that some  lagged and 
gradual  adjustment of the external reference price in an AMS  approach may  be 
necessary and that it could be  acceptable  as  long as it does not result in 
dramatic  fluctuations  in domestic market prices. 
Closing the  ~opholes in the  CAP 
When  it comes  to closing the  loopholes  in the  CAP,  or in EC  jargon,  to 
"rebalance  the  CAP",  it is more  difficult to see what  a  compromise  solution 
might  look like.  As  described above,  German  agricultural policymakers  are  so 
set on doing something about cereal substitutes that any  agreement which 
didn't make  progress  in this direction would not appear  to be  of much  interest 
to  them.  However,  the German  position on  this  issue is not non-negotiable.  In 
multilateral negotiations  on wide-ranging sets of issues,  there must be  some 
tradeoffs which would make  it possible to compromise  on  a  relatively limited 
issue like the substitutes question. 
The  political significance of the substitute issue  is probably much  greater 
than its economic  importance  for both the  EC  and  the United States.  It may  be 
possible to find a  compromise  solution which satisfies the  Community's  and 
German  political concerns without doing much  economic  harm  to  the  Community's 
trading partners. 
There  are  two  dimensions  in which  one  could try to  shape  an agreement  on 
"rebalancing".  First,  the parameters  of any  trading regime  for substitutes 
can be varied.  Second,  compensation in areas  other than substitutes might 
make  it possible or even attractive for  the  Community's  trading partners  to 
consider accepting an agreement  on  "rebalancing". 
Both  the nature of measures  being brought  to bear on substitutes and  the 
quantitative level at which  these measures  are applied can be negotiated. 
Regarding the  type  of instruments  to be used,  the  German  government would,  if 
it could proceed without  any constraints,  feel  safest if quantitative 
restrictions could be  imposed  on substitute  imports  into  the  Community. 
However,  given the  general  thrust for  moving  away  from  quantitative 
restrictions in the  GATT,  it should be  easy to get  the point across  that there 
is no  chance  for  an agreement  on  new  quantitative restrictions in a  sector 
where  they haven't existed.  For similar reasons it is unlikely that the 
Community's  trading partners would be prepared to negotiate seriously about an 
inclusion of substitutes  in the variable  levy system of the  CAP  -an option 
which would certainly be welcomed very much  in Germany. 
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"'. A slightly more  appealing solution might be  tariffs on  imports  of cereal 
substitutes,  oilseeds,  and oilseed products.  This  option was  explored in the 
"Disharmonies"  study prepared for  the  EC  Commission  (Koester et al.,  1988). 
From  the  Community's  and Germany's  point of view,  it would have  the attraction 
of generating additional budget  income  for  the  Community,  in addition to 
reducing the volume  of substitute  imports  into  the  EC.  As  a  hybrid of a 
quantitative restriction and  a  tariff,  a  tariff quota could also be 
considered. 
Another option would be  to enter into self-restraint agreements with all major 
suppliers of substitutes.  From  the point of view of the  countries  exporting 
substitutes into the  EC,  a  self-restraint agreement might be  the least 
objectionable solution.  In purely economic  terms,  a  self-restraint agreement 
might even  improve  the welfare of the exporting countries. 
For  example"  it has been shown  that the self-restraint agreement between the 
Community  and Thailand on manioc  has  probably raised potential welfare of 
Thailand because it has  raised the export price for Thailand so much  that the 
decrease  in the quantity exported was  overcompensated  (Winterling and 
Tangermann,  1987).  Whether  this could also be  expected in cases  other than 
manioc  would have  to explored. 
In legal  terms,  a  self-restraint agreement would  give  away  less of the rights 
of substitute exporters  than an unbinding of EC  tariffs on substitutes.  On 
the  other hand,  self-restraint agreements  would  imply all sorts of technical 
and  legal problems.  One  major problem,  for  example,  would be how  to treat the 
many  actual or potential exporters of substitutes which might  replace  exports 
from  the countries which have  entered into a  self-restraint agreement with the 
Community.  In the  case of manioc,  this problem was  dealt with  through tariff 
quotas  for non-Thai  exporters of manioc  (Hartwig and Tangermann,  1987). 
Whether  this approach could work  for substitutes other than manioc  would also 
have  to be  explored. 
In Germany,  a  self-restraint agreement  would probably be  considered superior 
to  the  imposition of tariffs.  A self-restraint agreement  would provide  the 
security that imports  remain under control while  the  imposition of tariffs 
might result in a  lowering of the world market price of the  commodities 
concerned without  leading to much  of a  price  increase or quantity reduction on 
the  domestic  EC  market  (Koester et al.,  1988).  From  the agricultural policy 
perspective,  at least in Germany,  it is much  more  important that quantities 
are brought under control  than additional tariff revenue be  added  to  the 
Community  treasury. 
Regarding  the quantitative parameters of a  new  regime  for substitutes,  the 
most  important variables are  the  level at which  tariffs would be  set if a 
tariff regime  were  chosen,  or the  import quantities if a  tariff quota or a 
self-restraint agreement  could be  negotiated.  In the  "Disharmonies"  study,  a 
10  percent tariff on all imports  of substitutes,  oilseeds,  and oilseed 
products  into the  EC  was  studied.  Analysis  showed  that anything significantly 
lower  than 10  percent would probably have  such  a  small effect that it would 
not be  worth  the negotiating effort. 
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quantities to be  agreed upon would have  to be negotiated.  It is difficult to 
say what  the result of such negotiations might be.  From  the perspective of 
German  agricultural politics,  reaching any agreement at all is more  important 
than the actual quantity agreed.  The  economic  effects of restricting access 
for substitute  imports would be  limited relative to  the  longer run market 
trends  anyway.  What  is important is the psychological  and,  hence,  political 
effect of "closing the  loophole"  in the  CAP. 
It might be  that German  negotiators could settle for  an agreement which would 
not actually reduce  the quantities currently imported,  but make  sure that 
there was  no  further  increase  in these quantities.  If it turned out that this 
was  not  a  possible compromise,  they might  even consider an agreement which 
would provide for  the possibility of some  limited increase of quantities 
imported if there were  ultimately a  ceiling on'imports. 
The  real  "compromise"  element  in any new  regime  on  the  Community's  substitute 
imports  would have  to  come  in the  area of compensatory measures.  German 
po1icymakers  are  aware  of the  fact that the  Community  has  to compensate  its 
trading partners if it wants  to get concessions  on substitutes.  The  report on 
the Uruguay Round  negotiations by  the Scientific Advisory Council 
(Wissenschaft1icher Beirat,  1988)  spelled this out very clearly.  In its 
earlier report on the  substitutes problem  (Wissenschaft1icher Beirat,  1985), 
the Advisory Council had also strongly warned against any  further access 
restrictions for  substitutes on the  grounds  that such restrictions might  l: 
eventually provide more  scope  for higher price support for cereals  and 
livestock products  in the  Community. 
In its 1989  report on  the Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  the Advisory Council 
changed its views  by arguing that in multilateral negotiations  the  Community 
could enter into  commitments  on price support which would  insure that access 
restrictions for  substitutes would not be  used for  increasing the  level of EC 
price support.  In this context,  the  Council not only pointed to  the 
disadvantages which  such new  tariffs would have  for  exporting third countries, 
but it also expressed concern that new  restrictions  on  EC  imports  of cereal 
substitutes and oi1seeds  could mean  that the  reduction of the  level of EC 
price support,  which  the Advisory  Council considers necessary,  would be 
delayed. 
The  Advisory Council  also pointed out that GATT  negotiations could lead to a 
binding reduction of agricultural support  and  to  the  introduction of tariffs 
which  could be  linked to  the  commitment  to  reduce  cereals support even more. 
Under  these conditions,  the Advisory  Council placed less  emphasis  on its 
earlier concerns  and no  longer argued against moderate  levies  on  imports  of 
cereal substitutes,  oi1seeds,  and oilseed products,  provided the  level of 
price support for cereals in the  EC  were  reduced  even more.  However,  the 
Advisory Council warned not  to push  so  strongly for  the  introduction of a  new 
import  regime  such that a  positive overall result of the agricultural 
negotiations  in the Uruguay  Round  is risked.  The  Advisory Council  also 
pointed out that the  EC  would probably have  to provide significant 
compensation  (Wissenschaft1icher Beirat,  1988). 
90 
'I The  "compromise"  regarding substitutes could come  not only in the  form  of 
relatively mild restrictions on access  for substitutes  into the  EC,  but also 
in the  form  of EC  concessions which would be  more  significant than what  German 
agricultural policymakers  might  like to accept.  There  may  be  a  point in 
trying to  see how  flexible  Germany  and  the  EC  are  regarding external reference 
prices in an AMS  agreement.  For  example,  a  three year moving  average world 
market price as  the basis for  AMS  calculations  and bindings  against  some  mild 
form  of "rebalancing"  might be  proposed. 
Other Elements 
It was  suggested that German  negotiators might be  prepared to consider 
binding the degree of self-sufficiency in the  European Community.  The 
assumption was  made  that Germany  might be willing to negotiate  a  binding of 
the  level of  EC  production at the current maximum  guaranteed quantity of 160 
million tons,  plus or minus  any change  in the volume  of substitute  imports 
from  a  given base year volume. 
Such bindings would have  to be understood as being very significant 
concessions by  the  Community.  None  of the  Community's  negotiating partners 
has  so  far requested anything similar from  the  EC,  nor has  any partner in the 
negotiations stated that it was  prepared to  accept such  types  of commitments 
for its own  agricultural policy.  Any  such offers by  the  Community  would  go 
far beyond what is expected of the  Community. 
Other member  countries of the  Community,  and  therefore  the  Community  in 
aggregate,  may  not be prepared to  even  immediately consider such offers. 
It is therefore unlikely that  the German  government  would propose  to make  such 
offers  in the  ongoing negotiations.  There  is no  reason to consider possible 
"compromise"  solutions which would entail even more  significant concessions by 
the  Community.  It would probably make  more  sense  to  discuss how  far it may  be 
possible and whether it would be  desirable at all to push  the  Community  in 
such a  direction. 
The  assumptions  made  on  the possible willingness of the  German  government  to 
negotiate  a  larger EC  contribution to  global  food aid and  to  emergency stocks 
of cereals  go  beyond what  is currently negotiated in the Uruguay Round. 
Negotiations  on such  issues may  at  some  stage be held during the Uruguay Round 
in relation to  the  request for special and differential treatment of 
developing countries  and in relation to  the  commitment  to  develop ways  "to 
take  into account  the possible negative effects of the  reform process  on net 
food  importing developing countries"  as  agreed  in the April  1988  framework  for 
the agricultural negotiations. 
If food aid and  emergency stocks  should become  elements  of the overall 
package,  any  compromise  on these  elements  would be  in terms  of the 
quantitative contributions  individual parties are prepared to make.  Since  any 
concrete proposals  as  to what  such  an  agreement  should look like have  not been 
made  in the negotiations,  there  is no  point in discussing  the  size of the 
contributions which  the  German  government  might  consider. 
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How  could the  German  government be  convinced that it should accept  compromise 
solutions  such as  those outlined above,  or that it should actually go  further 
in the direction of agricultural trade liberalization?  What  sorts of 
influences  could the  trading partners of the  European Community  bring to bear 
on  the  EC  and  on  Germany  in order to  increase the  chances  that the  CAP  is more 
thoroughly reformed as  a  result of the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations?  Are  there 
any ways  of explaining to German  po1icymakers  that they should not stick to 
requests  like  "rebalancing"  the  CAP?  Three  different  types  of strategies can 
be tried simultaneously or alternatively as  in most negotiations:  persuasion, 
enticement,  and threat. 
Persuasion requires that German  po1icymakers  be  convinced that it is in their 
own  interest to accept a  fundamental  reform of agricultural policy and that 
this reform fohou1d  go  in the direction of more  liberal trade.  German 
agriculturalists already understand that reform is unavoidable,  and to  some 
extent they also actively participate in reform endeavors.  However,  the 
direction in which  they are prepared to  change  agricultural policy does  not 
lead to more  liberal trade,  but to more  government  interference with 
agricultural markets.  German  agricultural policymakers  find it particularly 
difficult to  accept  the notion that decoupled payments  could be  a  general 
alternative to  continued high price  support.  • 
In order to persuade German  agricultural po1icymakers  that more  reliance  on 
decoup1ed payments  would be  in their own  interest,  it would be  necessary to 
deal with their two  main  arguments  against  decoupled payments.  One  argument 
is that farmers  want  "fair market prices"  rather than welfare payments.  The 
other argument  is that direct income  aids would be  too costly for  the public 
budget. 
It may  be  that the  "fair price" versus  "welfare"  argument  can be  gradually 
overcome  if more  acceptable political reasons  can be  found  for granting 
payments  to  farmers  which are not perceived as  "welfare".  In addition to  the 
large contributions  the German  government  is already making  to the  special 
social security schemes  for agriculture,  such politically acceptable  reasons 
for making direct payments  to  farmers  could come  in relation to ecological 
considerations.  Farmers  like to  think of themselves  as  custodians of the 
countryside,  and  they are generally happy  to  accept  payments  for providing 
what  they feel  is a  service  to  the  environment. 
There  are many  reasons  to doubt whether  farming  is a  generally useful 
contribution to ecological objectives  (Winters,  1988).  In fact,  it is well 
known  that a  number  of agricultural activities are rather detrimental  to  the 
environment  (Rat von Sachverstandigen fur Umweltfragen,  1985).  However,  this 
does  not affect the political appeal  of arguments  for helping  farmers  to help 
the  environment.  In Germany  this appeal  is felt across all political parties. 
The  Greens  are particularly keen  to make  sure  that agriculture contributes to 
preserving the  environment.  However,  the  Social  Democrats,  who  generally 
argue  for  more  direct payments  to  farmers,  are also happy  to  support  the  idea 
that more  should be  done  in order  to  improve  the  ecological effects of farming 
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J activities.  The  Christian Democrats  also emphasize  the  need to shape 
agricultural policies so  that ecological  concerns  are  taken into account. 
In German  agriculture,  there is increasing talk of the need  to  compensate 
farmers  for  the non-market services  they provide.  To  some  extent,  this is an 
implicit way  of saying that farmers  want more  direct  income  aids.  Farmers 
have  certainly understood that there is not much  hope  for  expansionary market 
policies and  increasing price support  in the  EC.  However,  they don't want  to 
ask for direct  income  aids.  If ways  to link direct payments  to  some  notional 
service which  farmers  perform can be  devised,  they would probably be happy to 
receive such payments. 
The  Community's  trading partners may  be  able  to  support such developments 
through appropriate analysis  and by public relations efforts which help  to 
spread the word  that it is good  to shift agricultural policy emphasis  from 
price support to ecological concerns.  In multilateral negotiations  such 
considerations  come  into play when  policy coverage  is discussed in relation to 
an AMS  approach.  It would be  counterproductive if attempts were  made  to 
define  decoupled policies so narrowly that a  number  of policies which could 
arguably be considered to be  ecologically positive would have  to be 
constrained. 
For  example,  if Germany  were  prepared to change  its program for  compensatory 
payments  to farmers  in disadvantaged areas  such  that they would become 
slightly more  production-neutral  than  they are now,  these payments  could be 
said to be  decoupled and would not be  included in support measurement.  Such 
decisions would certainly help German  policymakers  to  switch more  and more  to 
direct payments. 
The  second argument  against direct  income  aids which  German  agricultural 
policymakers like to  advance  is that such payments  would be  too  costly for  the 
public budget.  This  is simply no  longer  true  in the German  case.  As  is shown 
in table 5.1,  total public expenditure on agricultural policy,  including 
special tax benefits for  farmers,  has  grown  rapidly in Germany  over  the past 
thirty years,  much  faster  than  income  in agriculture.  Public expenditure is 
now  more  than twenty percent higher  than total  income  in German  agriculture. 
This  comparison might not be quite fair since agricultural  income  as  defined 
in this  table  (net domestic product  in agriculture)  does  not  include  some 
components  of disposable  farm  incomes  received  from  public expenditure budgets 
in the  form  of social security benefits  and  tax relief. 
The  expenditure  shown  in this table  includes  only  FEOGA  disbursements  in 
Germany,  not German"contributions  to  FEOGA  which are  around 4  billion DM 
higher  than what  FEOGA  spends  in Germany  (the difference being contributions 
which  Germany  makes  to  financing  FEOGA  expenditure  in other member  countries). 
The  burden which  current agricultural policies place  on  the  German  public 
budget  is so  enormously high  in relation to actual  farm  income  that it is 
difficult to argue  that direct  income  aids  could not be  financed.  It would 
certainly be worth  a  determined public relations effort to bring this message 
home  to  German  agricultural policymakers. 
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a)  FEOGA  spending  in Germany,  expenditure  by  the  Federal  government,  the states 
and  local  communities,  including  special  tax benefits for  farmers. 
Source:  Schmitt  and  Tangermann  (1988). 
Enticement 
Enticement  to reform agricultural policies  in Germany  and  the  EC  could 
essentially come  in two  different forms.  First,  rewards  could be  offered 
within the area of agricultural trade  and  in other sectors.  Within 
agriculture,  one  obvious offer attractive for German  agricultural policymakers 
is agreement  to allow the  Community  to  "rebalance"  the  CAP.  However,  such an 
offer would be  against the  interests of some  of the  Community's  major  trading 
partners and  they would have  to consider very carefully whether greater 
progress  toward more  liberal trade  in other agricultural products would 
justify sacrifices in the sector of substitutes. 
A second enticement which  should be of great interest to German  agricultural 
policymakers  is the  issue of GATT  rules for  exports of processed agricultural 
products.  According  to  the letter of the  GATT,  there  should not be  any 
subsidies  for  exports of processed agricultural products.  However,  the 
European Community  and many  other countries grant massive  export subsidies  on 
many  processed agricultural products.  In Europe,  Germany  has particular 
interests in 'exporting processed foods,  and  the  German  food  industry is proud 
of its many  specialties and of its competitive position. 
Given  the high prices of raw agricultural commodities  in the  EC,  the German 
food  industry would find it difficult to remain competitive  on international 
markets  if subsidies  could no  longer be paid on  the  raw material content of 
its processed food exports.  Since  the practice of international trade policy 
on processed agricultural products deviates  so significantly from  the letter 
of the  GATT,  the Uruguay Round  negotiations  on agricultural  trade would be  the 
proper occasion to address  this  issue. 
There  are different ways  in which  this could be  done  (Tangermann,  1989b). 
If the  European Community's  negotiating partners were  prepared to  accept  a 
framework which would essentially legalize most  of the current EC  subsidy 
practices in the  area of processed agricultural products,  then the  EC  might be 
more  forthcoming  in the area of agricultural policy reform in general.  Since 
most  trading partners of the  Community  have  less of an interest in processed 
food  exports  than  the  EC,  and because  Community  processors  must  pay higher 
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subsidies for processed food  should not be  impossible for  them.  German 
negotiators would be particularly attracted by the possibility to make 
progress  in this area. 
Enticement  in sectors other than agriculture could come  from  concessions  on 
trade in manufactures.  Germany's  manufacturing  industry has  a  very strong 
interest in gaining better and safer access  to  other countries'  markets.  In 
previous multilateral negotiations,  it was  not always  easy to use  Germany's 
industrial interests as  a  lever on agricultural issues because  German 
industrialists were  not prepared to  turn against the  interests of German 
agriculturalists.  However,  things have  now  changed significantly. 
The  manufacturing  industry in Germany  has  now  begun to  speak out openly 
against agricultural protectionism and,  in particular,  against the  CAP. 
Interest in ~na1yses of the negative  consequences  of excessive agricultural 
support has  grown  significantly in the manufacturing industry and  the  level of 
awareness  is now  generally much  higher. 
This has  certainly strengthened the position of the Minister for  Economic 
Affairs vis-a-vis that of the Minister for Agriculture  in the cabinet.  It 
would be much  more  difficult for  the Minister of Agriculture  to resist 
determined efforts of the Minister for  Economic  Affairs  to  influence  the 
agricultural talks in GATT  negotiations.  The  link between the agricultural 
negotiations and negotiations  on other issues  should now  be much  stronger in 
Germany.  If significant offers of interest to  German  industry were  made  on 
condition that Germany  be more  forthcoming  on agricultural issues,  the 
Minister for Agriculture would  come  under strong pressure  from his colleague 
from  Economic  Affairs.  It would be also be  more  difficult to  convince  the 
general public  in Germany  that agricultural issues  should be  allowed to block 
progress  in other sectors. 
Threats 
A strategy of threat has  its dangers.  In particular,  it is possible to 
exaggerate  threats  so  much  that  they become  unconvincing,  and threats can also 
be  counterproductive if they completely block thinking on  the side of the 
negotiating partner.  For example,  there  is probably only a  small margin 
between using industrial offers as  leverage  on agricultural issues  and 
threatening industrial retaliation for agricultural resistance to such an 
extent that solidarity among  German  Ministries and  in the  general public 
finally forces  everybody  to help domestic  farmers  against the  "external 
enemy".  It is therefore necessary  to  target threats very carefully. 
One  possible  example  of a  potentially productive  threat could come  in the area 
of "rebalancing"  the  CAP.  What  the  Community  wants  to  achieve  in this  regard 
is essentially the withdrawal  of an earlier GATT  concession.  The  Community's 
negotiating partners could,  instead of requesting compensation  through  EC 
concessions  in other areas,  "threaten"  to withdraw concessions,  or raise 
tariffs on  items  imported mainly  from  the  EC  if the  EC  persists in its attempt 
at "rebalancing"  the  CAP.  If this strategy were  considered by  the  Community's 
95 negotiating partners,  the question would arise as  to which products would be 
most suitable. 
When  it comes  to  "rebalancing",  threats against  EC  agriculture may  not be  the 
most productive strategy,  at least not as  far as  German  response is concerned. 
As  mentioned above,  it appears  that the  German  Ministry of Economic  Affairs 
was  prepared to accept  the request for  "rebalancing"  in the  EC  negotiating 
proposal  only on condition that compensation is to be provided within 
agriculture.  If the  Community's  negotiating partners were  to propose  raising 
tariffs on  some  industrial  items  in case  the  EC  were  to raise tariffs on 
substitutes,  the Ministry of Economic  Affairs would probably find it very 
difficult to  go  along.  Hence  the  "threat"  to  request negotiations  on raising 
certain industrial tariffs in exchange  for negotiations on "rebalancing"  the 
CAP  might greatly reduce  German  pressure for  "rebalancing". 
Only  a  few  examples  for actions  in the areas  of persuasion,  enticement and 
threat have been given here.  There  are probably other actions which  could be 
tried in order to  convince German  policymakers  that they should more  seriously 
consider approaches  to agricultural trade liberalization in the  GATT. 
However,  it would be wrong  to assume  that German  positions  on agricultural 
policy are easily given up.  As  always  in negotiations,  a  compromise will have 
to be  found  through give  and  take.  In any  case,  chances  for  a  slightly more 
forthcoming German  position on agricultural trade have  probably never before 
been as  good as  they were before December  1989  and with German  unification the 
German  position on the Uruguay  round could be  even more  forthcoming. 
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Political unification of the  Federal Republic  of Germany  and the  German 
Democratic Republic was  realized on October,  3  1990  after 11  astonishing 
months  of accelerating political change.  Germany  was  whole  again 
geographically and politically but confusion was  perhaps  the  dominant 
characteristic in the  economic  and social makeup  between west  and  east.  The 
German  Economic  and Monetary Union  (GEMU)  had preceded political union on July 
1  of the  same  year whereby  the west  German  Deutschmark became  the official 
currency in the  five  new  east German  states.  The  Berlin Wall  had only been 
broached the previous  November  and  the rapidity of the  succeeding political 
and  economic  events will not likely be  fully absorbed nor understood for 
another  generation. 
The  fundamental  cause of the  economic  and social problems  since unification 
derive  from  ~he inescapable fact that the  economic,  technological,  and social 
gap  between eastern and western Germany  was  much  greater  than anyone  realized. 
Before unification,  GNP  per capita in eastern Germany  was  estimated to be  63 
percent of that of western Germany,  whereas,  latest available data suggests 
that the  figure was  closer to  30  percent  (Jackson,  1991).  And  that does not 
even take  into account  the  enormous  environmental  damage  in eastern Germany  or 
the  gap  in the quality of goods  produced or the public  infrastructure.  It 
should not be forgotten that the wall did prevent escape  to political freedom 
and  a  better economic  life under  a  threat of death.  Nevertheless,  thousands 
took  the risk.  Even after the wall fell,  and  freedom was  no  longer  the motive 
for migration to western Germany,  hundreds  of thousands  crossed from east to 
west  for  economic  reasons. 
The  impact of GEMU  and  the  subsequent political unification of Germany  had 
large and  immediate  impacts  on east German  agricultural  commodity  markets with 
significant effects on markets  in west  Germany  and other  EC  member  states. 
Before  examining  some  of these effects and  the overall  implications of 
unification on German  agricultural policy,  a  brief review of east German 
agriculture under  communist  rule  and  a  comparison between east and west  German 
agriculture is required in order  to understand the present,  and possibly 
future,  dichotomous  nature of German  agriculture. 
East  German  Agriculture  from  1945-1990 
The  occupation authorities of the Soviet Union began a  system of government 
intervention after World War  II with widespread forced collectivization by  the 
East German  communist  regime.  The  large estates  (above  100 hectares)  of 
eastern Germany  were all expropriated by  the  Soviets  and distributed as  small 
farms.  When  the  German  Democratic Republic was  established in 1949,  intense 
pressure was  exerted against private  farms  in various  forms  so  more  and more 
land was  abandoned  to  the  government  (Hil1berg-Seitzinger,  1990). 
Collectivization of farms  into cooperatives  called Landwirtschaft1iche 
Produktionsgenossenschaften  (LPG's)  began  in 1952.  By  1957,  nearly 6,700 had 
been established and  they controlled 25  percent of the  GDR's  agricultural 
land.  Even  though  the  economic  performance  of cooperatives was  not very 
satisfactory,  private  farms  continued to be  forcibly collectivized and  an 
97 additional 40  percent of the  land was  collectivized in the first 3  months  of 
1960.  Policies such as  tax and subsidy discrimination favored  the  LPG's,  and 
horizontal and vertical integration of the  LPG  units was  intensified in order 
to achieve  industrialization of agriculture  on  a  large scale.  The  LPG's  were 
specialized by activity into crop,  livestock,  input services,  seed,  and 
breeding activities with the  intention of realizing economies  of sca1e,rapid 
diffusion of technological advances,  and equalizing rural/urban living 
conditions. 
The  end result was  that the LPG's  became  self-contained communities with their 
own  schools,  doctors,  construction crews,  and social services.  Farmers  became 
salaried workers with a  fixed work  schedule,  paid vacations,  and health and 
social benefits.  By  1989,  through consolidation and specialization,  3,855 
LPG's  and 465  state farms  were  in operation  (Henrichsmeyer  1990).  Only 5.4 
percent of the  land was  in church and privately held farms. 
State control was  guaranteed through  a  centrally planned system which served 
as  the  decisionmaking unit for  the allocation and distribution of inputs  and 
outputs.  All agricultural enterprises were  allotted production and  investment 
goods  which determined their expected output.  Input and output prices were 
fixed while producer prices were  based on production cost calculations but in 
effect they were  only accounting prices  (Henrichsmeyer,  1990).  Price  reforms 
in 1984 adjusted the prices of farm  inputs,  r~ised producer prices,  and 
realigned prices  among  commodities. 
Yages  were  determined by  comparisons with occupations  in the  industrial sector 
and were  only marginally related to profitability of the enterprise. 
Profitable enterprises were  taxed in order to compensate  enterprises that made 
losses.  Hence,  agricultural enterprises with a  comparative  advantage  in 
production had little incentive  to  increase productivity while  inefficient 
enterprises  laboring under  extremely marginal  conditions  stayed in production 
and absorbed resources  that would have had a  higher return elsewhere 
(Henrichsmeyer,  1990). 
While  livestock and crop production increased under  this  regime,  neither the 
productivity nor  the quality of east German  production kept pace with west 
German  production.  The  goal of food self-sufficiency in the  GDR  was  only met 
for milk,  meat,  and rapeseed.  Consumption was  subsidized so it is little 
wonder  that a  combination of low  food prices  and an inefficient production 
system would not attain food  self-sufficiency in spite of the  fact that nearly 
11  percent of the population worked  in agriculture full-time  (Made11,  1990). 
A Comparison of East  and West  German  Agriculture 
On  October  3,  1990  the addition of east Germany  to west Germany  added 16.7 
million people  and  108.3  thousand square kilometers  to  the  European  Community. 
Germany  thus  expanded its total population by  27  percent and its agricultural 
population by  70  percent,  its land area by  44  percent,  and its utilized 
agricultural area by  51  percent. 
The  most  outstanding characteristic regarding the  incorporation of agriculture 
of the  5  eastern states into west  Germany  is  the  difference  in farm  structure 
98 (tables 6.1  and 6.2).  As  an  immediate  result of unification,  the  German 
Minister of Agriculture was  faced with making policy for an agriculture that 
had a  combination of numerous  small,  inefficient farms  and some  of the  largest 
inefficient farms  in the Western world. 
Table  6.1: Distribution of  agricultural  land.  1988 
German  Democratic  Republic  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
Total  agricultural  land- 6,181,878  ha  Total  agricultural  land-11,951,000  ha 
Use 
- cultivated land 
- pasture  land 
- meadow  land 






- cultivated land 
- pasture  land 
- meadow  land 





----------------~----------------------------------.-- -----.------------------ - socialist enterprises 
- state owned  farms 
- of  those,  for  crops 
- cooperative farms 






non-socialist enterprises  5.4 
UAA  U1CIer  5 ha 
UAA  between  5 and  15  ha 
UAA  15  - 30  ha 
UAA  30  - 50  ha 
UAA  50  - 100  ha 
UAA  more  than 100  ha 
1/ data for  1987:  UAA  means  Utilized Agricultural  Area 







Statistisches Jahrbuch  der Deutschen  Demokratischen  Republik,  1988  and  1989. 
Agrarbericht  der Bundesregierung,  1988. 
In 1988,  west  Germany  had over  680,000  farms  with an average  size of slightly 
under  18  hectares while east Germany  had about 4,600  farm  enterprises with an 
average  size of 1,350 hectares.  In addition,  30  percent of west German  farms 
were  under  5  hectares  in size and  only 9  percent were  over  100 hectares, 
whereas,  in east Germany,  the average  cooperative grain farm had 4,500 
hectares with  some  reaching as high as  15,000 hectares.  (Madell,  1990). 
Another  important characteristic that differentiates  the  two  agricultures is 
efficiency which is reflected by greater production per  farmer  in west Germany 
and is also reflected in yield data  (table 6.3).  East German  yields  for  crops 
and livestock production are significantly below yields  in west Germany  even 
though prior to  1945  yields were higher in eastern Germany.  The  lower yields 
in eastern Germany  occur in spite of generally higher  input use but of low 
quality- particularly labor,  fertilizer,  and pesticides  (table 6.3).  In 
addition,  the overall quality of the  output  in the  east was  significantly 
below that of the W&$t.as  attested to by  the  abrupt  change  in east German 
consumption after the Berlin Wall  was  breached  (Madel1,  1991). 
There  are many  reasons  for  the  development of inefficient agriculture in east 
Germany.  The  most  important factor  is the  inherent nature of state 
cooperative  farming.  State  farms  in general have:  1)  insufficient economic 
incentives;  2)  an  inability to adjust the  labor  force  to  changing conditions; 
3)  low propensity for  saving and  investment;  and,  4)  a  complicated and rigid 
hierarchical decision structure  (Henrichsmeyer,  1990).  Modern  production 
technology was  not  forthcoming  from  this institutional setting.  The  end 
99 result was  that yields were  low,  production costs high,  and  too much  labor and 
administrative personnel were  employed.  Estimates  are  that even dividing the 
labor force  by half would not be sufficient to  increase productivity and 
income  to  reasonable  levels  (Henrichsmeyer,  1990). 
Table  6.2:  Farm  Numbers  and  Types  in East  and  West  Germany.  1987 
German  Democratic  Republic  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
------------------_.-------- ------------------------------------
Total  farms  4,574  Total  farms 
percent 
- state owned  10.2  Size 
- crops  17.0  ---------
- animals  66.9  farm  income  lI1der  OM  40,000 
farm  income  OM  40  - 60,000 
- cooperatives  84.3  farm  income  over  OM  60,000 
- crops  30.1 
- animals  69.9  farm  type 
---------
- cooperative gardens  4.4  Grain and  other field crops 
Fed  livestOCK  2/ 
- other coop.  0.1  Transformation 3/ 
Long-term  cultivation 4/ 
- coop.  fish  farms  1.1  Mixed  farms 
1/ as  a  percentage of  the 336,000  farms  earning all  income  from  farming. 
2/ chiefly cattle and  dairy. 
3/ chiefly pigs and  poultry. 
4/ viticulture,  orchards. 
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Agrarbericht  del'  Bundesregierung,  1988. 
Table 6.3: CC!!l!8rison  of Yields and  Irput Use  in East and  West  Germany 
East  Germany  West  Germany 
Average  Yields.  1983-1988: 
Grains  4400  Kg/ha 
Potatoes  23360  Kg/ha 
Sugar  Beets  30230  Kg/ha 
Winter  Oilseeds  2560  Kg/ha 
Mi lK  3821  Kg/cow 
Eggs  220  per hen 









8.21100  ha 
141.3  Kg/ha 
56.4  Kg/ha 
94.4  Kg/ha 
2n.7 Kg/ha 
4.9 Kg/ha 
1.4  KW/ha 
0.8/100  ha 
5230  Kg/ha 
33360  Kg/ha 
49040  Kg/ha 
2940  Kg/ha 
4713  Kg/cow 
257  per  hen 
5.21100  ha 
121.0  Kg/ha 
56.8 Kg/ha 
n.1  Kg/ha 
122.4  Kg/ha 
2.3  Kg/ha 
4.0  KW/ha 
3.21100  ha 
1/ 54  percent  fully depreciated. 
~/ 43  percent  fully depreciated. 
Sources:  Henrichsmeyer,  Commission  of  the  EC,  and  BMELF. 
Agricultural policy in east Germany  emphasized livestock production in order 
to earn scarce foreign exchange.  This  is reflected in table 6.4 where 
production of animals  relative to population was  higher  in the east than in 
the west;  and west  German  imports  of east German  animals  was  the  largest 
100 imported item while  oilseed cakes  for animal  feed was  the largest east German 
import  from west  Germany. 
Table 6.4:  Ani_l rulb!r5 
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Sources:  Agricultural  Situation in the Community,  1988,  1986,  1989. 
Statistisches Jahrbuch  der Deutschen  Demokratischen  Republik,  1988  and  1989. 
German  Agricultural Trade 
The  GDR  and  the  FRG  had well-established agricultural  trade  agreements  before 
unification.  The  FRG  constitution included the  five  states that comprised 
eastern Germany,  before  the  GDR  was  established,  as part of German  territory 
and East German  citizens were  legally classified as  West  German  citizens. 
These  legalities were  accepted by the  EC  and  incorporated into the Treaty of 
Rome  in 1957. 
Agricultural trade between the  two  Germanies  was  considered internal German 
trade.  Other  EC  member  states treated East German  products  as  they would non-
EC  products.  East Germany  was  treated favorably  in the  two-way  trade of 
agricultural and other products.  Within given value  quotas,  East German 
agricultural products  entered West  Germany  duty-free  on  a  non-reciprocal basis 
but could only be  consumed  in West  Germany.  The  exchange  rate used for  inter-
German  trade was  ona one-to-one basis  and East Germany  received around  $450 
million annually  from  West  Germany  in interest-free credits  (Madell,  1991). 
The  composition of the  trade between  the  two  Germanies  reflected the  two 
countries'  agricultural policies.  West  Germany  exported mostly processed 
agricultural products,  particularly oilseed products  to  East Germany,  while 
the  GDR  principally exported live animals,  grains,  and sugar and sugar 
products  to West  Germany.  East Germany  was  able  to earn much-needed foreign 
exchange  from  these  trade  arrangements  which  were  so  concessionary as  to be 
deemed  foreign aid.  Important as  these  foreign  exchange  revenues  were  for  the 
GDR,  West  German  agricultural  imports  from  the  GDR  added  only marginally to 
total supplies  in the  FRG. 
101 Table 6.5: Coaposition of inter-Gel"lB1 agricultural  trade 
East  German  Imports  from  West  Germany 
Agricultural  Products 
Raw  tobacco 
White  wine 
Horticulture 
Meat  products 
Tropical  wood 
Fish  products 
Food  products 
Meal-,dough-, 
baked  goods 
Sugar  &  products 
Milk,  butter. 
Tobacco  products 
Oi lcakes/meals  . 
Meat,fish  products 
Drinks  11 
1987  1988  1989  ------.----------_._._--
(S1,DOO) 
7,745  7,452  1,509 
2,834  3,443  3,192 
1,481  946  895 
228  239  97 
1,442  4,698  3,404 
480  583  589 
7,836  5,766  10,851 
52,303  54,298  56,381 
13,289  12,841  11,240 
13,481  11,489  12,312 
134,105  118,329  149,425 
12,120  10,975  10,569 
16,768  15,559  17,113 
West  German  imports  from  East  Germany 
Agricultural  Products 
Winter  wheat 
SUllller  wheat 
Oats 
Brew  barley 
Grass  seeds 
Horticulture 
Live  animals 
Forestry products 
Fish  products 
Food  Products 
Meal  and  dough-
baked  goods 
Sugar  and  products 
Meat,fish  products 











1988  1989 
(S1,000) 
13,620  10,426 
6,507  2,296 
29,400  16,984 
48,5n  28,853 
4,496  5,047 
4,812  4,040 
88,759  111,484 
8,666  5,766 
2,680  2,092 
16,800  14,091  13,297 
65,736  65,785  60,279 
15,565  15,610  19,950 
21,330  27,319  30,028 
1/ alcoholic and  non·alcoholic drinks 
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt.  Handel.  Gastwerbe. 
Reiseverkehr.  Fachserie 6.  Warenverkehr  mit  der Deutschen 
Demokratischen  Republik  und  Berlin (Ost),  various years. 
East Germany  in the  CAP 
The  CAP  has  been formally applied to east German  agriculture since October  3, 
1990,  the  day of political unification,  but in practice many  elements  of the 
CAP  had already been  implemented  in the  GDR  immediately after monetary  and 
economic  union was  established in July  1990.  As  east Germany  had already 
accepted the west  German  deutschmark  as  its currency,  CAP  prices,  converted 
into  deutschmarks  by  the  German  green rate,  became  east German  prices.  In the 
long run,  this  should prove  to be  an advantage  to east German  farmers  because 
they will be  able  to buy modern  inputs with deutschmarks  and because  Germany 
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/1, has  the highest producer price  in the  CAP  with the  exception of Spain. 
However,  in the short run,  harmonization with  CAP  prices is causing massive 
adjustment pains  in east Germany  because  GDR  producer prices had been more 
than double  the  level of CAP  prices1/ and because it will  take east German 
agriculture quite  some  time  to  overcome  its many  inefficiencies. 
East  Germany  also had to accept  EC  law,  including  EC  1992  legislation, 
although  some  exceptions have been made.  For  example,  air and water standards 
will not be fully in effect for  East Germany  until 1996  and full adoption of 
EC  veterinary and plant health  laws  will not occur until the  end of 1992. 
East Germans  now  have  their own  CAP  milk quota of 6.59 million tons which is 
80  percent of previous production.  The  sugar quota was  set at 847,000  tons, 
somewhat  above  current production levels.  The  intervention ceilings for  EC 
beef,  butter,  and skim milk powder  were  increased by  15  thousand tons,  25 
thousand  tons,  and  6  thousand  tons,  respectively,  because of German 
unification  .. 
For  the  time being,  East German  production of grains  and oilseeds will not be 
counted against the maximum  guaranteed quantities  (MGQ)  above  which  EC 
producers  must  accept price cuts,  but east German  producers will face  the  same 
price cuts if EC  production exceeds  the  MGQ.  The  MGQ  will be  reviewed over 
the next  two  years before east German  production is incorporated  (Madell, 
1991) . 
Like  farmers  in other EC  member  countries,  east German  dairy farmers will be 
compensated for  some  part of the production cuts.  Many  east German  farmers 
live in "less favored areas"  and will receive  EC  payments.  The  German 
government  spent $2.8 billion in 1990  and has  budgeted $4.8 billion for 
payments  to east Germany  to facilitate adjustment in its agricultural sector. 
In addition,  the  EC  has  estimated that east German  agriculture will qualify 
for about  3  billion ECU's  for  the  1991-93  period from  the  EC  Social  Fund,  the 
Regional  Development  Fund,  and  the  Guidance  fund of the  CAP,  though  a  fair 
share of these subsidies will go  towards  non-agricultural uses  in rural areas. 
One  immediate  impact on the  EC  agricultural markets  of German  unification was 
the disruption of the beef market  since east German  slaughterhouses  in part 
refused to accept cattle for slaughtering because  the  sudden elimination of 
subsidies left them without profits.  The  situation on  the beef market  further 
deteriorated when  farms  were  forced  to  slaughter dairy cows  because of the 
quota. 
The  EC  hog market was  also disrupted because east German  consumers  preferred 
western style foods  and because  the quality of the  pork did not measure  up  to 
EC  standards.  Prices of both beef and pork dropped precipitously in east 
Germany  and  in the  EC.  Such  abnormal  price fluctuations  in the  EC  are 
anathema  to  EC  member  states.  It is likely that these price fluctuations,  in 
combination with other world events  such  as  the  war  in the  Persian Gulf which 
1/ Calculated at the official exchange  rate 
103 affected  EC  prices adversely,  exacerbated  EC  fears  that the  GATT  negotiations 
could be  used  to  expose  EC  farm prices  to  the unexpected winds  of change 
outside  the  EC. 
However,  the  long-term  impact of German  unification may  be  even more 
significant as east Germany  increases productivity,  particularly in the 
products  that are already in surplus  in the  EC.  The  implications  for  EC  and 
German  agricultural policy are significant and will in turn affect world 
agricultural trade. 
Perhaps  the greatest effect will be  in the political calculus of the  CAP 
budget.  Germany  has  long been  the  largest net contributor to  the  CAP  and 
gained power  in the  decisionmaking process,  among  others,  because it was 
viewed as  the paymaster of the  CAP.  With  German  unification,  much  of east 
Germany  will qualify for  funds  from  the  structural and guidance budgets of the 
CAP.  In addition,  east Germans  have relatively low  incomes  and will not 
contribute as  much  to VAT  contributions  as  their western counterparts. 
Consequently,  Germany's  net contribution to  the  CAP  may  decline  for  some  t~me 
while  those of France  and Great Britain may  increase.  This  presents  a 
particularly difficult dilemma  for  the  French who  have  long considered 
themselves  the  granary of Europe  and  a  major exporter and competitor in world' 
markets. 
Effects  on  German  Agricultural Policy 
The  effects that German  unification might have  on agricultural policy in 
Germany,  and  on  the  German  position in multilateral agricultural negotiations, 
are not yet obvious  and will take  some  time  to clearly emerge.  For  the  time 
being east German  agriculture is in a  difficult situation with state-owned 
farms  and cooperatives receiving lower prices and  returns after unification. 
Reduction of the rural labor force has begun at a  high rate,  reallocation of 
production inputs  and  outputs  is underway,  and adoption of new  technology is 
increasing,  but efficiency has  not generally increased to make  most  farms 
profitable.  Most  importantly,  the process of structural change has  only begun 
and  in most  cases  the  large uneconomic  farms  have  not yet been redistributed 
and new  ownership patterns are  only beginning  to  emerge. 
Vulnerability of East German  Farming 
These  developments  would  seem  to reinforce  the  tendency of German  policymakers 
to strive for  an higher level of support  than before unification.  Relatively 
small  farms  in west  Germany  demand  high protection,  and  the  inefficient east 
German  farms  which are under  so much  economic  stress are  doing  the  same. 
Hence,  there is no  reason to believe that the  German  position has  eased, 
rather,  it would  seem  to have  hardened  in the  short run.  This  was  evident in 
the protracted negotiations  on  the  1991/92  CAP  price package where  the  German 
Minister of Agriculture  argued strongly against  the price cuts proposed by  the 
EC  Commission just as  he has  done  in earlier price negotiations.  There  is 
some  change  in the  German  position on  CAP  structural policies because  the 
German  government  must  now  consider what  structural policies mean  to  the  large 
east German  cooperatives.  However,  when  it comes  to market  and  trade policies 
there has  not yet been any noticeable  change  in the  German  position. 
104 
I' There  is no  sign either of any political parties or pressure groups having 
fundamentally  changed their position on agricultural policy.  This  is not 
surprising given the  enormous  amount  of work  and  decisionmaking which has  to 
be  done  in order to  integrate east Germany  into  the  EC  and  the unified 
Germany.  There  is a  staggering amount  of concrete  issues which must be dealt 
with on a  daily basis which  occupies  many  functionaries  in solving these 
mundane  "technical"issues rather then adopting fundamentally  new  strategies on 
agricultural policies. 
The  DBV,  for  example,  has yet to decide which of the  old or newly established 
farmer  groups  in east Germany  should be  allowed to become  members.  This 
process  is difficult because of the varying personal  and political backgrounds 
of the different east German  farm  groups;  the uncertainty about their long-rnn 
viability;  the competition among  different groups  in east Germany;  the 
difficulty in predicting the future  ownership  and  farm  size structure in east 
Germany  and  ~he relationship of the different groups with different types of 
farms;  and  the  implications  any of these  decisions have  for  the structure of 
farmers'  representations  in the  individual states in west Germany. 
Emergence  of Large  Farms 
It is likely that after some  time,  a  farming  industry will  emerge  in east 
Germany  that is potentially much  more  efficient than that of west Germany. 
Some  basic trends  appear  to be  emerging even  though  the process of structural 
change has  only begun.  It is unlikely that many  of the  cooperative  farms will 
survive  in the  longer  term even in restructured forms.  Agriculture  in east 
Germany is destined to be  dominated by  family  farms  as  in all western 
countries.  Some  of these  farms  will be  similar in size to small  farms  in west 
Germany  but most will likely be  larger.  Such  farms  will originate where 
members  of cooperatives,  who  still have  titles to  the  land they or their 
parents were  forced  to bring into  the  cooperatives,  are claiming  the  land and 
are  re-establishing their family  farms.  In most  cases  these  farms  will be 
larger than their previous  farms  because  these  new  farmers  have  an interest 
in,  and frequently  the possibility of,  renting more  land from  former  members 
of the cooperative. 
There will also be  rather large  farms  far beyond  the  any size known  in west 
Germany.  These  large  farms  originate  from  two  processes:  1)  Some  farmers  who 
have  the managerial skill and capital to  develop  new  large  farms  by renting 
land from  a  large number  of small  landowners  who  have  no  interest in farming; 
nearly all of these  farmers  are  from west  Germany  and  the  farms  range  in size 
from  a  few hundred  to  a  few  thousand hectares:  2)  Some  of the  owners  of 
previously large estates that were  expropriated have  shown  an interest in 
reclaiming and  farming  their estates again.  These  potential large farmers 
cannot  simply claim their land and begin to  farm  since  the  Supreme  Court 
confirmed the ruling in the unification treaty that  the  land expropriated 
between  1945  and  1949  will not be  given back  to its previous  owners.  However, 
in some  cases  they have  begun to  rent their former estates  from  the 
Treuhandanstalt  (the current owner).  In other cases  they may  use  the 
financial  compensation  they will  receive  and  opt  for buying  the  land back from 
the Treuhandanstalt on  favorable  terms.  In still other cases  the  estates will 
be  sold by  the Treuhandanstalt and  they may  survive undivided.  In any  case 
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more  favorable  than the  structure in west Germany.  Moreover,  tenant  farming 
is likely to playa much  more  important role. 
These  factors  argue  for  a  more  competitive agriculture in east Germany  in the 
longer run which  is less  dependent  on,  and even less  interested in,  high price 
protection.  The  managerial  farmers  who  may  become  prominent  in east Germany 
may  have  more  of an interest in free  markets  and free  decisionmaking  on the 
farm putting them  in opposition to  government  intervention programs  like 
quotas  and mandatory set-aside.  However,  many  of the  employees  of 
cooperatives  and state farms  would prefer the security and benefits  they had 
under  the old regime,  thus  there  is likely to be  resistance  to any movement  to 
free markets. 
East Germany  may  develop  a  rather competitive  food  and processing industry. 
In the  GDR  processing industry,  machinery  and buildings were  outdated, 
technology was  obsolete,  quality standards were  poor,  marketing activities 
were  essentially non-existent,  and managerial capacity was  limited.  Large 
parts of the east German  food processing sector will be re-created by capital 
and know-how  from west Germany  and other western countries.  The  industry that  •  emerges  from  this process  is likely to be  modern  and  competitive like German 
industry was  after its rapid re-establishment after World  War  II. 
Implications for Multilateral Negotiations 
What  are  the  implications of such prospects  for  the  German  position on 
multilateral negotiations?  Time  will be  an  important factor.  The  trend 
towards  larger and more  competitive  farms  in east Germany  and  towards  a 
modernized  food  industry is obvious,  but it has  not yet materialized to  an 
extent that it would  influence  thinking in the agricultural policy circles in 
Bonn.  It will probably take  a  number  of years  to restructure in east Germany 
and  the new  situation will not  then be  reflected for  many  years  in the  federal 
government's position on agricultural policy matters  such as price support and 
trade  liberalization.  The  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  are  therefore unlikely 
to be affected by  such potential changes  in agricultural policy trends  in 
Germany. 
For  the  remainder of the Uruguay  Round  negotiations  (assuming  they are 
finished  in 1991  or 1992)  it is likely that  the  economic  stress  on agriculture 
in east Germany  will reinforce most  of the positions of German  agricultural 
policy held before nnification.  The  tendency  to opt for  continued price 
support  in combination with set-aside now  appears  to be  even stronger than 
before unification.  This  is because  set-aside payments  are  an  important  cash-
flow for many  farms  in east Germany.  The  special set-aside program,  which  the 
German  government  introduced for east Germany  soon after unification,  proved 
to be very attractive even  though  payments  were  lower  than in west  Germany. 
About  600,000 hectares were  taken out of production  in 1990, -or  12.8 percent 
of arable  land,  compared  to 4.3 percent  in west  Germany,  because  government 
payments  offered a  secure  cash  income  to  farms  whose  managers  had no  other 
source  to  pay wages  to  the  members  of their cooperatives. 
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Some  analysts  assume  that up  to  25  percent of east German  land may  be  idled in 
the medium  term because  the  GDR  had utilized marginal  land and had 
marginalized other land through overuse  and misuse  of fertilizers  and 
pesticides in a  bid for greater food self-sufficiency  (Henrichsmeyer,  1990). 
Other analysts  expect  a  much  smaller share  of east German  land to be  set-aside 
because efficient farms  are likely to  emerge  in parts of east Germany  and will 
want  to  compete  in the market rather than only collect government  payments 
(Tangermann,  1991).  In any case,  set-aside in east Germany  is expected to 
remain proportionally more  significant than in west  Germany. 
The  continued German  tendency  towards  a  combination of price support and set-
aside  may  well be  reflected in the  "reform"  of the  CAP  which,  as  agreed among 
EC  Commission  and Council  members,  will be  debated in the  second half of 1991. 
If that is the  case,  the  EC  would  then be  likely to pursue  the Uruguay Round 
negotiations  so  that its "new"  domestic policy is covered by  the multilateral 
agreements. 
An  indication of the direction this policy could go  was  given by  the  outcome 
of the 1991/92  CAP  price negotiations.  The  Commission had proposed that 
cereal prices  should be  cut  in spite of the  fact  that 1990  EC  cereal 
production had remained below the  guarantee  threshold by  a  narrow margin. 
German  farmers  and Mr.  Kiechle  strongly opposed such  a  price cut while  some 
member  countries were  prepared to accept it.  Mr.  Kiechle  argued strongly for 
an intensified and extended set-aside program in order to make,  as he  put it, 
a  first step towards  reforming  the  CAP ..  It was  eventually agreed that the co-
responsibility levy on cereals be  raised and  a  program of "super"  set-aside in 
1991/92 be  added  to  the normal  set-aside such  that farmers  who  participate in 
the  additional program be  exempted  from  the  co-responsibility levy.  Mr. 
Kiechle  used this  "success"  to  present to German  farmers  as  a  victory for  them 
in that he  had managed  to push  the  EC  a  bit in the direction where  he  thought 
CAP  reform should go. 
Mr.  Kiechle  is not alone  in his  thinking about  the  role  od set-aside in CAP 
reform.  Agricultural  Commissioner MacSharry  is heading in a  similar 
direction.  The  MacSharry plan for  CAP  reform is also very much  based on set-
aside,  and  the  incentives for  farmers  to participate would also come  from 
price differentiation such that farmers  participating in the  set-aside  r~ceive 
higher prices  than farmers  who  do  not.  In the MacSharry  scheme,  there would 
be  deficiency payments  and price differentiation would be  brought  about by 
excluding farmers  who  do  not participate in the set-aside program  from  such 
payments  rather than having  them  pay co-responsibility levies like under  the 
current system.  Such  differences  are  relatively minor  in political terms  but 
not in economic  terms. 
As  far as  the  GATT  negotiations  are  concerned,  the  EC  in aggregate  may  be  more 
forthcoming  as  a  consequence  of the  increasing domestic  pressures  for  CAP 
reform.  The  position of the  German  agricultural policymakers,  however,  may 
not be  much  different from  what it was  before  1990,  except  that German 
interest in set-aside policies  may  now  be  stronger.  Hence,  Germany  and 
possibly the  EC  on aggregate  may  have  even more  of an  interest in making  sure 
that credit is given for set-aside policies  and  other  forms  of supply control 
in any  AMS  arrangement. 
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Germany  has  far more  to lose  than before if the  Uruguay  Round  is not 
successful.  Germany's  willingness  to make  significant contributions  to 
financing political and economic  reforms  in Eastern Europe  and  the  Soviet 
Union further  increases  the need for capital in Germany.  The  trade 
implications of unification,  the restructuring of Eastern Europe,  and support 
for  the Baltics and other Republics  from  the  old U.S.S.R.  is that Germany 
should now  have  even more  of an interest in earning foreign exchange by 
ensuring access  to other countries'  markets  in order to export its 
manufactured goods  and services  (Agra  Europe,  December  7,  1991). 
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German  unification may  also affect the overall attitude of the  German 
government  to multilateral trade negotiations.  German  politicians and  the 
general public very much  appreciate  the political support that Germany  has 
received from  many  countries  in achieving unification.  It is therefore likely 
that German  politicians will consider more  carefully the  interests of those 
countries'  that were  instrumental in helping achieve  rapid unification. 
German unification has  significantly changed the macroeconomic  situation of 
Germany.  West  Germany  has .traditionally run a  large surplus  in its foreign 
exchange balance.  This  situation has  now  changed significantly.  High  east 
German  consumer  demand  and large  investment  requirements  for east Germany  have 
rapidly turned the  German  trade balance  into  the negative.  This  situation is 
likely to persist for  some  time  and is quite acceptable  to Germany  as it has 
been a  capital exporter for  a  long  time  and is now  in need of capital imports 
to  finance  the  enormous  investments  required to  develop  the  infrastructure and 
industrial base  in east Germany.  On  the  other hand,  the  German  government has 
had to  increase  taxes  in spite of promises  not  to  do  so because  the  costs of 
German  unification were  apparently greatly underestimated  (The  Economist.  July 
20,  1991). 
The  question remains  whether nonagricultural  economic  interests will be  able 
to  overcome  the  entrenched and powerful agricultural interests in the short 
run in Germany  in order to conclude  a  significant agreement  in agriculture in 
the  Uruguay  Round.  While  there are  formidable  obstacles  to  an agreement  in 
agricul~re from  the point of view of German  agriculturalists,  German 
unification provides  more  impetus  to  the  opportunity to  reach a  compromise  on 
agriculture with Germany  which has  never been greater. 
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The  German  position on agricultural talks  in the  Uruguay Round  of the  GATT 
negotiations has been shaped by a  unique political, historical,  and economic 
background that makes  Germany  a  key player in the bid to liberalize 
agricultural trade.  Germany  has been the major  influence  on  the  development 
of price support and protectionist policies  in the  Common  Agricultural Policy 
(CAP)  of the  European Community  (EC)  and its politically powerful  farm  lobby 
will resist any erosion of its support.  On  the other hand,  German 
industrialists are more  aware  than before of the  opportunity costs of the 
German  position on agriculture in the Uruguay  Round.  Germany  also stands  to 
gain most  among  EC  member  states from  trade liberalization.  Based upon  tha~ 
background,  it becomes  more  apparent where  Germany  might  stand fast and where 
it might  compromise  in agricultural trade negotiations.  ' 
Germany's  unique history has  led to  three periods of agricultural 
protectionism,  the 1880's,  the 1930's,  and  the  1950's  to present.  Germany's 
tendency  towards  agricultural protectionism,  in combination with its bouts 
with starvation in the  two  world wars  of the  twentieth century,  led the newly 
established Federal Republic  of Germany  (FRG)  in the  1950's  to  a  policy of 
import restrictions and high  farm  prices.  A farm  lobby also  evolved that 
continues  to wield disproportionate political power  because  of the nature  of 
German  coalition politics.  This  power  is evident in The  Agricultural Act of 
1955  of the  FRG  which requires  the  government  to  "enable agriculture to ... 
offset the  eXisting natural and  economic  disadvantages"  in order to  "equalize 
the social situation of people working  in agriculture with  that of comparable 
professions". 
German  farm  structure has  led to  one  of the  least efficient farming sectors  in 
the  EC  and its small mixed  farms  have  led German  officials to  push for high 
prices for all farm  products.  Grain and sugar prices  are  favored because of 
the historically powerful  large  landowners  who  have  occupied an  important role 
as  a  central pillar of the prevailing social system,  and who  dominate  the 
powerful  farm  lobby.  Resistance  to structural change  in German  agriculture 
affects  the  CAP  and  reached a  legislative peak  in Germany  in 1988  with  the 
•  adoption of a  bill that excludes  larger farms  from  certain benefits and has  as 
its objective  to keep  as  many  farmers  on  the  land as possible.  The  philosophy 
implied in this legislation is not unlike  the philosophy of the  current  CAP 
reform as  proposed by the  EC  Commissioner  for Agriculture,  Ray  MacSharry. 
German  agriculture was  dragged into  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  for 
larger politicsl'considerations.  German  farmers  suffered nominal  price cuts 
of 10-15  percent when  the  CAP  was  introduced and  contend  they were  never fully 
compensated as  they had been promised.  The  establishment of the  CAP  was 
regarded by  many  German  farmers  and agricultural ministry officials as  a 
"national catastrophe"  because it forced  German  farmers  to  accept  lower prices 
and less protection than its previous national policy. 
German  officials in Brussels have  used  their uniquely powerful position within 
the  CAP  to  influence  the  CAP  to  the  advantage  of German  farmers.  The  most 
successful efforts have  led to: 
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of all other  EC  member  states and far above  world prices; 
2)  keeping  EC  nominal prices at high levels  through use  of its veto power; 
3)  the  introduction of an  EC  milk quota; 
4)  the  establishment of the  EC  set-aside program. 
The  CAP  as it is currently constituted is now  accepted by German  farmers  and 
they would not be willing to  abandon it easily. 
Even  though  the  CAP  costs German  consumers  and  taxpayers  more  than the net 
farm  income  that their own  farmers  receive,  German  agricultural policy remains 
insulated because: 
1)  People  outside agriculture simply do  not have  the  information to apprise 
themselves  of the effects of the policy; 
2)  political asymmetry  allows politicians to be  pro-farmer without losing 
votes  from  other sectors; 
3)  organization of a  small,  homogeneous  group  of farmers  is easy  compared to 
consumers  and  taxpayers; 
4)  the  farm  lobby has  convinced the  German  electorate that it is a 
disadvantaged group  that provides  many  useful services  to society. 
Agricultural trade liberalization in Germany will be  a  wrenching political and 
economic  experience that will be  greatly resisted by entrenched interests in 
spite of the positive  impact  on  the overall economy.  However,  most  German 
agriculturalists recognize  that the  CAP  and Germany's  agricultural policies 
must  change.  The  agricultural talks  in the  Uruguay  Round  offer an opportunity 
to  influence  these policy changes  although  the negotiations are considered a 
side  issue by most  German  agriculturalists,  and at a  minimum,  as  an 
opportunity to  "rebalance"  the  CAP  by restricting imports  of cereal 
substitutes and oilseeds.  While  there  is  some  appreciation of the need  to 
avoid serious  international  trade conflicts  among  German  agricultural 
policymakers,  they regard the  opening up  of borders  to  international 
competition and market  signals as both dangerous  and unnecessary. 
Mistrust of market  forces  by German  farmers  and  the  German  Ministry of 
Agriculture has  led them  to push for  quantity rather than price controls. 
Within an international context,  Germans  consider it unthinkable  to bind 
domestic  prices  in any  way  to world prices.  Hence,  German  priorities in a 
GATT  package  might consist of four  fundamental  elements: 
1)  Maintain the  CAP  mechanisms,  particularly variable  levies  and  export 
restitutions which would  legitimize  the  two-tier price system of the  CAP. 
2)  Loopholes  in the  CAP  must  be  closed which means  limiting the  imports  of 
cereal substitutes.  This  is considered an essential component  in any 
GATT  agreement by Germans.  Often called "rebalancing,"  this aspect of 
the agricultural negotiations  is of unique  importance  to German  farmers 
and agricultural officials for  economic  and political reasons.  It is 
considered the  only potentially positive  development  for  German  farmers 
amidst  CAP  reform and  trade liberalization.  Rebalancing,  even  an 
economically insignificant agreement,  is  a  necessary condition for an 
overall  GATT  agreement  in agriculture. 
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3)  Germans  would be willing to bind the  degree  of self-sufficiency in 
the  EC  and  there are precedents  in previous  GATT  negotiations  and in 
the  CAP  for  such an effort. 
4)  The  establishment of an extended Food Aid Convention consisting of a 
larger EC  commitment. 
The  Germans  will be  constrained in what  they can achieve  in a  GATT  agreement 
and realistic compromises  might be  attained that would not completely upset 
its negotiating partners  in the  EC  and in the  GATT.  However,  the  German 
position on tariffication is that it cannot be  a  compromise  solution for 
Germany  because it would either not change  anything or it would change  the 
legal and philosophical nature of the  CAP  that agricultural policymakers would 
find totally unacceptable. 
A compromise  for Germany  could lie in an aggregate measure  of support  (AMS) 
approach which  the  EC  also supports.  While  this approach restricts the  CAP's 
room  for maneuver,  it could be  the least restrictive available.  An  AMS 
approach where credit is given to countries  that pursue  supply control would 
allow Germany  to trade-off reductions  in domestic  production against increases 
or lack of reductions  in domestic  support prices,  i.e., it reduces  the  trade 
distorting impact but allows  domestic  support.  The  flexibility of the  AMS 
approach  imposes  balanced disciplines but allows  different types  of policies 
under  one  umbrella.  This flexibility would  enable  internal  EC  decisionmakidg 
to reconcile disparate interests. 
There  are  four aspects of an AMS  which  would be  of particular significance to 
Germany:  1)  specificity regarding policy measures,  2)  policy coverage,  3) 
treatment of domestic  supply control,  and 4)  definition of the external 
reference price.  Essentially,  Germany  would like to have  the  freedom  to 
choose  the policy instruments  to adjust to bindings  on aggregate  support and 
they would like  to  receive credit for  their social security schemes  for 
agriculture and its disadvantaged areas.  Such  credit could even serve as  an 
incentive  to Germany  to  "decouple"  some  social security schemes  to  the  extent 
that they are production-enhancing.  In addition,  the  Germans  would prefer AMS 
credit for  domestic  supply control so  they could  lower  quotas  and not prices 
and provide direct  income  payments. 
Germany  would not accept an external reference price which would fully expose 
German  prices  to  the  shocks  of international capital markets  and  the weather. 
However,  if an AMS  approach were based on  a  fixed external reference price and 
bindings applied to  the  domestic price and not  to  the  gap  between domestic  and 
world prices,  then Germans  might  be  more  forthcoming because  this is 
essentially what  the  CAP  does  with  its cereal stabilizer scheme. 
Alternatively,  technical solutions  to  the  problem could  include  a  moving 
average  of world prices or a  subset of  time  periods where  reductions  are 
phased  in.  EC  prices could then gradually follow  the  international price 
level without having  to  fully fluctuate  with it.  The  agrimonetary system 
j  provides  a  precedent because  the  CAP  eventually forces  this kind of 
adj us  tment. 
The  "rebalancing"  effort of Germany  and  the  EC  must  be  addressed for political 
reasons  even if it does  not have  any  great  economic  significance.  German 
III farmers  are not  going  to constrain cereal and oilseed output to see it 
replaced by cereal substitutes or oilseed imports.  Various  forms  of 
compensation in agriculture  for  "rebalancing"  could be  made  attractive to  the 
EC's  trading partners.  Even  a  voluntary restraint agreement  could be  a 
profitable alternative for  those  countries exporting substitutes to  the  EC. 
For  Germans  it is much  more  important that the quantities  of substitutes have 
a  ceiling rather than a  tariff that generates  revenues. 
Current developments  in Germany  which could affect the  German  agricultural 
position and  the  outcome  in multilateral agricultural negotiations are  German 
unification,  the  events  in Eastern Europe  and  the Soviet Union,  and  the 
awakened  interest of German  industrialists in a  successful conclusion to  the 
Uruguay  Round.  The  potential emergence  of an efficient agriculture in east 
Germany  is of less  importance  than the  immediate  need for high prices  to 
support  farm  revenues,  which  is not consistent with trade  reform.  However, 
the German  government  acknowledges  the political debt  they  owe  to other 
countries for  German unification and  the need for  a  strong GATT  agreement  that 
keeps  market  access  open for  German  exports  needed to  finance unification, 
support Eastern Europe,  and deal with the  Soviet Union. 
The  most  important negotiating strategy in forging  a  compromise  in agriculture 
with Germany  in the Uruguay  Round  is to  insure  that  the  German  government 
recognizes  ~he linkage between agriculture  and  industry.  German 
industrialists are waking up  to  the  economic  cost of German  agricultural 
policy and are attempting to prevent German  agricultural interests  from 
dominating  the  outcome  of the multilateral trade negotiations.  However,  their 
position is weak if German  politicians are  convinced that protecting farmers 
against outside pressures  can be  accomplished without significant negative 
repercussions  for German  industrial trade prospects. 
112 \ 
References 
Abel,  W.,  Agrarpo1itik.  2nd edition,  Gottingen 1958. 
Abel,  W.,  Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur.  Eine  Geschichte  der Land- und 
Ernahrungswirtschaft Mitte1europas seit dem  hohen Mitte1a1ter.  Hamburg,  Berlin 
1966. 
Abel,  W.,  Geschichte  der deutschen Landwirtschaft vom  fruhen Mitte1a1ter bis 
zum  19.  Jahrhundert.  2nd edition,  Stuttgart 1967. 
Ackermann,  P.,  Der  Deutsche  Bauernverband  im  po1itischen Kraftespie1 der 
Bundesrepub1ik.  Tubingen 1970. 
Agrarbericht der Bundesregierung,  var.  issues. 
Anderson,  K: and R.  Tyers.  "Liberalizing OECD  Agricultural Policies  in the 
Uruguay  round:  Effects  on trade  and Welfare.  Australian National university, 
Working  paper  in trade  and Development,  10.  Canberra,  July 1987. 
77Arbeitsprogramm fur  die Agrarpo1itik der Bundesregierung  (Agrarprogramm). 
Hiltrup  1968 . 
• 
Behrens,  R.,  Verg1eichende Analyse  der Entwick1ung  der Produktionsfaktoren in 
der Landwirtschaft der Europiischen Gemeinschaft. 
"Agrarwirtschaft",  Sonderheft  90.  Hannover  1981. 
Beusmann,  V.  and K.  Hagedorn,  Ansatze  der po1itischen Okonomie  zur Erk1irung 
einer sektora1en Einkommenspo1itik.  In:  W.  Grosskopf and M.  Kohne,  Einkommen 
in der Landwirtschaft  - Entstehung,  Vertei1ung,  Verwendung  und Beeinf1ussung. 
Schriften der Gese11schaft  fur Wirtschafts- und  Sozia1wissenschaften des 
Landbaues,  Bd.  21.  Munster-Hi1trup 1984. 
Braune,  I.,  and  W.  Henrichsmeyer,  Zukunftsperspektiven der Landwirtschaft. 
Landwirtschaft1iche  Produktions- und  Einkommensentwick1ung  in den  90er Jahren 
unter a1ternativen agrarpo1itischen Szenarien.  Angewandte  Wissenschaft,  Heft 
354.  Munster-Hi1trup  1988. 
Britton,  D.K.,  and  B.  Hill,  Size  and  Efficiency in Farming.  Saxon House  1975. 
Buckwe11 ,  A.E.,  D.R.  Harvey,  K.J.  Thomson  and K.A.  Parton,  The  Costs of the 
Common  Agricultural Policy.  London,  Canberra 1982. 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie,  BDI-Positionspapier zur Agrarpo1itik. 
Cologne,  September  1987. 
CDU/CSU,  Agrarpolitisches Konzept  der  CDU  und  CSU.  "Agra-Europe"  (German 
edition),  No.  10/86,  March  10,  1986,  Dokumentation. 
Ciriacy-Wantrup,  S.V.,  Agrarkrisen und  Stockungsspannen.  Berlin 1936. 
113 Commission of the  EC,  Perspectives  for  the  Common  Agricultural Policy.  COM 
(85)  333  final.  Brussels,  July 15,  1985. 
Commission of the  EC,  Restoring Equilibrium on  the Agricultural Markets. 
"Green Europe",  No.  1/88. 
Darre,  R.W.,  Das  Bauerntum a1s  Lebensque11  der nordischen Rasse.  Munchen  1929. 
Der  Bundesminister fur Wirtschaft,  Vorsch1age  zur Intensivierung und 
Koordinierung der  regiona1en Strukturpo1itik.  Manuscript,  Bonn  1968. 
Deutscher Bauernverband,  Leitsatze zur Strukturpo1itik.  Bad  Godesberg,  June 
10,  1968. 
Deutscher Bauernverband,  Ste11ungnahme  des  Bauernverbandes  zu den 
GATT-Verhand~ungen.  "Agra-Europe"  (German  edition),  No.  51/87,  December  21, 
1987,  Sonderbei1age. 
Dicke,  H.,  J.B.  Donges,  E.  Gerken and  G.  Kirkpatrick,  The  Economic  Effects of 
Agricultural Policy in West  Germany.  "We1twirtschaft1iches Archiv".  Review of 
World  Economics,  Band  124  (1988),  H.  2,  S.301-321. 
Dietze,  C.  v.,  Die  Lage  der deutschen Landwirtschaft.  IIJahrbucher  fur die 
Nationa1okonomie  und Statistik", vol.  130  (1929).  Reprinted in:  Gedanken und 
Bekenntnisse eines Agrarpo1itikers.  Gesamme1te  Aufsatze von C.  v.  Dietze. 
Gottingen 1962. 
Dixon,  P.B.,  B.R.  Parmenter,  J.  Sutton,  and D.P.  Vincent,  ORANI.  A Mu1tisecto-
ra1 Model  of the Australian Economy.  Amsterdam  1982. 
Eisenkramer,  K.,  Agrarpo1itische Konzepte  aus  der Sicht der  Bundesregierung. 
In:  W.  Henrichsmeyer  and C.  Langbehn  (eds.),  Wirtschaft1iche und sozia1e 
Auswirkungen unterschied1icher agrarpo1itischer Konzepte.  Munster-Hi1trup 
1988. 
Eu1enberg,  F.,  Grundrifi  der  Sozia1okonomik.  Tubingen 1929. 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture,  Press  Statement  on  the Mid-Term  Agreement  of 
April  1989.  Bonn,  April  8,  1989. 
Gemeinsames  Gutachten von Mitg1iedern des  Wissenschaft1ichen Beirates beim  BML 
und  von wirtschaftswissenschaft1ichen Beratern der  Kommission  der  EWG, 
Wirkungen einer Senkung der Agrarpreise  im  Rahmen  einer gemeinsamen Agrarpo1i-
tik der  EWG  auf die  Einkommensverha1tnisse  der  Landwirtschaft in der Bundesre-
pub1ik Deutschland.  Brussels,  June  1962. 
Grupe,  D.,  Die  Nahrungsmitte1versorgung Deutsch1ands  seit 1925.  Hannover  1957. 
Gutachten des  Ausschusses  fur 1andwirtschaft1iche Marktordnung vom  1.  Marz 
1950.  Reprinted  in:  Wissenschaft1icher Beirat beim  Bundesministerium fur 
Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft und Forsten,  Samme1band  der Gutachten von 1949  bis 
1974.  Hi1trup  1975. 
114 Haase,  K.,  Die  politische Okonomie  der Agrarpolitik.  "Agrarwirtschaft", 
Sonderheft  98,  Hannover  1983. 
Hanau,  A.,  Die  Stellung der  Landwirtschaft  in der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. 
"Agrarwirtschaft",  vol.  7  (1958),  pp.  1-5. 
Hanau,  A.,  Der  Mechanismus  der agrarpolitischen Willensbildung  - dargestellt 
am  Beispiel der Getreidepreisangleichung in der  EWG.  In:  H.-G.  Schlotter 
(ed.),  Die  Willensbildung in der Agrarpolitik.  Munchen,  Bern,  Wien  1971. 
Hanau,  A.  und R.  Plate,  Die  deutsche  landwirtschaftliche Preis- und Marktpoli-
tik im  Zweiten Weltkrieg.  Stuttgart 1975. 
Hartwig,  B.,  and S.  Tangermann,  Legal Aspects  of Restricting Manioc  Trade 
between Thailand and  the  EEC.  Kiel  1987. 
Hartwig,  B.: T.E.  Josling,  and S.  Tangermann,  Design of New  Rules  for Agricul-
ture  in the  GATT.  Prepared,  under  a  co-operative research agreement with 
NCFAP/Resources  for  the  Future,  for  USDA  and USTR.  GOttingen,  Stanford 
September  1989. 
Haushofer,  H.,  Die  deutsche  Landwirtschaft  im  technischen Zeitalter.  Stuttgart 
1963. 
Haushofer,  H.,  Ideengeschichte  der Agrarwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik im 
deutschen Sprachgebiet.  Band  II,  Vom  Ersten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart. 
Munchen,  Bonn,  Wien  1958. 
Heidhues,  T.  and G.  Schmitt,  Zur  Neuorientierung der Agrarpolitik.  Hannover 
1969. 
Heidhues,  T.,  Weltagrarhandel:  Entwicklungslinien,  Bestimmungsfaktoren und 
politische Ordnung.  Manuscript,  GOttingen 1978. 
Henrichsmeyer,  Wilhelm.  "The  Impact of the  Integration of East Germany  on  the 
CAP:  First Calculations  and  Indications,"  EC  1992:  Implications  for World  Food 
and Agricultural Trade.  USDA,  Econ.  Res.  Serv.,  Washington D.C.,  August,  1991. 
Henning,  F.W.,  Landwirtschaft und  landliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland.  Band 
2,  1750  - 1976.  Paderborn 1978. 
Herlemann,  H.-H.,  Vom  Ursprung  des  deutschen Agrarprotektionismus.  In:  E. 
Gehrhardt  and  P.  Kuhlmann  (eds.),  Agrarwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik.  KOln, 
Berlin 1969. 
Hillberg-Seitzinger,  Ann  Marie.  "The  Transition of East German  Agriculture 
into  a  Unified Germany,"  Centrally Planned Agriculture  Report.  Edited by Mark 
)  R.  Lundell,  Vol.  3,  No.6.  USDA,  Econ.  Res.  Servo  Washington  D.C.  Nov/Dec. 
1990. 
Hoffmann,  W.G.,  Das  Wachstum  der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte  des  19. 
Jahrhunderts.  Berlin,  Heidelberg,  New  York  1965. 
115 Jackson,  Marvin.  "One  Year after German  Unification,"  Report  on  Eastern 
Europe.  Vol.  2,  No.  26,  Radio  Free  Europe,  Radio  Liberty:  New  York,  N.Y.  June 
28,  1991. 
Kiechle,  I., Minister of Agriculture,  in a  public  speach during  the  1984  Green 
Week  in Berlin,  "Agra  Europe"  (German  edition),  no.  5/84  (30.01.1984),  Europa 
Nachrichten,  p.  4. 
Kiechle,  I., Weltmarktpreise keine Leitlinie fur  EG-Agrarpreise.  Report  on a 
public  speech by  Kiechle  in "Agra-Europe"  (German  edition),  No.  43/85,  October 
28,  1985,  Kurzmeldungen,  p.10. 
Kiechle,  I., Agrarpolitik im  Zwang  zur Neuausrichtung.  "Berichte uber 
Landwirtschaft",  Vol.  64  (1986),  pp.  515-527. 
Kiechle,  I., Aktuelle Agrarpolitik in Stichworten.  Presse- und 
Informationsste11e  des  Bundesministers  fur  Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten.  Bonn,  November  23,  1988. 
Kiechle,  I.,  Kiechle betont Bedeutung  des  Agrarexports.  Report  on  a  public 
speech by Kiechle  in "Agra-Europe"  (German  edition),  No.  10/89,  March  6,  1989, 
Kurzmeldungen,  p.  23. 
Kittel,  W.,  Auswirkungen der  europaischen Agrarpolitik auf den AuBenhandel. 
Vortrag anlaBlich der  150.  Sitzung des  Wirtschaftsausschusses  fur 
AuBenhande1sfragen,  Bonn,  April  13,  1989. 
Koester,  U.,  and  S.  Tangermann,  A1ternativen der Agrarpo1itik.  Eine  Kosten-Nu-
tzen-Ana1yse  im  Auf  trag des  Bundesministeriums  fur  Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft 
und  Forsten.  Landwirtschaft  - Angewandte  Wissenschaft,  Heft 182. 
Munster-Hietrup  1976. 
Koester,  U.,  The  Redistributional Effects of the  Common  Agricultural Financial 
System.  "European Review  of Agricultural  Economics",  Vol.  4  (1977),  pp. 
321-345. 
Koester,  U.,  et al.,  Disharmonies  in EC  and  US  Agricultural Policy Measures. 
Study prepared for  the  Commission  of the  European Communities.  Luxembourg 
1988. 
Kommission  der Europaischen Gemeinschaften,  Entwicklung der  Produktivitat der 
Landwirtschaft  in der  EWG.  Hausmittei1ungen uber  Landwirtschaft.  Brussel  1969. 
Kommission  der Europaischen Gemeinschaften,  Die  Lage  der Landwirtschaft  in der 
Gemeinschaft,  Bericht 1974,  Tabelle II C/l.7.l. 
Made11,  Mary  Lisa.  "  Agricultural Prospects  Following German  Unification," 
World Agriculture.  USDA,  Econ.  Res.  Serv.,  Washington D.C.,  April,  1991. 
Madell,  Mary  Lisa.  "German Unification:  Implications  for Agriculture,"  Western 
Europe  Agriculture  and Trade  Report.  USDA,  Econ.  Res.  Serv.,  Washington D.C., 
November,  1990. 
116 Magura,  W.,  Chronik der Agrarpolitik und Agrarwirtschaft in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland von 1945-1967.  "Berichte uber Landwirtschaft",  185.  Sonderheft, 
Hamburg,  Berlin 1970. 
McCrone,  G.,  The  Economics  of Subsidizing Agriculture.  London  1962. 
Neidlinger,  G.,  Versuch einer Quantifizierung der Wirkung  unmittelbar 
preiswirksamer AgrarschutzmaBnahmen  in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
"Agrarwirtschaft",  Sonderheft  23,  Hannover  1967. 
OEEC,  Landwirtschaftliche Preis- und  Einkommenspolitik in Europa und 
Nordamerika.  1958. 
Petit, Michel,  Michele  de benedictus,  Denis  Britton,  Martijn de  groot,  Wilhelm 
Henrichsmeyer,  and Francesco  Lechi.  Agricultural Policy formation  in the 
European community:  The  Birth of Milk Quotas.  Amsterdam:  Elsevier Science 
Publishers,  1987. 
Plate,  R.,  E.  Woermann  and  D.  Grupe,  Die  Landwirtschaft  im  Strukturwandel der 
Volkswirtschaft.  "Agrarwirtschaft",  Sonderheft 14,  Hannover  1962. 
Puvogel,  C.,  Der  Weg  zum  Landwirtschaftsgesetz.  Bonn,  Munchen,  Wien  1957. 
Rat von Sachverstindigen fur Umweltfragen,  Umweltprobleme  der Landwirtschaft. 
Stuttgart,  Mainz  1985. 
Reischle,  H.  and  W.  Saure,  Der  Reichsnihrstand.  Aufbau,  Aufgabe  und Bedeutung. 
3rd edition,  Berlin 1940. 
Ritter,  K.,  Art.  Getreidezolle,  Viehzolle.  Handworterbuch  der 
Staatswissenschaften,  Jena  1927. 
Scandizzo,  P.L.,  and D.  Diakosavas,  Instability in the  Terms  of Trade  of 
Primary Commodities,  1900-1982.  FAO  Economic  and Social  Development  Paper No. 
64,  Rome  1987. 
Schauz,  M.,  Die Rolle  der Europiischen Gemeinschaft bei den Verhandlungen uber 
das  International Grains  Agreement  1967.  Diploma  thesis,  Institute of 
Agricultural  Economics,  Gottingen 1989. 
Schmitt,  G.,  Landwirtschaft  in der Marktwirtschaft  - Das  Dilemma  der 
Agrarpolitik.  In:  D.  Cassel,  G.  Gutmann  and H.J.  Thieme  (eds.),  25  Jahre 
Marktwirtschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  Stuttgart 1972. 
Schmitt,  G.,  Vernachlissigte Aspekte  der Anpassungsflexibilitit der 
Landwirtschaft and  ihre agrarpoli  tischen Implikationen.  "Agrarwirtschaft",  Jg. 
32  (1983),  pp.  1-13. 
Schmitt,  G.,  Warum  die Agrarpolitik ist,  wie  sie ist,  und  nicht,  wie  sie sein 
soUte.  "Agrarwirtschaft",  Jg.  33  (1984),  pp.  129-136. 
117 Schmitt,  G.,  and S.  Tangermann,  Regulierte Markte mit extremer 
Fehlentwicklung:  Die  Agrarmarktordnungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
der  EG.  Paper presented at the  1988  annual  conference of the  German  Economics 
Association  (Gesellschaft fur Wirtschafts- und  Sozialwissenschaften  - Verein 
fur Socialpolitik),  Freiburg,  5-7  October  1988. 
Schnittker,  J.A.,  and A.P.  VanStolk,  GATT  Negotiations  and Agricultural Policy 
Reform.  "Choices",  Second Quarter 1989,  pp.  20-25. 
Sohn,  W.  Versorgungssicherung als Argument  in der Agrarpolitik  - Okonomische 
Analyse mit einer empirischen Untersuchung fur  die  Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
und die  Europaische  Gemeinschaft.  Munster-Hiltrup  1984. 
Statistischer Bericht fiber  die Milch- und Molkereiwirtschaft in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und  den  EWG-Mitgliedsstaaten 1974. 
Statistisches Handbuch  Landwirtschaft und  Ernahrung  1956. 
Statistisches Jahrbuch fiber  Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft und Forsten  (StJELF), 
various  issues. 
Stoeckel,  A.,  Intersectoral Effects of the  CAP:  Growth,  Trade  and 
Unemployment.  BAE  Occasional  Paper No.  95.  Canberra  1985. 
Stoeckel,  A.,  Macro-economic  Consequences  of Farm  Support Policies.  Overview 
of an International Program of Studies.  Canberra  1988. 
Strecker,  0.,  Der  Kampf  um  die Agrarzolle  in GroBbritannien  (Anti-Corn-Law 
League)  und  in Deutschland  (1871-1902).  Politische Krafteverteilung und 
Argumente.  "Berichte uber Landwirtschaft",  Bd.  36  (1958),  pp.  869-904. 
Tangermann,  S.,  Entwicklung von Produktion,  Faktoreinsatz und Wertschopfung  in 
der deutschen Landwirtschaft seit 1950/51.  "Agrarwirtschaft",  Jg.  25  (1976), 
pp.  154-164. 
Tangermann,  S.,  Germany's  Role within the  CAP:  Domestic  Problems  in 
International Perspective.  "Journal of Agricultural  Economics",  vol.  30 
(1979),  pp.  241-259. 
Tangermann,  S.,  L'Allemagne et la politique agricole  commune:  theme  et 
variations.  "Economic  Rurale",  no.  149,  Mai-Juin 1982. 
Tangermann,  S.,  What  is different about  European Agricultural  Protectionism. 
"The  World  Economy",  vol.  6  (1983),  no.  1,  March  1,  1983. 
Tangermann,  5.,  T.E.  Josling and  S.R.  Pearson,  Multilateral Negotiations  on 
Farm  Support Levels. "World  Economy",  Vol.  10  (1987),  pp.  265-281. 
Tangermann,  S.,  Effects of a  50  % PSE  Cut  in the  EC.  Paper drafted in 
preparation of the  1988  Symposium  of the  International Agricultural Trade 
Research  Consortium  on  "Bringing Agriculture  into  the  GATT.  Annapolis,  19-20 
August  1988. 
118 , 
Tangermann,  S.,  Evaluation of Current CAP  Developments.  Paper for  the  European 
Agricultural Outlook Conference,  sponsored by AgraEurope  (London)  Ltd.  London, 
22-23  February 1989a. 
Tangermann,  S.,  Approaches  to  Export Subsidies:  Disciplines for  Export 
Subsidies  in Primary and Non-Primary  Products.  Paper  prepared for  the Meeting 
on  "Subsidies  and  Countervailing Measures:  Critical Issues  Faced in the 
Uruguay  Round"  convened by  the  Centre  for Applied Studies  in International 
Negotiations.  Montreux,  13-14  February 1989b. 
Tangermann,  S.,  Strengthening Market Orientation of Agricultural Policies and 
the  Possible Role  of Direct Support.  Background  Paper for  the  FAO  Committe  on 
Commodity  Problems.  Gottingen,  February 1989c. 
Tangermann,  S.,  Die Auswirkung der Vereinigung auf die Landwirtschaft 
Gesamtdeutschlands:  Markt  und Absatz.  Vortag auf der  gemeinsamen 
Hochschultagung der  landwirtschaftskammer Hannover  und  der 
Landwirtschaftlichen Fakultat der Georg-August-universitat Gottingen. 
Hannover,  Februray 19,  1991. 
Teichmann,  U.,  Die  Politik der Agrarpreisstutzung.  Ko1n-Deutz  1955,  pp.  194 
and  205. 
Thoroe,  C.,  and S.  Tangermann,  Towards  More  National Responsibility in the 
CAP.  Paper prepared for an International Workshop  in Vila Real,  Portugal,  May 
1987. 
Tracy,  M.,  Agriculture  in Western  Europe.  2nd  edition,  London  1988. 
USDA/ERS,  Estimates  of Producer  and  Consumer  Subsidy Equivalents.  Government 
Intervention in Agriculture,  1982-86.  Washington,  D.C.,  April  1988. 
Weber,  W.,  Chronik der deutschen Agrarpolitik 1914-1932.  Edited by 
Friedrich-List-Gesellschaft,  Berlin 1932. 
Winterling,  H.-J.,  Selbstbeschrankungsabkommen  im  internationalen Agrarhandel 
- Eine  qualitative sowie  quantitative Analyse  ihrer Bedeutung und Wirkungen  am 
Beispiel des  Tapiokaabkommens  zwischen der  Europaischen Gemeinschaft und 
Thailand.  "Agrarwirtschaft",  Sonderheft  111.  Frankfurt  1986. 
Winterling,  H.-J.,  and S.  Tangermann,  Economic  Implications  of Restricting 
Manioc  Trade between Thailand and  the  EEC.  Kie1  1987. 
Winters,  L.A.,  The  So-Called  "Non-Economic"  Objectives of Agricultural  Policy. 
OECD  document  CPE/WP1(88)3,  Paris,  February 17,  1988. 
Wissenschaft1icher Beirat beim  Bundesministerium fur  Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft 
und  Forsten,  Agrarsozia1po1itik  - Situation und  Reformvorsch1age. 
Landwirtschaft  - Angewandte  Wissenschaft,  Heft  233.  Munster-Hi1trup  1979. 
119 Wissenschaft1icher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fur  Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten,  Landwirtschaft1iche  Einkommenspo1itik.  Angewandte  Wissenschaft, 
Heft  267.  Munster-Hi1trup  1982. 
Wissenschaft1icher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fur  Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten,  BestandsgroBenprob1eme.  Landwirtschaft  - Angewandte  Wissenschaft, 
Heft  286.  Munster-Hi1trup  1983. 
Wissenschaft1icher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fur  E  rnah  rung ,  Landwirtschaft 
und  Forsten,  Zum  Problem der  importierten Kraftfuttermitte1 in der 
Europaischen Gemeinschaft.  Munster-Hi1trup  1985. 
Wissenschaft1icher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fur  Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten,  Aktue11e  Fragen der Ordnung  des  internationa1en Agrarhande1s. 
Munster-Hi1trup  1988. 
Wissenschaft1icher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fur  Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft 
und  Forsten,  F1ankierende MaBnahmen  in Erganzung einer Agrarpreispo1itik des 
"mittleren Weges".  Munster-Hi1trup  1989. 
Witzke,  H.  v.,  Zur Aussagefahigkeit  inter- und  intrasektora1er 
Einkommensverg1eiche  in den Agrarberichten.  "Agrarwirtschaft",  Jg.  24  (1975), 
pp.  173-180. 
Witzke,  H.  v.,  Persone11e  Einkommensvertei1ung  in der Landwirtschaft und 











October  15,  1991 
INTERNATIONAL  AGRICULTURAL  TRADE  RESEARCH  CONSORTIUM* 
Working  Papers  Series 
Do  Macroeconomic Variables 
Affect the Ag  Trade 
Sector?  An  Elasticities 
Analysis 
Basic  Economics  of an 
Export  Bonus  Scheme 
Risk Aversion in a  Dynamic 
Trading Game 
An  Econometric Model  of 
the  European  Economic 
Community's  Wheat  Sector 
Targeted Ag  Export 
Subsidies  and Social 
Welfare 
Optimum  Tariffs  in a 
Distorted Economy:  An 
Application to U.S. 
Agriculture 
Estimating Gains  from  Less 
Distorted Ag  Trade 
Comparative  Advantage, 
Competitive Advantage,  and 
U.S.  Agricultural Trade 
Author(s) 
McCalla,  Alex 
Pick,  Daniel 
Houck,  James 
Karp,  Larry 
de  Gorter,  Harry 
Meilke,  Karl 
Abbott,  Philip 
Paarlberg,  Philip 
Sharples,  Jerry 
Karp,  Larry 
Beghin,  John 
Sharples,  Jerry 
White,  Kelley 
121 
Send correspondence  or 
reguests  for  copies  to: 
Dr  Alex McCalla 
Dept of Ag  Econ 
U of California 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  James  Houck 
Dept of Ag  Econ 
U of Minnesota 
St Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Larry Karp 
Dept  of Ag  & Resource 
Econ/U  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr  Karl Meilke 
Dept of Ag  Econ 
U of Guelph 
Guelph,  Ontario 
CANADA  N1J  lS  1 
Dr  Philip Abbott 
Dept  of Ag  Econ 
Purdue University 
W Lafayette,  IN  47907 
Dr  Larry Karp 
Dept of Ag  & Resource 
Econ/U  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr  Jerry Sharples 
USDA/ERS/IED/ETP 
628f NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr  Kelley White 
USDA/ERS/IED 
732  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York  Ave  NW 










on  Farm  Support Levels: 
The  Role  of PSEs 
The  Effect of Protection 
and  Exchange  Rate  Policies 
on Agricultural Trade: 
Implications for Argentina, 
Brazil,  and Mexico 
Deficits  and Agriculture: 
An  Alternative Parable 
An  Analysis  of Canadian 
Demand  for  Imported 
Tomatoes:  One  Market  or 
Many? 
Japanese  Beef Policy and 
GATT  Negotiations:  An 
Analysis  of Reducing 
Assistance  to Beef Producers 
Grain Markets  and  the 
United States:  Trade  Wars, 
Export  Subsidies,  and 
Price Rivalry 
Agricultural Trade 




Agriculture  in the Uruguay 
Round:  What  the  North 
Might Miss 
Author(s) 
Tangermann,  Stefan 
Josling,  Tim 
Pearson,  Scott 
Krissoff,  Barry 
Ballenger,  Nicole 
Just,  Richard 
Chambers,  Robert 
Darko-Mensah,  Kwame 
Prentice,  Barry 
Wahl,  Thomas 
Hayes,  Dermot 
Williams,  Gary 
Houck,  James 
Krissoff,  Barry 
Ballenger,  Nicole 
Mabbs-Zeno,  Carl 
Ballenger,  Nicole 
Send correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr  Tim  Josling 
Food Research Institute 
Stanford University 
Stanford,  CA  94305 
Dr  Barry Krissoff 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
624  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York Ave  NW 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr  Robert  Chambers 
Dept  of Ag  & Resource 
Economics 
Univ of Maryland 
College  Park,  MD  20742 
Dr  Barry Prentice 
Dept  of Ag  Econ & 
Farm  Mgmt 
University of Manitoba 
Winnipeg,  Manitoba 
CANADA  R3T  2N2 
Dr  Dermot  Hayes 
Dept of Economics 
Meat  Export Research 
Center 
Iowa State University 
Ames,  IA'  50011 
Dr  James  Houck 
Dept of Ag  Econ 
Univ of Minnesota 
St Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Barry Krissoff 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
624  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York Ave  NW 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr  Nicole Ballenger 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
624  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York Ave  NW 













Import  Demand  Models 
Theory and Applications 
Determinants  of U.S. 
Wheat  Producer Support 
Price:  A Time  Series 
Analysis  . 
Effect of Sugar Price 
Policy on U.S.  Imports 
of Processed Sugar-
containing Foods 
Market  Effects of 
In-Kind Subsidies 
A Comparison of Tariffs 
and Quotas  in a 
Strategic Setting 
Targeted and Global 
Export  Subsidies  and 
Welfare  Impacts 
Who  Determines  Farm 
Programs?  Agribusiness 
and  the Making  of Farm 
Policy 
Report of ESCOP  Subcom-
mittee  on Domestic  and 
International Markets 
and Policy 
Does  Arbitraging Matter? 




Carter,  Colin 
Green,  Richard 
Pick,  Daniel 
von Witzke,  Harald 
Jabara,  Cathy 
Houck,  James 
Karp,  Larry 
Bohman,  Mary 
Carter,  Colin 
Dortman,  Jeffrey 
Alston,  Julian 
Carter,  Colin 
Wholgenant,  M. 
Abbott,  P.C. 
Johnson,  D.G. 
Johnson,  R.S. 
Meyers,  W.H. 
Rossmiller,  G.E. 
White,  T.K. 
McCalla,  A.F. 
Anania,  Giovanni 
McCalla,  Alex 
123 
Send correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr  Colin Carter 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
Univ of California 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Harald von Witzke 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
Univ of Minnesota 
St Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Cathy Jabara 
Office of Econ  Policy 
U.S.  Treasury Dept 
15th & Pennsylvania Ave  NW 
Washington,  DC  20220 
Dr  James  Houck 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
University of Minnesota 
St Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Larry Karp 
Dept  of Ag  & Resource 
Econ/U  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr  Colin Carter 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
U of California,  Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Colin Carter 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
U of California,  Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Alex McCalla 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
U of California-Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Alex McCalla 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
U of California-Davis 










Export  Supply and Import 
Demand  Elasticities in the 
Japanese Textile Industry: 
A Production Theory Approach 
The  Welfare  Effects of 
Imperfect Harmonization of 
Trade  and Industrial Policy 
Report of the Task Force 
on Tariffication and 
Rebalancing 
Report of the Task Force 
on Reinstrumentation of 
Agricultural Policies 
Report of the Task Force 
on The  Aggregate Measure 
of Support:  Potential Use 
by  GATT  for Agriculture 
Agricultural Policy 
Adjustments  in East Asia: 
The  Korean Rice  Economy  . 
Background Papers  for 
Report of the Task Force 
on The  Aggregate Measure 
of Support:  Potential 
Use  by  GATT  for Agriculture 
Optimal  Trade  Policies 
for  a  Developing Country 
Under Uncertainty 
Report of the  Task  Force 
on  The  Comprehensive 
Proposals  for Negotiations 
in Agriculture 
Author(s) 
Pick,  Daniel 
Park,  Timothy 
Gatsios,  K. 
Karp,  Larry 
Josling,  Tim 
Chair 
Magiera,  Stephen 
Chair 
Rossmiller,  G.E. 
Chair 
Kwon,  Yong  Dae 
Yamauchi,  Hiroshi 
Rossmiller,  G.E. 
Chair 
Choi,  E.  Kwan 
Lapan,  Harvey  E. 
Josling,  Tim 
Chair 
124 
Send correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Daniel  Pick 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York Ave.  N.W. 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr.  Larry Karp 
Dept.  of Ag  & Resource 
Econ/U  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr.  Timothy Josling 
Food Research Institute 
Stanford University 
Stanford,  CA  94305-6084 
Stephen L.  Magiera 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York Ave.,  Rm  624 
Washington,  D.C.  20005-4788 
Dr.  G.  Edward  Rossmiller 
Resources  for  the  Future 
Nat'l Ctr for  Food/Ag  Policy 
1616  P  Street N.W. 
Washington,  D.C.  20036 
Dr.  Hiroshi Yamauchi 
Dept.  of Ag  & Res.  Econ. 
University of Hawaii 
3050  Maile  Way 
Gilmore Hall 
Honolulu,  Hawaii  96822 
Dr.  G.  Edward  Rossmiller 
Resources  for  the  Future 
Nat'l Ctr for  Food/Ag  Policy 
1616  P  Street N.W. 
Washington,  D.C.  20036 
Dr.  E.  Kwan  Choi 
Dept.  of Economics 
Iowa  State University 
Ames,  Iowa  50011 
Dr.  Timothy Josling 
Food  Research  Institute 
Stanford University 









Uncertainty,  Price 
Stabilization & Welfare 
Politically Acceptable 
Trade  Compromises  Between 
The  EC  and The  US:  A 
Game  Theory Approach 
Agricultural Policies 
and  the  GATT:  Reconciling 
Protection,  Support  and 
Distortion 
Report of the  Task Force 
on Reviving  the  GATT 
Negotiations  in Agriculture 
Economic  Impacts  of the 
U.S.  Honey  Support  Program 
on  the  Canadian Honey  Trade 
and Producer Prices 
U.S.  Export Subsidies  in 
Wheat:  Strategic Trade 
Policy or art  Expensive 
Beggar-My-Neighbor Tatic? 
The  Impact of Real 
Exchange  Rate Misalignment 
and Instability on 
Macroeconomic  Performance 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Global  Grain Stocks  and 
World Market Stability 
Revisited 
Author(s) 
Choi,  E.  Ewan 
Johnson,  Stanley 
Johnson,  Martin 
Mahe,  Louis 
Roe,  Terry 
de  Gorter,  Harry 
Harvey,  David R. 
Send correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr.  E.  Kwan  Choi 
Dept.  of Economics 
Iowa  State University 
Ames,  IA  50011 
Dr.  Terry Roe 
Dept"  of Ag  &  Applied Econ 
1994  Buford Avenue 
University of Minnesota 
St.  Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr.  Harry  de  Gorter 
Dept.  of Ag  Economics 
Cornell University 
Ithaca,  NY  14853 
Trade Update  Notes  Dr.  Maury  E.  Bredah1 
Center for  International 
Prentice,  Barry 
Darko,  Kwame 
Anania,  Giovanni 
Bohman,  Mary 
Colin,  Carter A. 
Ghura,  Dhaneshwar 
Grennes,  Thomas  J. 
Martinez,  Steve 
Sharples,  Jerry 
125 
Trade  Expansion 
200  Mumford  Hall 
Missouri University 
Columbia,  MO  65211 
Dr.  Barry E.  Prentice 
University of Manitoba 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
& Farm  Management 
Winnipeg,  Manitoba 
R3T  2N2  CANADA 
Dr.  Colin Carter 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
Univ.  California-Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr.  Thomas  J.  Grennes 
Dept of Economics 
& Business 
North Carolina State Univ 
P.O.  Box  8109 
Raleigh,  NC  27695-8109 
Steve Martinez 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York Ave  NW 
Room  624 





The  Export  Enhancement 
Program:  Prospects Under 
the  Food,  Agriculture, 
Conservation,  and Trade 
Act of 1990 
European  Economic 
Integration and  the 
Consequences  for  U.S. 
AgriculturE! 
Agricultural Policymaking 
in Germany:  Implications 
for  the  German  Position 
in Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations 
Partial Reform of World 
Rice  Trade:  Implications 
for  the U.S.  Rice  Sector 
Author(s) 
Haley,  Stephen L. 
Gleckler,  James 
Koopman,  Bob 
Tweeten,  Luther 
Send correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr.  Stephen L.  Haley 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
& Agribusiness 
Louisiana State University 
101  Ag  Admin  Bldg 
Baton Rouge,  LA  70803-5604 
Luther Tweeten 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
& Rural  Sociology 
Ohio  State  Universi~y 
2120  Fyffe Road 
Columbus,  OH  43210-1099 
Tangermann,  Stefan David Kelch 
Kelch,  David  ATAD/ERSjUSDA 
Haley,  Stephen 
1301  New  York Ave  NW 
Room  624 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Stephen L.  Haley 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
& Agribusiness 
Louisiana State University 
101  Ag  Administration Bldg 
Baton Rouge,  LA  70803 
*The  International Agricultural Trade  Research  Consortium is an informal 
association of university and  government  economists  interested in agricultural 
trade.  Its purpose  is  to  foster  interaction,  improve  research capacity and  to 
focus  on relevant trade policy issues.  It is financed by  the USDA,  ERS  and  FAS, 
Agriculture  Canada  and  the participating institutions. 
The  IATRC  Working  Paper  Series provides members  an opportunity to circulate their 
work at the  advanced draft stage  through limited distribution within the  research 
and analysis  community.  The  IATRC  takes  no  political positions or responsibility 
for  the  accuracy of the  data or validity of the  conclusions presented by working 
paper  authors.  Further,  policy recommendations  and opinions  expressed by  the 
authors  do  not necessarily reflect those  of the  IATRC. 
Correspondence  or requests  for copies  of working papers  should be  addressed to  the 
authors  at the  addresses  listed above. 
A current list of  IATRC  publications  is available  from: 
Laura Bipes,  Administrative Director 
Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics 
University of Minnesota 
231g  Classroom Office  Building 
1994  Buford Ave 
St.  Paul,  MN  55108 
U.S.A. 
126 